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ABSTRACT 
 
          The US military’s culture, structure, and process for providing advice to the 
president and his national security decision-making team are flawed due to the 
marginalization of unconventional warfare (UW) expertise -- UW is the military’s 
doctrinal term for support to resistance activities and movements. This marginalization 
results in inadequate consideration for applying UW as a strategic option for the nation.   
          Through a qualitative methods case study analysis utilizing macro- and micro-
level process-tracing with a conceptual framework based on Niklas Luhmann’s Systems 
Theory, the author shows that viable and acceptable resistance elements existed in 
Syria in March 2011 to June 2014 and that the conventional US military failed to 
recognize this development, adequately analyze its implications, and craft a strategic 
UW option for the national security decision-makers to consider.   
          This finding is significant in that it exposes a deficiency in the US military’s 
culture, structure and process that results in an incomplete and insufficient menu of 
military options for the president.  If these cultural, structural, and procedural flaws are 
left unaddressed, the US is likely to repeat this strategic error in the future.  
          The author identifies specific recommendations for national security practitioners; 
however, the overarching theme is the need to change the institutional culture and the 
old structures of the conventional military to be able to provide the president a more 
complete, comprehensive, and creative menu of options to consider when assessing 
and responding to violent political crises short of conventional war. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“What often appears to be a personality-driven 
or political debate between the commander-in-
chief and his strong-minded military advisors 
actually has deeper institutional and cultural 
roots.  The ‘professional’ military officer has 
certain expectations about how to craft ‘best 
military advice’ for the president that are deeply 
embedded into the organizational culture and 
in fact hard-wired into the institutionalized and 
incredibly detailed military planning process…. 
Ultimately, the output of the military’s planning 
process fails to deliver the type of nuanced 
advice in the form of creative options that the 
president needs.” 
     --Janine Davidson, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Plans from 2009-
20121 
 
 
 
 The Syrian rebellion in the period of March 2011 to June 2014 can be viewed on 
three distinct levels with one unifying theme that penetrates and links all three. 
 The first level is geostrategic.  During this period, an opportunity existed to 
disrupt the strategic partnership of Iran, Syria, and Lebanese Hizballah by supporting 
non-terrorist resistance elements within Syria that sought to overthrow the Bashar al-
Assad regime and, by implication, break the weapons supply routes between Iran and 																																																								1	Janine Davidson, “The Contemporary Presidency: Civil-Military Friction and 
Presidential Decision Making: Explaining the Broken Dialogue”, Presidential Studies 
Quarterly, 43 no.1, March 2013, 129. 
	 2 
Lebanese Hizballah.2  Moreover, as the rebellion evolved into a civil war, the existence 
of significant chemical weapons – and their use by the Assad regime – compounded the 
geostrategic and realism view to this crisis. 
 The second level is counterterrorism.  During this same period, what began as a 
grassroots, non-terrorist, resistance movement quickly became violent.  During the latter 
portions of this time frame, the terrorist groups of al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria (ISIS) grew in strength and capabilities at the expense of the non-terrorist 
resistance elements.  With the fall of Mosul in June 2014, ISIS had established their 
caliphate in western and northern Iraq plus eastern Syria. 
 The third level is humanitarian.  The rebellion morphed into a civil war with 
foreign intervention by Iran, Iranian-sponsored Shia militias from Iraq, Lebanese 
Hizballah, and Russia.  By 2016 several hundred thousand people had died and ten 
million others were refugees or internally displaced.3   
 One unifying theme penetrates and links all three of these levels: the lack of an 
effective strategic response from the United States.   
 What was the US response?  This dissertation will show a very activity engaged 
and committed US State Department.  The dissertation will also show feckless US 
military planning and options.  Within the National Security Council and interagency 
process, this divergence became apparent to the key participants.   
																																																								2	For a more thorough examination of this strategic partnership between Iran, Syria, and 
Hizballah, see Mohsen Milani, “Why Tehran Won’t Abandon Assad(ism),” The 
Washington Quarterly 36:4 (Fall 2013): 79-93. 3	Michael E. O’Hanlon, “Deconstructing Syria: A Confederal Approach,” published 
September 16, 2016, accessed November 4, 2016, 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/deconstructing-syria-a-confederal-approach/	
	 3 
 The president recognized that the situation in Syria was not a problem that the 
US military could solve by itself.  He also did not want to involve the US in another 
conventional military invasion of another country; Afghanistan and Iraq were enough.  
The president knew that working with the local Sunni population was the best way to 
both fight the Islamic State and unseat the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad – or to at 
least coerce the regime to transition the government and hold free elections.4  Yet no 
such option for providing military support to the Syrian resistance was provided by the 
US military through the National Security Council to the president.  With a conventional 
military invasion off the table, the US military could muster no sufficient options to 
satisfy the president.  Limited airstrikes, maritime interdiction, refugee safe zones, and 
secured humanitarian corridors would not be effective in driving Assad from office, 
defeating ISIS, or in resolving the humanitarian crisis.  Yet those were the only military 
options provided to the president.5  
 As Janine Davidson, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans from 
2009-2012 wrote, “Ultimately, the output of the military’s planning process fails to deliver 
the type of nuanced advice in the form of creative options that the president needs.”6 
 Senior leaders of the US military – a very conventional force -- complained that 
no one could satisfactorily identify the various disjointed elements of the Syrian 
																																																								4	Interview with President Barack Obama by Steve Kroft, 60 Minutes, which aired 
October 11, 2015 and was accessed February 5, 2016, 
http://cbsnews.com/news/president-obama-60-minutes-syria-isis-2016-presidential-
race. 5	The Situation in Syria, Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services United 
States Senate, 100th Congress, 2nd session (March 7, 2012), accessed September 23, 
2014, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsy/pkg/CHRG-112shrg76271/html/CHRG-
112shrg7621.htm. 6	Janine Davidson, “The Contemporary Presidency”, 129. 
	 4 
resistance, that is, the resistance did not present itself in an organized form from which 
a central military leadership could be recognized and partnered with to receive US 
weapons, ammunition, and training.  Yet at the very same time, the US ambassador in 
Damascus was training, advising, assisting, and equipping 1,500 Syrian political 
activists – inside Syria, not expatriates in Europe – to build a network of activism that 
consisted of strengthening local councils, civil society groups, free media, lawyers’ 
union, and private radio stations.7   
 As this dissertation will show, viable and acceptable resistance elements did 
exist.  The State Department was actively working with them – the leaders were known.  
Moreover, using data and analysis published contemporary to this March 2011 to June 
2014 period, even civilian research institutes and academics knew that a viable and 
acceptable Syrian opposition existed.  Indeed, some research institutions and non-
governmental organizations were communicating with these resistance force leaders. 
 This dissertation will show that the US military did not provide any viable options 
to directly support this resistance movement during this critical period of March 2011 to 
June 2014. 
 I do not argue that supporting the resistance would have “won the war” in Syria.  
Rather, this dissertation is about strategic negligence; the negligence to provide a full 
menu of military options to the National Security Council (NSC) principals, the president 
included. 
 The questions become:  Why and how does the best military in the history of the 
world get to the point were it can provide only conventional military options, and when 																																																								7	US Policy Toward Syria. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations United 
States Senate. 113th Congress, April 11, 2013, 11. 
	 5 
the conventional options do not fit, the US military is unable to provide any useful and 
creative options, despite the subject of “unconventional warfare” or “military support to 
resistance activities” being part of the US Army’s doctrinal mission set for decades?8  
How and why does this happen?  Answering these questions is the thrust of this 
dissertation.  
 The US military is obligated by law to provide the president its “best military 
advice”.  That should include a complete menu of options, not just those constrained to 
only conventional options like a modern day Maginot Line.9 
 To more formally introduce this dissertation, I will preview the research question, 
hypothesis, conceptual or theoretical framework, key questions, and show how this 
dissertation adds to the existing body of knowledge.  I conclude this introduction with a 
brief preview of the chapters. 
 The research question asks: Why and how did the US military miss the 
opportunity to provide military support to a viable and acceptable Syrian resistance in 
the March 2011 to June 2014 period? 
 My hypothesis is that the US military’s culture, structure, and process for 
providing advice to the president and his national security decision-making team are 
flawed due to the marginalization of unconventional warfare (UW) expertise.  By 																																																								8	The terms “unconventional warfare” (UW) and “military support to resistance activities” 
will be fully defined in chapter one.  For now, suffice it to say that UW is the military’s 
doctrinal term for “military support to resistance activities” and that the terms are 
essentially synonymous.   9	The Maginot Line was an extensive and fortified defensive belt built by the French 
after World War I to deter, defend, and defeat another German invasion.  However, 
when the Germans invaded again in World War II, they simply bypassed this extensive 
and expensive defensive system with a flanking attack through Belgium.  Since then the 
term Maginot Line has referred to strategies or investments based on the experience of 
the previous war that are not be applicable to the next conflict.   
	 6 
organizational structure and function – rooted in organizational culture – the UW experts 
are literally assigned to organizations that exercise little to no role in major operational 
decision-making; hence, the marginalization.  The result is inadequate consideration for 
applying UW as a strategic option for the nation. 
 The conceptual framework for this dissertation is based on Niklas Luhmann’s 
Systems Theory that addresses complexity and a system or organization’s response to 
such challenges.  This will be reviewed in much more detail in chapters one and two, 
but for now suffice it to say that the organizational or institutional biases within the 
conventional US military precluded or at least obstructed any serious considerations for 
strategic options to support the Syrian resistance movement.  
 To be sure, there are plausible rival hypotheses, and these are addressed within 
this dissertation.  The first rival hypothesis is the president provided guidance that pre-
empted any consideration of military support to the resistance, or unconventional 
warfare using the military’s doctrinal term.  A variant to this first rival hypothesis 
specifically highlights the then-secret negotiations with the Iranians over their nuclear 
development program as the rationale for the president to direct his defense and military 
leaders to not consider any such military option for Syria that could arguably derail 
these negotiations with Iran.  The second rival hypothesis states that the Department of 
Defense (DoD) leaders themselves deliberately suppressed some US options, perhaps 
due to either a desire to gather and preserve military resources in anticipation of a 
possible war with Iran or out of a more general war-weariness after years of fighting in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  This dissertation shows where the evidence supports or counters 
these competing hypotheses.  
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 I show in this dissertation that the primary hypothesis is correct – this is indeed 
where, on balance, the preponderance of the evidence exists.  However, there are still, 
classified papers, briefings, and studies that could provide more evidence to any of 
these hypotheses.  Over time, these materials will be declassified and future 
researchers can review this dissertation’s findings in that new light.  Moreover, the new 
evidence may show that although the rival hypotheses were not valid, they contained 
elements of fact and analysis that would add to a richer understanding of the actual 
causal mechanisms inherent in the original hypothesis.  To this end, I anxiously await 
the future researchers’ works.   
 The three key questions inherent in the investigation that links the research 
question to the hypothesis and conclusions are: 
• Was there a viable and acceptable resistance force in Syria in the period 
March 2011 to June 2014? 
• If so, why and how did the US miss the opportunity to train, advise, and equip 
them? 
• What are the resulting recommendations for national security practitioners? 
 
 This dissertation adds to the existing body of knowledge by exposing a deficiency 
in the military’s culture, structure, and process for providing advice to the president and 
his national security decision-making team.  This deficiency is a cultural, structural, and 
process flaw that marginalizes the military’s expertise associated with supporting 
resistance movements.  As the early years of the Syrian rebellion demonstrated, there 
are crises, contingencies, and events in the world that are not conducive to being solved 
	 8 
by conventional military operations.  At the same time, doing nothing is often not a good 
option either.  More to the point, however, the US military has a niche capability within 
its small Special Forces ranks that is trained, equipped, and professionalized with a 
career path to plan, coordinate, and execute such options.  But by structure, process, 
and institutional culture of the conventional military, this expertise is marginalized. Thus, 
this dissertation provides policy-relevant research that illuminates this deficiency and, by 
implication, argues for its remedy. 
 Chapter one provides the research design for the dissertation.  At its core, this is 
a qualitative methods single case study with macro- and micro-level process-tracing.  
The conceptual framework is based on Niklas Luhmann’s Systems Theory that 
addresses complexity and an organization’s responses to such challenges.  Primary 
source evidence included Congressional testimonies and memoirs from the key 
participants in the decision-making, public statements from the White House and State 
Department, plus interviews with senior leaders who participated in the decision-making 
or were intimately familiar with the military’s culture, structure, and process concerning 
unconventional warfare. 
 Chapter two provides the literature review that examines the previous academic 
research that underpins the theoretical and conceptual framework of the dissertation. 
 Chapter three addresses the first of the three key questions: Was there a viable 
and acceptable non-terrorist resistance force in Syria during the period March 2011 to 
June 2014?  Using source material contemporary to that period, including photos, 
videos, and social media coupled with analysis graphically displayed on maps, the 
reader can clearly see that such a resistance force existed.  More significantly, any 
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military staff officer or intelligence analyst could and should have seen this same 
information during this period. 
 Chapter four addresses the second of the three key questions: Why and how did 
the US miss the opportunity to train, advise, and equip this resistance?  I first review the 
evolving US policy and strategy at the time, and then process-trace the key national 
security decision-making concerning the military options.  I then more directly address 
the questions of how and why the US made its decisions.  This analysis is based on 
Luhmann’s Systems Theory. To answer the “how” portion I used a systems theory 
approach to examine the military decision-making process for providing inputs to the 
National Security Council (NSC).  This approach revealed the inherent flaws for 
developing military support to resistance activities – also known as “unconventional 
warfare” options by marginalizing such experts from the key operational positions in the 
decision-making.  To answer the “why” portion, I showed that the conventional senior 
military leaders, in accordance with Luhmann’s theory, are prone to see and react to 
developments in their environments that make sense only from their autopoiesis-based 
frame of reference.  In other words, they are biased towards providing conventional 
warfare solutions. 
 The third of the three key questions concerns the resulting recommendations for 
national security practitioners, but before I address that final question I consider the 
counter-arguments, plausible rival hypotheses, and synthesize those results.  For if the 
analysis that answers the first two questions is faulty, the third question becomes 
spurious.  So in chapter five I present the counter-arguments, an analysis of the 
plausible rival hypotheses (showing where and how well the evidence supports each), 
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and then synthesize the results.  The synthesis reveals and highlights a unique factor 
concerning the role of “contact teams” to assess the resistance force.  The significance 
of this factor becomes a driving force in analyzing the recommendations of this study for 
national security practitioners. 
 Chapter six addresses these recommendations, which focus on cultural, 
structural, and process changes to address the deficiencies highlighted in chapter four.  
The recommendations extend beyond this linear thinking, however, to more holistically 
address the strategic nature of this issue; for example, what considerations should be 
given to expanding the strategic partnership between the State Department, CIA, the 
US Special Operations Command, and the private sector concerning joint planning, 
coordination, and execution of support to resistance activities?  
 In summary, the US military’s culture, structure, and process for providing advice 
to the president and his national security decision-making team are flawed due to the 
marginalization of its own unconventional warfare -- or military support to resistance 
activities -- expertise.  This marginalization results in inadequate consideration for 
applying unconventional warfare as a strategic option for the nation.  If these cultural, 
structural, and procedural flaws are left unaddressed, the US is likely to repeat this 
strategic error in the future.   
 The research design that provides the basis for this dissertation is the subject of 
the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER ONE:  
RESEARCH DESIGN10 
 
 
--“What these studies show is a decline in …’old 
war’ – that is to say, war involving states in which 
battle is the decisive encounter…. New wars 
involve networks of state and non-state actors and 
most violence is directed against civilians….New 
wars…are wars in which the difference between 
internal and external is blurred; they are both 
global and local and they are different both from 
classic inter-state wars and classic civil wars. 
--“In the context of spending cuts, there is a 
tendency for governments to cut the very 
capabilities most suitable for addressing new wars 
and to protect their capabilities for fighting old 
wars. 
--“It turned out to be very difficult to change the 
culture of the (US) military.” 
-----Mary Kaldor, New War Theory11 
 
 
 
 At its core, this dissertation concerns the US military’s decision-making process 
and its inability to effectively generate strategic options for the national security 
decision-makers that involve support to resistance movements.  The early years of the 
Syrian rebellion provide the venue or the case for this analysis.  Given the unit of 
																																																								10	Portions of this chapter appeared in earlier papers submitted during coursework at the 
University of South Florida.  Specifically, POS 6933 PhD Capstone in the Spring 
Semester of 2017 and POS 6707 Qualitative Methods in the Fall Semester 2016. 11	Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, 3rd ed., 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), vi-vii. 
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analysis as the US military’s decision-making process concerning supporting to 
resistance elements, with Syria as the case, this dissertation illuminates how exactly 
this decision-making structure, process, and culture failed to work effectively by 
marginalizing expertise in supporting resistance activities.  This can best be described 
as a “pathway case” (Gerring, 2007) where causal effects can be isolated from other 
potentially confounding factors indicating its uniquely penetrating insight into causal 
mechanisms.12  
 Acknowledging this focus, I utilize the qualitative methods technique of a single 
case study with macro- and micro-level process-tracing.  Primary source evidence 
included Congressional testimonies and memoirs from the key participants in the 
decision-making, public statements from the White House and State Department, plus 
interviews with senior leaders participating in the decision-making or who were 
intimately familiar with the military’s structure, process, and culture concerning support 
to resistance movements. 
 The major sections of this chapter are: 
• Research question and unit of analysis 
• Scope and frame 
• Hypothesis 
• Conceptual framework 
• Substantive focus 
• Concepts, definitions, and variables 
• Plausible rival hypotheses 																																																								12	John Gerring, “Is there a (Viable) Crucial-Case Method?” Comparative Political 
Studies Vol 40 Number 3, March 2007, Sage Publications, 238-239. 
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• The three key questions 
• Methodology 
• Data collection plan 
• The contribution of the dissertation 
 
Research Question and Unit of Analysis 
 The research question is: Why and how did the US military miss the opportunity 
to provide military support to viable and acceptable Syrian resistance elements in the 
March 2011 – June 2014 period? 
 The unit of analysis concerns the US military’s decision-making structure, 
process, culture, and recommendations to the National Security Council (NSC) 
concerning support to resistance activities. 
 
Scope and Frame 
 This dissertation is scoped and framed both temporally and functionally.  The 
time period of March 2011 to June 2014 corresponds to the outbreak of the rebellion in 
Daraa in March 2011 and concludes when the US administration finally decided to 
provide military support to the resistance in June 2014.  The fall of Mosul to the Islamic 
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) also occurred in June 2014, which finally triggered the US 
decision to become more militarily active in the region.    
 Functionally, this dissertation is limited to the US military’s support to the 
resistance.  The dissertation will not review or discuss any Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) involvement with resistance elements that may or may not have been occurring, 
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with the exception of the September 2012 NSC meeting where President Obama 
rejected a recommendation for the CIA to arm the resistance, only to reverse his 
decision the following year, as documented in the memoirs of Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta.  
 
Hypothesis:  
 The US military’s culture, structure, and process for providing advice to the 
president and his national security decision-making team are flawed due to the 
marginalization of unconventional warfare expertise.  This marginalization results in 
inadequate consideration for applying unconventional warfare as a strategic option for 
the nation. 
 
Conceptual Framework 
 This dissertation concerns the US military’s culture, structure, and decision-
making process and its inability to generate strategic options for the national security 
decision-makers that involve support to resistance movements.  Consequently, the 
theoretical or conceptual framework of this dissertation concerns national security 
decision-making -- not resistance movements and not revolutions.   More broadly, this 
concerns systems theory.  The core theoretical basis for this study is Niklas Luhmann’s 
Systems Theory (Luhmann, 2002) that recognizes and addresses complexity and a 
system’s or organization’s tendency to reproduce or reinforce its own structure and 
activities rather than to more openly or holistically address the challenge of change.  
This focus from Luhmann on complexity and an organization’s processing of complexity 
	 15 
is significantly more advanced than earlier systems theorists’ work that tended to focus 
on structural-functionalism and relatively simple input and output designs.  Moreover, 
Luhmann suggests that when an organization has established a mechanism to reduce 
uncertainty, other alternative options are likely to be discarded.  As such, Luhmann’s 
approach to system theory and its work with complexity is more applicable to today’s 
national security environment than the earlier simplistic theories.   
 There are several main components to Luhmann’s theory that I highlight in 
relation to this dissertation: autopoiesis, complexity, rationality, communications, and 
decisions. 
  Autopoiesis, literally meaning self-production or creation, refers to a system or 
organization that reproduces or maintains itself or its boundaries like a biological cell.  
Luhmann stripped away the biological depiction and instead emphasized the reflective 
and self-reproductive nature of this action for systems or organizations.13  Luhmann 
further argued that the environment is a distinct element that exists outside or beyond 
the boundaries of the autopoiesis system.  How well the system or organization could 
recognize and respond to developments in the environment, especially with the 
organization’s desire to continue to reproduce itself in its current image, bears a strong 
resemblance to how the US military would respond – or not respond – to resistance 
activities in Syria. 
 Likewise, Luhmann’s writings on complexity provide an interesting lens to view 
the Syria case.  Luhmann argues that a system or organization “bundles” complex 
developments in the environment and then undertakes indifference or other 																																																								13	Niklas Luhmann, Introduction to Systems Theory, trans. Peter Gilgen (Malden, MA: 
Polity Press, 2013), viii-xiv.  
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arrangements to deal with this complexity.  The system engages in a “reduction of 
complexity” by ignoring or treating the new developments with a template or design that 
it previously experienced under different conditions.14  Consequently, the organization is 
not fully seeing, understanding, and then developing appropriate responses to the new 
development – exactly the same three verbs I will use in the formulation of the variables 
for this dissertation.  Instead, the system or organization has a “tendency to limit the 
problem to the question of the arrangements that a system has at its disposal.”15 
 In his discussion on rationality, Luhmann posits that systems or organizations will 
avoid or exclude developments that are deemed risky before they then rationally 
evaluate possible response options.  In Luhmann’s words, there is “always a non-
rational zone outside the marked space” for rational consideration.16  This comment 
provides a strong segue for a subsequent discussion on Alex Mintz’ theory of decision-
making in upcoming paragraphs. 
 Luhmann advocated that one should treat communications and not actions as 
the elements of a social system.17  Within the concept of autopoiesis, Luhmann 
considered communications as essential for the system or organization to reproduce or 
reinforce itself.18  The flow of information, from recognition, to understanding, and to 
crafting responses, all underscore the significance of communications, or the 
transmission and reception of information, to shaping decision-making for an 
																																																								14	Ibid., 121. 15	Ibid., 124. 16	Ibid., 136. 17	David Seidl, Luhmann’s Theory of Autopoietic Social Systems (Munich: University of 
Munich School of Management, 2004), 11. 18	Ibid. 
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organization or system.  This flow of information will be the focus of the process-tracing 
methodology used to examine the decision-making associated with the Syrian rebellion.   
 Luhmann considered organizations as social systems that would reproduce 
themselves on the basis of their internal decisions.19  Based upon the organization’s 
processing of information, the organization would decide what actions to take and these 
decisions would shape the conditions for future decisions or adaptation.  Thus, decision 
would form a precedent for shaping future decisions and adaptations. 
 Together, Luhmann’s systems theory with the inherent concepts of autopoiesis, 
complexity, rationality, communications, and decisions provide a strong conceptual 
framework for this dissertation  
 Luhmann acknowledges that his theory is highly abstract.20  To provide a bridge, 
pathway, or connective tissue between Luhmann’s theory and the very pragmatic 
(perhaps dogmatic) military decision-making process, I use Alex Mintz’ theory of foreign 
policy decision-making in a supporting role to Luhmann.  Mintz’ theory of foreign policy 
decision-making sequentially integrates cognitive and rational theories.21  As Mintz 
describes it, there are two general schools of thought for foreign policy decision-making: 
rationale choice and cognitive psychology.  Mintz integrates both of these approaches 
by stating that decision-makers actually use a two-stage process that first eliminates 
alternatives with unacceptable returns (the cognitive psychology approach) and then 
analyzes the remaining options with the clear risk-gain lens (rational decision-making).  
This first stage process that eliminates options or ideas from a subsequent round of 																																																								19	Ibid., 15. 20	Luhmann, Introduction to Systems Theory, 7. 21	Alex Mintz, ed., Integrating Cognitive and Rationale Theories of Foreign Policy 
Decision Making (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003). 
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“rationale” decision-making strongly supports and is illustrative of Luhmann’s systems 
theory.  I review this in more detail in the literature review chapter.   
 In the case of the early years of the Syrian rebellion, these structural, process, 
and organizational cultural factors formed a “glaucoma” that precluded a full vision, 
understanding, and response from the US military to the National Security Council.22  
  
Substantive Focus: 
 Figure 1 is an overly simplistic view of national security decision-making 
concerning military support to resistance activities.  Acknowledging Luhmann’s Systems 
Theory, which better captures the complexities of systems and decision-making, this 
sketch does concisely convey a simplistic structure of decision-making.  As Luhmann 
would immediately inject, however, this simplistic view of the Intelligence Community, 
State Department, and Defense Department inputs on the left side of this chart are, in 
fact, each separate systems and environments that provide their inputs to the NSC.  
Nevertheless, Figure 1 is a simple way to quickly orient the reader to the NSC decision-
making process.    
 
																																																								22	This concept of a “theoretical glaucoma” is taken from Mohsen M. Milani’s The 
Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution: From Monarchy to Islamic Republic, 2nd ed. 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 10.  As Dr. Milani used the term, he highlighted 
that there was no lack of information that foretold the ulama’s ultimate victory; rather, 
there was a “theoretical glaucoma” that precluded a proper view and understanding of 
the situation.  Likewise, in the case of the early years of the Syrian rebellion, the 
information on the resistance was abundantly available, but failed to be understood and 
processed into feasible options by the US military.   
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 The substantive focus is on the unit of analysis (the US military’s decision-
making structure, process, culture, and recommendations to the NSC concerning 
support to resistance activities) and the environment and culture in the national security 
enterprise that are relevant to limiting or marginalizing UW inputs.  At the macro-level, 
depicted in Figure 1, the output is the President’s decision to provide the military 
support to the resistance or not, or some variant of limited support in between.  As the 
figure shows, the President’s decision-making is influenced by many actors and events, 
including inputs from the Intelligence Community, Department of State, and Department 
of Defense against the backdrop of many international factors.  There is also a 
backdrop of domestic political considerations, again depicted in the figure, but with the 
Backdrop of Domestic Political  
Considerations 
-Congressional Support 
-Popular Support 
National Security Council 
Deliberations  
  State 
   Defense 
       Vice President 
     Intelligence 
Backdrop of Other National Security Factors 
-Allies’ and adversaries’ views, intentions, 
 capabilities, and probable actions 
-Regional actors’ views, intentions, 
capabilities, and probable actions 
-Other competing crises 
President’s  
Decision 
Inputs From: 
Intelligence Community 
Department of State 
Department of Defense 
 
Output To: 
Figure 1: National Security Decision-Making on Military Support to 
Resistance Activities (MSRA) Post-9/11 
The Broad Aperture View 
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important understanding that the National Security Council (NSC) is the entity that 
reviews, analyzes, and synthesizes all of the information and various options and then 
presents a consolidated recommendation to the President for his decision.  To this end, 
this case study on Syria provides limited generalizations that will be useful to inform this 
broader framework and process for national security decision-making.  
 Next, when the aperture is then narrowed to examine only the military’s inputs 
into this larger process, we can isolate useful variables and steps that allow a more 
focused case study examination of the military’s decision-making process for supporting 
resistance movements, and in this specific case concerning the early years of the 
Syrian rebellion.  Figure 2 depicts this more narrow and focused view on the military’s 
decision making.  As shown, the independent variable, for the specific case of Syrian 
resistance, is the ability to See and Understand the Resistance Activity and Potential.  
The intervening variable is Develop Military Support to Resistance Activities (MSRA) 
Options.  The Dependent Variable is then Gain Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(C/JCS) and Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Approval and Submit the Options to the 
National Security Council (NSC). 
 Figure 2 then is a key part of the research design and operationalization.  This is 
how exactly and concretely I assess the problem of marginalization of unconventional 
warfare (UW) knowledge, expertise, and input into national security decision-making. 
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Concepts, Definitions, and Variables:  
 There are two parts to this section.  The first section will define terms whose 
definitions are essential to understanding the dissertation, like the nuanced but critical 
difference between Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Special Forces (SF).  The 
second section focuses on defining the independent, intervening, and dependent 
variables in both nominal and operational terms.   
 
 
 
 
See and Understand 
The Resistance 
Activities and  
Potential 
Develop MSRA 
Options 
 
Independent Variable Intervening Variable 
Gain Chairman and  
Secretary of Defense 
 Approval and Submit 
 Options 
 to the NSC 
Dependent Variable 
Figure 2: National Security Decision-Making on  
Military Support to Resistance Activities (MSRA) Post-9/11 
The Narrow Aperture View 
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 Key Terms Defined 
  Unconventional Warfare and Military Support to Resistance Activities 
 The following terms are essential to fully comprehend the various elements of the 
dissertation.  The term Unconventional Warfare (UW) is essentially synonymous with 
Military Support to Resistance Activities (MSRA).  UW is a military term defined by the 
Department of Defense (DoD) as, “Activities conducted to enable a resistance 
movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying 
power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a 
denied area.”23  In simpler terms, UW is political, economic, and military support to 
resistance activities or a resistance movement.  Resistance movements could include 
insurgents, militants, and other irregular armed political groups.  There are also non-
violent resistance movements, like the resistance movement within Serbia that 
unseated Milosevic from power in 2000.   
 With regards to the issue of which resistance groups the US should support, a 
key determinant would be sufficient overlap or commonality of the goals and objectives 
of the resistance group with the US national security interests.  Other factors to consider 
include analyzing if the resistance group has the capability of achieving the objectives 
and if it will operate within the expected norms of warfare, i.e. the group will not engage 
in terrorist tactics.   
 In this dissertation I use both terms: UW when the discussion is focused on the 
internal US military deliberations, MSRA when the discussion emphasizes the broader 
US interagency (e.g., State Department, CIA, others).  Those distinctions make for 																																																								
23 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations, July 
16, 2014, GL-12. 
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nuanced differences; however, the two terms are essentially synonymous.  To avoid 
confusion, I often use the combined acronym of MSRA/UW in this dissertation. 
  Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Special Forces (SF) 
 Special Operations Forces (SOF) are forces from the Army, Navy, Marines, and 
Air Force specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special 
operations, which include UW, direct action kill/capture raids, and special 
reconnaissance.24  However, not all SOF are trained, organized, and focused on UW.  
The primacy for UW resides with the Army’s Special Operations Forces, and more 
specifically, its sub-set of the Special Forces community, more commonly known as the 
nation’s Green Berets. 
 Special Forces (SF) are Army special operations personnel who are “organized, 
trained, and equipped to conduct special operations with an emphasis on UW 
capabilities.”25  This is the only element within the US military uniquely focused on UW. 
 
  Viable and Acceptable Resistance 
 This phrase “viable and acceptable resistance” holds a prominent role in the 
research question and helps to frame the resulting analysis.  I will parse, define, and 
carefully describe each of these words   
 Viable means feasible or capable of working successfully; in this case, capable of 
successfully executing unconventional warfare.  I have already provided the definition of 
unconventional warfare as activities to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to 
coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or 																																																								
24 Ibid., GL-11. 
25 Ibid., GL-10. 
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with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.  So, in the Syrian 
context, viable refers to having that capability to successfully disrupt, coerce, or 
overthrow the Assad regime.  Keeping in mind that the words “disrupt, coerce, or 
overthrown” are on a spectrum of their own, a resistance force that is not yet able to 
overthrow the Assad regime, but one that can still disrupt it, is still, by definition, a viable 
resistance force.  Moreover, once US support, like weapons, ammunition, and training, 
is provided to such a resistance force, one would expect to see the capabilities of the 
resistance force expand from simple disruption to coercion and then overthrow. 
 Acceptable means suitable or allowed.  In this case, an “acceptable” resistance 
force would need to meet three criteria.  First, the interests and objectives of the 
resistance force must align with interests and objectives of the US.  This does not 
necessarily mean that the resistance force likes or supports the US, only that the 
interests and objectives align.  So, to the extent that the US sought to seek the removal 
of the Assad regime and the resistance force did as well, then this first criteria is met 
regardless of whether the rebels were pro-US or not.  Second, the political end state of 
the resistance could not contradict US values; i.e., the resistance force could not strive 
to establish a dictatorship while receiving US support.  Third, the resistance force could 
not use terrorist tactics, i.e. deliberately targeting civilians for political affects on a 
different entity, normally the governing or occupying power.  (The definition and 
description of terrorism is discussed in the next section.) 
 While the term resistance has many variants, most support the idea of an 
organized political opposition to a governing or occupying power.  Often this political 
opposition, or at least core elements of it, must remain clandestine or underground to 
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avoid arrest from the governing or occupying power.  This organized political opposition 
– and the term “organized” spans a spectrum of various degrees from incipient to highly 
organized – could espouse violent and/or nonviolent measures in its resistance 
activities.  Violent political struggles are not uncommon in the history of the world or in 
the development of freedom or liberty for oppressed groups.   
 Within the context of violent resistance, however, one must draw a distinction 
between terrorism and non-terrorism tactics.   
 
  Terrorism 
 There is no one universally agreed upon definition of terrorism.  Section 2656f(d) 
of Title 22 of the United States Code defines terrorism as premeditated, politically 
motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or 
clandestine agents.26  The definition of terrorism from the US military is, “The unlawful 
use of violence or threat of violence, often motivated by religious, political, or other 
ideological beliefs, to instill fear and coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals 
that are usually political.”27   
 Given this variance, I accept and use both the State and Defense Department 
definitions since this dissertation concerns the US interagency decision-making 
process.  The synthesis that I will emphasize, however, is the deliberate targeting of 
innocent men, women, and children for political effects on a different entity, normally the 
																																																								26	United States Department of State, Legislative Requirements and Key Terms, 
accessed May 21, 2017 at https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65464.pdf 
27 US Department of Defense, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 
(Washington, D.C.: The Joint Staff, March 2017), accessed April 1, 2017 at 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/dictionary.pdf 
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governing or occupying power.  Of significance -- and this must be underscored -- a 
terrorist deliberately targets innocent people.  Thus, detonating a car bomb in a crowded 
market place to deliberately target innocent civilians is a terrorist act.  However, 
detonating a car bomb that deliberately targets a military checkpoint or soldiers is not a 
terrorist act.  This latter act is undoubtedly unlawful and criminal from the perspective of 
the affected country, but this is not an act of terrorism.  Likewise, a bombing that 
intentionally and deliberately targets a military position but unintentionally harms 
innocents is not a terrorist act – there was no deliberate attempt to target civilians.  This 
distinction is significant and must be understood before progressing in the analysis 
presented in this dissertation.   
 Two non-Syrian examples illustrate this important point.  Both Lebanese 
Hizballah and Hamas, although portraying and conducting themselves as resistance 
forces to Israeli occupation and activities, are also terrorist groups because at times 
they deliberately target civilians.  Their attacks deliberately targeting civilians are not 
conducted by rogue commanders or units; rather, they are authorized and directed by 
senior leaders of these organizations.   
 For purposes of this dissertation, I draw a sharp line between the terrorist and 
non-terrorist resistance elements that operated in Syria in the March 2012 to June 2014 
period.  These will be clearly delineated and described in chapter three.   
 
 Defining the Variables in Nominal and Operational Terms 
 This second section focuses on defining the independent, intervening, and 
dependent variables in both nominal and operational terms. 
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 The independent variable, as depicted in the above figure, is the ability to “See 
and Understand the Resistance Activity and Potential”.  The nominal definition of this 
variable is “The Combatant Command and Joint Staff respective intelligence (J-2) 
sections direct, collect, analyze, and report assessments of the Syrian resistance to 
their operations officer (J-3), plans officer (J-5), and Commander/Chairman”.  There are 
three critical elements or measurements to operationalize this definition: 
See and Understand 
The Resistance 
Activities and  
Potential 
Develop MSRA 
Options 
 
Independent Variable Intervening Variable 
Gain Chairman and  
Secretary of Defense 
 Approval and Submit 
 Options 
 to the NSC 
Definition: The Combatant Command and Joint Staff respective J-2 sections 
directs, collects, analyzes, and reports assessments of the Syrian  
resistance to their J-3s, J-5s, and Commander/Chairman.   
Operationalize: 
1. Show the Combatant Command and Joint Staff intel assessment inputs 
provided to the planners.  (Due to classification this will be unavailable.) 
2. In the absence of the classified assessments, show assessments from  
others, to include those from the State Department and private organizations.   
In other words, show what was available to any entity (military or private)  
that was looking for it.) 
3. Show testimony from the “consumers” of this data (e.g. Chairman of the  
Joint Chiefs of Staff) and how they described or assessed it.   
 
 
Dependent Variable 
Figure 3: Defining and Operationalizing the Independent Variable 
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1. Show the Combatant Command and Joint Staff intelligence assessment inputs 
provided to the planners.  (Due to its security classification this assessment will be 
unavailable.) 
2. In the absence of the classified assessments, show assessments from others, to 
include those from the State Department and private organizations.  In other words, 
show what was available to any entity (military or private) that was looking for it. 
3. Show testimony from the “consumers” of this data (e.g., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff) and how they described or assessed it.   
 
 
See and Understand 
The Resistance 
Activities and  
Potential 
Develop MSRA 
Options 
 
Independent Variable Intervening Variable 
Gain Chairman and  
Secretary of Defense 
 Approval and Submit 
 Options 
 to the NSC 
Definition: The Combatant Command and Joint Staff respective 
 J-5 sections conduct planning, which includes UW options, and 
presents recommendations to the Commander/Chairman. 
 
Operationalize: 
1.  Show the Combatant Command and Joint Staff planning products 
(i.e. staff estimates) provided to the Commander/Chairman. 
(Due to classification this will be unavailable.) 
2. Show testimony from the “consumers” of this data (e.g. Chairman of the  
Joint Chiefs of Staff) and how they described or assessed it.   
Dependent Variable 
Figure 4: Defining and Operationalizing the Intervening Variable 
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 The intervening variable, as depicted in the above figure, is “Develop Military 
Support to Resistance Activities (MSRA) Options”.  The nominal definition of this 
variable is “The Combatant Command and Joint Staff respective plans (J-5) section 
conducts planning, which includes UW options, and presents recommendations to the 
Commander/Chairman”.  There are two critical elements or measurements to 
operationalize this definition: 
1. Show the Combatant Command and Joint Staff planning products (i.e., staff 
estimates) provided to the Commander/Chairman. (Due to its security classification this 
estimate will be unavailable.) 
2. Show testimony from the “consumers” of this data (e.g., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff) and how they described or assessed it.   
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 The dependent variable is then “Gain Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(C/JCS) and Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Approval and Submit the Options to the 
National Security Council (NSC)”.  The nominal definition of this variable is “The 
Secretary of Defense, with advice from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
approves the planning and forwards it to the NSC for staff review and presidential 
approval”.  There are two critical elements or measurements to operationalize this 
definition: 
1. Show the plans submission from DoD to the NSC.  (Due to its security classification 
this plan will be unavailable.) 
See and Understand 
The Resistance 
Activities and  
Potential 
Develop MSRA 
Options 
 
Independent Variable Intervening Variable 
Gain Chairman and  
Secretary of Defense 
 Approval and Submit 
 Options 
 to the NSC 
Definition: The Secretary of Defense, with advice from the  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, approves the  
planning and forwards it to the NSC for staff review and  
presidential approval 
Operationalize: 
1.  Show the plans submission from DoD to the NSC.  
(Due to classification this will be unavailable.) 
2. Show testimony from those who observed this event and had access to the  
information (e.g. the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense,  
Director of the CIA) and show how they described and assessed it.   
Dependent Variable 
Figure 5: Defining and Operationalizing the Dependent Variable 
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2. Show testimony from those who observed this event and had access to the 
information (e.g. the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Director of the CIA) and 
show how they described and assessed it. 
 
Plausible Rival Hypotheses 
 As identified earlier in this chapter, my hypothesis is that the US military structure 
and process for providing advice to the president and his national security decision-
making team are flawed due to the marginalization of unconventional warfare expertise.  
This marginalization results in inadequate consideration for applying unconventional 
warfare as a strategic option for the nation.   
 However, there are two plausible rival hypotheses that need to be considered: 
• Presidential guidance preempted any consideration of MSRA. 
• DoD leaders deliberately suppressed the MSRA/UW option and did not 
present it to the NSC. 
 In chapter five I apply the evidence against each of these hypotheses. 
 
 Rival Hypothesis #1: Presidential Guidance Preempted any Consideration 
of MSRA.  
 Under this rival hypothesis, the president would have provided guidance to the 
NSC principals or military senior leaders to not consider any serious options or 
recommendations for military operations in Syria.  I found no evidence to support this 
hypothesis, although it is true that the President was reluctant to get involved in Syria.  
The President disapproved the CIA Director’s proposal to provide limited arms to the 
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resistance in September 2012, although the Secretaries of State and Defense endorsed 
the plan.28  However, after the Assad regime used chemical weapons against his own 
people, the President changed his position and approved the CIA plan to arm the 
resistance in June 2013.29  Despite the President’s initial reluctance and subsequent 
approval to provide limited CIA arms to the resistance, there are no indications that he 
provided guidance to the military to not initiate any recommendation for a larger military 
support option.  Given Clinton’s and Panetta’s disclosure and discussion of these 
debates in their memoirs, it seems unlikely they would avoid commenting on this 
presidential guidance to the military, if it occurred.  
 
 Variant to Rival Hypothesis One: The Iranian Negotiations Factor 
 A variant to this rival hypothesis concerns the initiation of the then confidential 
negotiations between the US, Iran, and others to limit Iran’s development of nuclear 
capabilities in exchange for the relaxation of the economic sanctions.  Under this 
scenario, the President would not want other areas of conflict to emerge between the 
US and Iran lest they disturb or otherwise adversely affect the ongoing negotiations.  In 
this case too, however, I found no evidence supporting this option.  That said, since 
absence-of-evidence is not evidence-of-absence, this remains an open question for 
future researchers.  As the years pass, it is reasonable to expect at least some 
classified documents concerning this topic will be declassified and available to 
researchers.   
 																																																								
28 Hillary Clinton, Hard Choices (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014), 463. 
29 Leon Panetta, Worthy Fights (New York: Penguin Press, 2014), 450. 
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 Rival Hypothesis #2: DoD Leaders Deliberately Suppressed the UW Option  
 Under this rival hypothesis, there are two independent reasons why this would 
have been plausible.  First, concern over a looming possible war with Iran, it could be 
speculated, would have caused the military leaders in the US Central Command and 
the Joint Staff to deliberately suppress the UW option so that they could husband the 
necessary military resources in advance of that possible conflict.  Second, a more 
general war-weariness within the senior military ranks from years of fighting in Iraq and 
Afghanistan could have led the military leaders to suppress any consideration to 
become involved in the Syrian conflict to include UW.   
 
The Three Key Questions 
 Linking the research question to the hypothesis and conclusions are three key 
supporting questions that provide the framework for the main sections of this 
dissertation. 
• Was there a viable and acceptable resistance force in Syria in the period 
March 2011 to June 2014? 
• If so, why and how did the US miss the opportunity to train, advise, and 
equip them? 
• What are the resulting recommendations for national security 
practitioners?   
Methodology:  
 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett (building on Arend Lijphart and Harry 
Eckstein’s works) described six theory building approaches or objectives for qualitative 
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methods case studies.30  Of those, the disciplined configurative case studies that use 
established theories to explain a case is the best frame for this dissertation.  That said, 
if this single case study was expanded to include the other MSRM events, then the 
resulting larger research effort would fit the model of the “building block” study of 
phenomenon used to identify patterns for a broader set of conclusions, and this case 
and dissertation could be considered one of those building blocks.  However, for 
purposes of this dissertation, the disciplined configurative case study approach is the 
proper frame, although I discuss this broader topic in the conclusion. 
 More specifically this dissertation is a single case study with macro- and micro-
process-tracing to capture the complexity of the military inputs to the National Security 
Council decision-making.  Primary source evidence included Congressional testimonies 
and memoirs from the key participants in the decision-making, plus public statements 
from the White House and State Department.  Other primary source evidence included 
elite interviews with senior leaders participating in this decision-making or those who are 
subject matter experts in the cultural-institutional biases of the military. 
 To answer the “how” portion of the research question, I used a systems theory 
approach to examine the military decision-making process for providing inputs to the 
National Security Council (NSC).  This approach revealed the inherent flaws for 
developing military support to resistance activities – also known as “unconventional 
warfare” options by marginalizing such experts from the key operational positions in the 
decision-making.  To answer the “why” portion of the research question, I showed that 
																																																								
30 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in 
the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 74-76. 
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the conventional senior military leaders, in accordance with Luhmann’s theory, are 
prone to see and react to developments in their environments that make sense only 
from their autopoiesis-based frame of reference.  In other words, they are biased 
towards providing conventional warfare solutions. 
 
Data Collection Plan:  
 There were four elements to the data collection plan: background research, 
detailed review of key decision-maker comments from their Congressional testimonies 
and memoirs, interviews of senior leaders involved in the decision-making, and the 
construction of process-trace charts that reveal the interconnectedness (or lack thereof) 
of the decision-making.  These four parts are not purely sequential steps; rather, there 
is a necessary and advantageous overlap between these four elements. 
 First, the background research detail the existence of the moderate Syrian 
resistance movements during March 2011 to June 2014 exclusively using data 
contemporary to that period – in other words, showing the existence of the resistance 
movement with data that the US military and intelligence communities could and should 
have seen independent from any classified sources and methods.  In addition, during 
this research phase I document the structural-functionalism and systems theory 
approaches of the military decision-making process.  
 Second, I researched and extracted comments from the key senior leaders 
involved in this decision-making.  These leaders included the President, the Secretaries 
of State (Clinton and Kerry) and Defense (Gates, Panetta, and Hagel), the Chairman of 
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the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Mullen and Dempsey), and the US Ambassador to Syria 
(Ford).   
 Third, only after researching exactly what they said and when they said it, did I 
arrange and conduct interviews with some of the senior leaders that would have 
participated or at least observed this decision-making.  This involved interviews with the 
US Ambassador to Syria at that time, Robert S. Ford, and retired Lieutenant General 
Charles Cleveland, who commanded the U.S. Army Special Operations Command 
during much of this period.  
 Fourth, given the data above, I constructed process-trace charts at two levels, 
macro and micro.  First, I listed and categorized all major political and military events 
associated with the Syrian rebellion of March 2011 to June 2014, arranging them not 
just temporally but by categories of actions taken by Syrian actors (Assad regime, 
resistance elements) plus ISIS, actions by other states (minus the US) and international 
organizations, and actions by the US government to include internal decision-making 
events.  These more than one hundred events, which are displayed in over thirty pages 
of charts found in Appendix A, constitute the macro-level process-tracing of this case 
study.  Second, the analysis shows that seven of these events were particularly critical 
in terms of the US decision-making.  I isolated each of these seven events and framed 
them as micro-level process-tracing which provided a timeline, identified the actors 
involved in the particular event, and analyzed their inputs to that decision-making event 
– in other words, who said what, where, when, why, and how.    
 An example chart is shown below – one that will be discussed in more detail in 
chapter four.  In the below example of the micro-level process-trace, I highlight two 
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significant Congressional testimonies that occurred within one week of each other.  In 
the first event, Ambassador Ford testifies that he was training and equipping 1500 local 
activists within Syria in how to organize and conduct their political resistance activities.  
Then, within a week of this event, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff testifies that 
he cannot “clearly identify the right people” in the resistance.31  Such a diverging 
assessment within the US government illuminates the deficiencies in the military’s 
inputs to the National Security Council. 
   
 																																																								31	Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 113th Congress, 1st Session, 
April 17, 2013. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013, accessed 
September 23, 2014, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys. 
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Amb Ford testifies April 11th to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the State Department has trained  
and equipped (non-lethal) over 1,500 local leaders and activists within Syria; the Chairman of the  
Joint Chiefs of Staff testifies April 17th that he cannot identify the resistance.  “If we could clearly 
 identify the right people, I would  support it.” 
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Figure 6: (Example of Process-Tracing Chart) Significant Divergence 
Apparent Between DoD Senior Leaders and the US Ambassador in Syria 
on Assessing the Resistance (April 2013) 
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 This process-trace of the decision-making – of which the above chart is only a 
sample event -- is key to the analysis, findings, and conclusions of this dissertation 
research.   
 
The Contribution of this Dissertation:  
 This dissertation makes one major and two secondary but important 
contributions.  The major contribution of this dissertation is the provision of a detailed 
case study that demonstrates the role of organizational culture within the US military 
between the conventional military, including the kill/capture SOF elements, versus the 
unconventional forces (support to resistance elements) and ties this cleavage to policy 
outcomes in the early years of the Syrian rebellion.  In other words, a case study in US 
interagency and military decision-making process that shows the marginalization of 
MSRA/UW expertise in the formulation of strategic options provided to the president.  
 The secondary but important contributions are to theory testing and towards 
bridging the gap from theory to policy development. 
 First, the conceptual framework for this dissertation is based on Niklas 
Luhmann’s Systems Theory that addresses complexity and a system or organization’s 
responses to such challenges.   This dissertation tests and supports important elements 
of Luhmann’s theory:  autopoiesis, complexity, rationality, communications, and 
decisions.  The case study of the US military’s decision-making concerning the Syrian 
rebellion becomes a useful example of a system dealing with complexity by aggregating 
information and foreclosing options that do not fit with the autopoiesis nature of the 
organization. 
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 Second, this dissertation contributes to the body of knowledge by beginning to 
illuminate the causal conditions between the structure, function, bureaucracy culture, 
assignment pattern of key military leaders, and the resulting uneven application of UW 
as a national security option.  In so doing, this dissertation provides policy-relevant 
research for national security practitioners on the UW option.   
 Future research should examine this pattern of uneven application of UW in the 
post-9/11 period by researching other cases or attempting to discern other factors that 
may have affected these outcomes.   Additionally, as more information concerning the 
early years of the Syrian rebellion becomes declassified, future researchers should 
reexamine this dissertation and challenge its assessments with the new information.   
Chapter Summary 
 This chapter provided the research design for this dissertation.   In the 
subsequent chapters I show that the US military structure and process for providing 
advice to the president and his national security decision-making team are flawed due 
to the marginalization of unconventional warfare (UW) expertise.  This marginalization 
results in inadequate consideration to applying UW as a strategic option for the nation.  
This inadequate planning and decision-making during the Syrian rebellion in 2011-2014 
is an act of negligence that the US cannot afford to repeat.   
 In the next chapter I examine the literature associated with this issue and its 
conceptual framework.  
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CHAPTER TWO:  
LITERATURE REVIEW32 
 
“President Kennedy came into office believing that 
American security would be challenged by guerilla 
forces against whom American power would have 
to be used in limited and quite special ways. He 
therefore began an effort to develop such a 
capability within the Army. That ran contrary to the 
Army’s definition of its essence, which involved 
ground combat by regular divisions, and by and 
large the Army was able to resist Kennedy’s 
effort.”33 
     --Morton H. Halperin and Priscilla A. Clapp 
 
 
 This dissertation concerns the US military’s decision-making process and its 
inability to effectively generate strategic options for the national security decision-
makers that involve support to resistance movements.  Consequently, the literature 
review for this dissertation concerns national security decision-making -- not resistance 
movements and not revolutions.  In this chapter I describe the literature concerning US 
national security decision-making in general, and specifically the US military decision-
making process as it addresses support to resistance movements.  In so doing, I 
highlight the gap in the literature that this dissertation addresses.   																																																								32	Portions of this chapter appeared in earlier papers submitted during coursework at the 
University of South Florida.  Specifically, POS 6933 PhD Capstone in the Spring 
Semester of 2017 and POS 6707 Qualitative Methods in the Fall Semester 2016. 33	Morton H. Halperin and Priscilla A. Clapp, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, 
2nd ed.  (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 33. 
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 The analysis of the literature underscores the significant role of organizational 
culture and how that shapes the inputs from the various institutions; e.g., the State 
Department, the Intelligence Community, and the Defense Department.  Furthermore, 
the literature shows organizational cultural cleavages between the various Services of 
the US military; i.e., the Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force.  These are well known to 
even the casual observer of national security affairs.   
 However, there are two other important institutional and cultural cleavages that 
are not as well documented in the literature that manifest themselves in this research.  
First is the cleavage between the conventional military and the Special Operations 
Forces (SOF), which is somewhat known due to the recent wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq.  Second, and arguably more salient, is institutional and cultural cleavage within the 
Special Operations community: the cleavage between the units that specialize in 
kill/capture operations and those who specialize in unconventional warfare – support to 
resistance elements.  It is this institutional and organizational cleavage between the 
conventional military, including the kill/capture SOF elements, versus the 
unconventional warfare organizations that have sparse literature coverage.  This is the 
arena of this dissertation and where the dissertation makes its contributions.  This study 
uniquely demonstrates the role of organizational culture within the US military between 
the conventional military including the kill/capture SOF elements versus the 
unconventional forces (support to resistance elements) and ties this cleavage to policy 
outcomes in the early years of the Syrian rebellion.  Although the literature shows a few 
isolated sparks of brilliance concerning this line of thinking (Votel, Cleveland, Connett, 
and Irwin, 2016), these sparks have not yet caught fire within the conventional military 
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establishment nor within the national security enterprise.  The conventional military 
seems to minimize such thinking and writing. 
 This chapter is organized into the following seven sections, and the unifying 
thread between all of them is the factor of organizational culture.  From general to 
specific, the first six sections, starting with a review of the conceptual framework from 
Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory, build a logic chain that demonstrates the critical role 
or organizational culture in US national security decision-making.  The seventh section 
then culminates this chapter by showing how this dissertation contributes to this body of 
knowledge.   
• The Base: The Conceptual Framework of Luhmann’s Systems Theory 
• The Big Picture: Foreign Policy and National Security Decision-Making 
• Role of Organizational Culture within the National Security Decision-Making 
• Organizational Culture and Cleavage within the US Military 
• Organizational Culture and Cleavage within Special Operations 
• Emerging Literature 
• The Contribution of this Dissertation: Addressing the Gap 
 
The Base: The Conceptual Framework of Luhmann’s Systems Theory 
 As described more fully in the previous chapter, the core theoretical basis for this 
study is Niklas Luhmann’s Systems Theory (Luhmann, 2002) that recognizes and 
addresses complexity and a system’s or organization’s tendency to reproduce or 
reinforce its own structure and activities rather than to more openly or holistically 
address the challenge of change. Luhmann suggests that when an organization has 
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established a mechanism to reduce uncertainty, other alternative options are likely to be 
discarded.  
 Luhmann’s writings on complexity provide an interesting lens to view the Syria 
case.  Luhmann argues that a system or organization “bundles” complex developments 
in the environment and then undertakes indifference or other arrangements to deal with 
this complexity.  The system engages in a “reduction of complexity” by ignoring or 
treating the new developments with a template or design that it previously experienced 
under different conditions.34   The system or organization has a “tendency to limit the 
problem to the question of the arrangements that a system has at its disposal.”35 
 Joseph Pilotta, Timothy Widman, and Susan Jasko further developed Luhmann’s 
theory with a focus on organizational culture. (Pilotta, Widman, and Jasko, 2014)  The 
authors argue “organizational culture serves the maintenance and development of 
organizations by providing important ordering mechanisms that further the 
organization’s domination of complex information environments.”36  They argue that 
Luhmann reduces “complexity by simultaneously transmitting both a selected alternative 
from among multiple action possibilities and the motivation for the acceptance of that 
selection.”37  Of significance, they add, “Organizational culture consists primarily of 
																																																								34	Niklas Luhmann, Introduction to Systems Theory, trans. Peter Gilgen (Malden, MA: 
Polity Press, 2013), 121. 35	Ibid., 124. 36	Joseph J. Pilotta, Timothy J. Widman, and Susan A. Jasko, “Meaning and Action in 
the Organizational Setting: An Interpretive Approach,” in An Introduction to Niklas 
Luhmann: Logic and Investigations,  ed. Joseph J. Pilotta and Wei-San Sun (New York: 
Hampton Press, 2014,148. 37	Ibid., 154. 
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open-ended context framed by significant symbols and modes of legitimated social 
action that enables selective responses to changes.”38 
 Luhmann posits that systems or organizations will avoid or exclude 
developments that are deemed risky before they then rationally evaluate possible 
response options.  In Luhmann’s words, there is “always a non-rational zone outside the 
marked space” for rational consideration.39  This comment provides a strong segue for 
the following section on Alex Mintz’ theory of decision-making, which involves a two-
stage process that immediately eliminates unfamiliar options from consideration. 
 
The Big Picture: Foreign Policy and National Security Decision-Making 
 Alex Mintz’ theory of foreign policy decision-making readily appears to be built 
from the concepts of Luhmann’s systems theory, although much of their research was in 
parallel during the 1990s.  Mintz sequentially integrates cognitive and rational theories 
concerning decision-making in a manner that Luhmann, Pilotta, Widman, and Jasko 
would recognize.40  In this section, I first describe Mintz’ theory, then show how two 
other researchers added to the theory. 
 As Mintz describes it, there are two general schools of thought for foreign policy 
decision-making: rationale choice and cognitive psychology.  Mintz integrates both of 
these approaches by stating that decision-makers actually use a two-stage process that 
first eliminates alternatives with unacceptable returns (the cognitive psychology 
approach) and then analyzes the remaining options with the clear risk-gain lens (rational 																																																								38	Ibid., 155. 39	Luhmann, 136. 40	Alex Mintz, ed., Integrating Cognitive and Rationale Theories of Foreign Policy 
Decision Making (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003). 
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decision-making).  Mintz originally conceived of this cognitive psychology step with a 
“non-compensatory principle” whereby a national decision-maker would exclude certain 
options that brought unacceptable consequences, usually from a domestic political 
dimension.41  However, of significance, Mintz added that political decision-makers would 
also remove options that they considered to be “militarily unfeasible” which underscores 
the significance of the advice they would receive from the military, even prior to  
receiving a formal menu of options.42 
 Steven B. Redd extended Mintz’ theory in two important respects.  First, he 
highlighted the role of ambiguity and how familiar the decision-makers were with the set 
of options presented to them.  To Redd, such familiarity or unfamiliarity would have a 
major impact in the cognitive psychology step that may result in the exclusion of options 
not due to domestic political reasons but to a more basic unfamiliarity with the option.43  
Second, within the framework of Mintz’ theory, Redd would become a strong proponent 
and advocate for the process-tracing method linking the decision-making process to the 
foreign policy outcomes.44  In this dissertation, I use the process-trace method to show 
the linkage, too. 
 Vesna Danilovic reinforced and further developed Redd’s contribution that the 
cognitive psychology step would exclude certain options from the subsequent rational 
analysis phase.  Danilovic specified the concepts of “prior beliefs” and “working scripts” 
																																																								41	Ibid., 1-3. 42	Ibid., 6. 43	Steven B. Redd, “The Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign Policy Decision Making: 
Experimental Evidence,” in Integrating Cognitive and Rationale Theories in Foreign 
Policy Decision Making, ed. Alex Mintz (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 116. 44	Ibid., 106. 
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as significant factors that shaped the responses and preferences of decision-makers in 
the cognitive psychology stage.45    
 Of significance, although Mintz cites examples of military options presented to 
national security decision-makers, he does not narrow this aperture to examine how his 
theory might apply to the internal decision-making process within the military. 
 Thus, Alex Mintz’ theory of foreign policy decision-making, that integrates both 
cognitive and rational theories into a two-step process, provides a more specific lens to 
Luhmann’s conceptual framework for this dissertation.  The further refinements from 
Redd and Danilovic extend the understanding of the cognitive factors to include 
familiarity with the options, prior beliefs, and biases as cognitive – not rational – factors 
that preemptively exclude options before they can be rationally considered.   
 In addition to Mintz and his colleagues, several other key scholars critically 
analyzed the NSC structure and decision-making.  The classic textbook for basic 
national security studies is Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, Michael J. Meese, and 
Suzanne C. Nielsen’s seminal work American National Security, originally published in 
1981 with its sixth edition in 2009.46  Editors Karl Inderfurth and Lock Johnson’s text, 
Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security Council, provide unique insights from 
numerous contributing researchers and practitioners into the NSC process and 
deliberations.47  Christopher C. Shoemaker’s, Structure, Function and the NSC Staff 
provides almost a staff officer’s handbook to understanding the decision-making 																																																								45	Vesna Danilovic, “The Rational-Cognitive Debate and Poliheuristic Theory,” in 
Integrating Cognitive and Rationale Theories in Foreign Policy Decision Making, ed. 
Alex Mintz (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 131-132, 136. 
46 Amos A. Jordan.  et al. American National Security, 208-229. 
47 Karl F. Inderfurth and Lock K. Johnson, eds., Fateful Decisions: Inside the National 
Security Council (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).  
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process.48  Finally, Good Judgment in Foreign Policy: Theory and Application from 
editors Stanley A. Renshon and Deborah Welch Larson provided an excellent overview 
of not only the decision-making process but to the analysis of what constitutes good 
judgment.49 
 However, none of these well-known NSC and foreign policy decision-making 
texts fully explore the role of organizational culture in the decision-making.  A more 
limited subset of this work is highlighted in the next section. 
 
Role of Organizational Culture within the National Security Decision-Making 
 Whereas the literature concerning national security decision-making described 
above focuses primarily on the various processes and organizations, it is apparent that 
individual organizations and bureaucracies have their own cultures that do impact on 
policy developments.50  This analysis is a key basis to this dissertation. 
 Morton Halperin and Priscilla A. Clapp’s Bureaucracy Politics and Foreign Policy 
provides an excellent analysis on the bureaucracies’ roles in foreign policy decision-
making.51  This important work clearly described the entrenched bureaucracies and how 
they approach initiatives or events that are neither anticipated nor part of the traditional 
core functions of that agency.  For the military, brought up with the understanding that 
																																																								
48 Christopher C. Shoemaker, Structure, Function and the NSC Staff: An Officer’s Guide 
to the National Security Council (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US 
Army War College, 1989). 
49 Stanley A. Renshon and Deborah Welch Larson, eds., Good Judgment in Foreign 
Policy (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003). 
50 This section was extracted from a previous paper I submitted as part of my studies at 
the University of South Florida for POS 6045, November 29, 2015 51	Morton H. Halperin and Priscilla A. Clapp, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, 
2nd ed.  (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006). 
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they fight the nation’s wars with a deeply ingrained tradition of conventional war, any 
significant deviation from this line of thinking is treated with suspicion and deflection.52  
This finding is somewhat reinforced in Amos A. Jordan’s, et al, American National 
Security, but not with the same clarity.53   More significantly, and germane to this post-
9/11 era, is a similar finding by Janine Davidson, a former Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Plans.  She is quoted in the opening citation in the Introduction section of 
this dissertation, that the conventional military frequently failed to deliver creative 
national security options that the president was seeking.54 
 Other authors more specifically highlight the fissures and frictions within various 
departments, agencies, and other elements that collectively make up the national 
security apparatus.  This includes Roger Z. George and Harvey Rishikof’s, The National 
Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth, which is organized to highlight the 
competing cultures within the agencies, departments, and other elements including the 
press and the courts.55   
  This section on bureaucracy and organizational culture has a direct bearing on 
the earlier section concerning national security decision-making, and in particular, Alex 
Mintz’ theory of the two-step heuristic approach to decision-making.  Coupling these two 
together, the reader could anticipate the US military bureaucracy opposing initiatives 
that are outside of the core function of conventional war.  In Mintz’ theory, military 																																																								
52 Morton H. Halperin and Priscilla A. Clapp, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, 
25-61. 
53 Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, Jr., Michael J. Meese, and Suzanne C. Nielsen, 
American National Security, 6th ed. (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2009), 170-189. 54	Janine Davidson, “The Contemporary Presidency”, 129. 
55 Roger Z. George and Harvey Rishikof, The National Security Enterprise: Navigating 
the Labyrinth (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011). 
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national security practitioners would likely eliminate such alternatives from even being 
considered during the development of strategic options in response to a crisis like the 
Syrian rebellion.   
 In summary, the literature clearly records the role of institutional and 
organizational culture of the various US government departments and agencies 
impacting national security decision-making.  However, do similar cleavages exist within 
those organizations, specifically the US military? 
 
Organizational Culture and Cleavage within the US Military 
 The topic of organizational culture cleavage within the US military is well known 
to national security studies scholars.  The various institutional and organizational 
cultures between the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines – which manifests itself into 
distinct uniforms, most military schools, promotion systems, and most assignments -- 
contributed to shortcomings in US military operations in Vietnam, Grenada, and the 
Iranian hostage rescue attempt in 1980.  This crescendo of military shortfalls from the 
1960s through the early 1980s prompted Congress to enact the Goldwater-Nichols 
legislation that placed strong emphasis on “joint duty” (that is, duty at a headquarters 
that requires officers from more than one Service), even going so far as to tie officer 
promotions to the admiral and general ranks to mandatory prior service in these joint 
units.  However, cultural changes occur over many years, arguably a generation, and 
are seldom resolved with an individual law.   
 Yet there is second cross cutting element of cleavage within the US military 
separate from the distinctions of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines, which is the 
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cleavage between conventional military forces and Special Operations Forces (SOF).  
Each of the Services (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines) has select units that are 
designated as SOF – these include Army Special Forces, Navy SEALs (an acronym 
meaning sea, air, and land; referring to their infiltration mediums), and Air Force special 
aircraft and flight crews.  Together, these select sub-elements from the Services 
constitute SOF.  There is an unmistakable cultural cleavage between those that are 
recruited, trained, educated, and employed to conduct conventional combat and these 
forces that are assessed and selected from the conventional forces’ junior ranks and 
subsequently trained, educated, and employed to conduct special operations.  That 
said, today there is strong leadership attention within the Services and within SOF to 
integrate these forces within their Services, as the needs of warfare in Afghanistan and 
Iraq made clear to all commanders, but, as stated earlier, changing organizational 
cultures can take many years.   
 There is a good amount of literature that documents this difference between the 
conventional military and SOF.  Perhaps the best that highlights the cultural aspects as 
it relates to the function of risk-taking during the decision-making process is Yaacov Y. I. 
Vertzberger in his 1998 study of five cases of foreign military intervention decisions.  In 
his text, somewhat based on Alex Mintz’ two-stage decision-making theory covered 
earlier in this chapter, Vertzberger showed how military officers – by culture and 
organizations – would overstate or minimize risk depending on their backgrounds.  Of 
note, however, Vertzberger addressed several variables in his sets, including context, 
culture, the individual, and the group, which consequently did not fully examine the 
organizational culture variable in sufficient light.  Moreover, his one hundred pages 
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addressed five different case studies.  The focus of this one variable set in this one case 
study on the Syrian resistance in this dissertation provides a more in depth examination 
of this causal relationship.   
 A second significant text addressing this cultural cleavage between conventional 
and SOF cultures is found in the research and writings of Colin Gray, a theorist of 
strategic studies who has written extensively on nuclear strategy, arms control, maritime 
strategy, and geopolitics.  His 1996 work on strategy highlighted this organizational and 
cultural cleavage between the conventional military and SOF officers.  However, given 
the time period of his research and writing on this important topic, he focused on neither 
the post-9/11 environment nor the recent developments that highlighted the 
opportunities to support resistance movements as a national security option, which this 
dissertation does address.    
 A third and more contemporary text on this cleavage comes from Dr. Hy 
Rothstein who published a detailed case study of unconventional warfare during the 
Afghanistan war in 2006.  In this work he documents the distinct cultural divide between 
conventional and unconventional warfare forces, and consequently, how UW options 
have become marginalized.56  However, his analysis led to more far-reaching 
recommendations than this dissertation will present.  The linkage of causality to 
recommendations is important. 
 Yet the organizational culture and cleavage within the US military is only part of 
the explanation.  Within SOF itself, there is a significant cleavage. 
																																																								56	Hy S. Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional 
Warfare (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006). 
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Organizational Culture and Cleavage within Special Operations 
 To most outside observers, SOF is a small and elite element within the military 
that probably has its own homogenous culture.  Although that is true to an extent, there 
is actually a significant organizational and cultural cleavage that divides the special 
operators.  Retired Army Lieutenant General Charles Cleveland, a career Special 
Forces officer who commanded the Army Special Operations Command from 2012 to 
2015, wrote extensively about this dichotomy in SOF in the command’s professional 
journal, Special Warfare.  Although SOF is assigned several mission sets by law, 
including unconventional warfare, direct action (kill/capture missions), foreign internal 
defense (advice and assistance to foreign governments fighting insurgencies), and 
special reconnaissance, General Cleveland binned the various missions into two 
components that he called Surgical Strike (the direct action, counterterrorism, and 
counter-proliferation mission sets) and Special Warfare (unconventional warfare, foreign 
internal defense, civil affairs, and psychological operations).  Within these two arms of 
SOF, the surgical strike mission set requires a high degree of intelligence to “squeeze 
out uncertainty” before striking, while the special warfare mission set requires the 
operator to “wade into uncertainty” and still prevail.  The skill sets, as well as the 
psychological backgrounds of the operators themselves, likewise present a dichotomy 
along these same lines.  So it is not surprising to find different organizational cultures, 
and indeed rivalries, between the two communities within SOF.   
 A review of the literature finds other authors confirming this same finding.  Linda 
Robinson, a RAND researcher and independent author, has written extensively about 
SOF in the post-9/11 era and published several insightful works that address the gap in 
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understanding and properly utilizing unconventional warfare and the broader category of 
Special Warfare.57   As her focus on the unconventional warfare mission set shows, 
there is a remarkable difference between the kill/capture units of SOF (e.g., Army 
Rangers, Navy SEALs) and those in Army Special Forces who are assigned the primary 
role of support to resistance forces. 
 David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb in their 2007 work, United States Special 
Operations Forces, described SOF missions, organizations, and seminal operations, but 
more significantly highlight the neglect that senior defense and even SOF leaders have 
displayed in not pursuing strategic unconventional warfare options for the nation.  The 
authors, Tucker an associate professor on terrorism and irregular warfare at the Naval 
Postgraduate School and Lamb a senior fellow at the National Defense University and 
former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Resources and Plans, provide a 
persuasive argument for SOF leaders to provide independent strategic options for the 
nation that would include unconventional warfare options to support resistance 
elements.58   
 With ongoing wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, it is important to review not 
just the decision-making literature of the past few decades, but to also see and 
understand the emerging literature that is not fully absorbed into the body of knowledge. 
 
 																																																								57	For example see Dan Madden, Dick Hoffmann, Michael Johnson, Fred Krawchuk, 
John E. Peters, Linda Robinson and Abby Doll. Special Warfare: The Missing Middle in 
U.S. Coercive Options (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014). 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR828.html. 58	David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). 
	 54 
Emerging Literature 
 Certainly, how SOF addressed the Syrian conflict in the 2015-2018 period, where 
it did partner with local forces and advised, assisted, armed, and shaped their activities 
to fight ISIS, stands in marked contrast to the military’s reluctance to employ SOF with 
the resistance in the 2011-2014 period, the time frame of this dissertation.  Today, there 
are several articles emerging that address these activities – and the wider implications 
for unconventional warfare beyond Syria.  Two such works bear mention for this 
dissertation. 
 First, General Joseph Votel, the former commanding general of the US Special 
Operations Command and current commanding general of the US Central Command, 
co-authored a 2016 article entitled “Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone”59 which 
advocated for a stronger application of UW as part of a larger “political warfare” strategy 
that was proposed by the scholar Max Boot in 2013.60  General Votel and his co-authors 
reviewed not historical operations with resistance elements in this “gray zone” between 
open war and diplomacy, but advocated a holistic approach within the national security 
enterprise to employing such means as unconventional warfare, psychological 
operations, covert actions, and other elements in conjunction with but beyond classic 
diplomacy.  Votel highlighted that the US seems to have lost much of its Cold War era 
skills for operating in these gray zones with non-conventional means. 
																																																								59	Joseph L. Votel, Charles T. Cleveland, Charles T. Connett, and Will Irwin, 
“Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone,” Joint Forces Quarterly, 1st Quarter 2016, 
101-109. 60	Max Boot, “Political Warfare”, Council on Foreign Relations, Policy Innovations 
Memorandum No. 33, June 7, 2013. 
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 The most directly applicable literature vis-à-vis this dissertation comes from Will 
Irwin (who was also a co-author of the Votel article described above) who authored a 
paper entitled “A Comprehensive and Proactive Approach to Unconventional Warfare” 
that was based on the post-2014 period and the controversial Syria Train and Equip 
Program.61  Of note, the Syria Train and Equip program was not UW; it was a classic 
training mission to train and equip a force to conduct counterterrorist operations against, 
in this case, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).  In fact, the Train and Equip 
mission forbid any activities to unseat the Assad regime.  That said, Irwin correctly 
identified the root problem with the Train and Equip program in that it was initiated too 
late and should have been framed and focused on UW.  Moreover, Irwin strongly 
argues for the need to make contact with resistance elements early to enable the US to 
properly assess the feasibility and utility of working with such elements.  In sum, this 
short fifteen-page article is the most applicable item in the vast body of literature that 
touches upon the research question of this dissertation. 
 
Contribution of this Dissertation:  Addressing the Gap 
 There are one major and four minor conceptual contributions of this dissertation 
to the body of knowledge and literature involving the interagency and military decision-
making processes concerning support to resistance elements.   
 The major contribution of this dissertation is the provision of a detailed case 
study that demonstrates the role of organizational culture within the US military between 
the conventional military, including the kill/capture SOF elements, versus the 																																																								61	Will Irwin, A Comprehensive and Proactive Approach to Unconventional Warfare 
(MacDill Air Force Base, FL: Joint Special Operations University Press, May 2016). 
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unconventional forces (support to resistance elements) and ties this cleavage to policy 
outcomes in the early years of the Syrian rebellion.  In other words, a case study in US 
interagency and military decision-making process that shows the marginalization of 
MSRA/UW expertise in the formulation of strategic options provided to the president. 
 The four minor conceptual contributions follow.  First, this dissertation provides a 
case of theory testing for Niklas Luhmann’s Systems Theory, specifically the tendency 
of an organization to discard options dealing with complexity when those options are not 
part of the organization’s normal procedures and processes.  Second, in a similar vein, 
this dissertation provides a case study directly testing and supporting Alex Mintz’ two-
stage theory for foreign policy decision-making.  Third, this dissertation also provides a 
clear case for Mary Kaldor’s New War Theory, and specifically the element of that 
theory which argues the conventional military does not fully comprehend the irregular 
warfare activities that we are currently engaged in, and how a conventional military 
approach to these types of violent political struggles has limited utility and applicability.  
Fourth, this dissertation reinforces the rich literature on institutional and organizational 
culture theory. 
 
Chapter Summary 
 In this chapter I described the literature concerning US national security decision-
making in general, and specifically the US military decision-making process as it 
addresses support to resistance movements.  The analysis of the literature highlights 
the significant role of organizational culture and how that shapes the inputs from the 
various departments and agencies of the US government; e.g. the State Department, 
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the Intelligence Community, and the Defense Department.  Furthermore, the literature 
also shows organizational cleavages between the various military services within the 
US military.  These are well documented in the literature.  However, there is also a 
cleavage between the conventional military forces and the Special Operations Forces, 
and within the Special Operations Forces there is also an organizational cultural 
cleavage between those who specialize in kill/capture missions and those who 
specialize in UW.  It is this institutional cleavage – and resulting cultural cleavage – that 
has sparse literature coverage.  This is the arena of this dissertation, and this is where 
the dissertation’s contribution is found.  This study uniquely demonstrates the role of 
organizational culture within the US military between the conventional military including 
the kill/capture SOF elements versus the unconventional forces (support to resistance 
elements) and ties this cleavage to policy outcomes in the early years of the Syrian 
rebellion. 
 Given this background of the literature review, in three of the next fours chapters, 
I sequentially examine each of the three supporting questions: 
• Was there a viable and acceptable resistance force for the US to partner?	
• If so, how did the US military miss this opportunity?	
• What are the implications?	
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CHAPTER THREE: 
WAS THERE A VIABLE AND ACCEPTABLE RESISTANCE FORCE IN SYRIA 
DURING THE PERIOD MARCH 2011 TO JUNE 2014? 
 
“The common refrain among people skeptical of 
deeper involvement in Syria is that…America and 
its allies no longer know who the opposition really 
is.  Ford refuted that notion head on. ‘We’ve 
identified them quite well now.... We’ve worked 
with them for years. They need to get the tools 
they must have to change the balance on the 
ground.’” 
     --Former US Ambassador to Syria Robert S. 
Ford in an interview with Christiane Amanpour 62 
 
 
Figure 7: Syrian Youth and Rebels in Aleppo March 22, 2013. 																																																								62	Krever, Mick, Former U.S. Ambassador to Syria Robert Ford: I could no longer 
‘defend the American policy’, CNN, accessed at December 31, 2015, 
www.http://amanpoir.blogs.cnn.com/2014/06/03/former-u-s-ambassador-to-syria-i-
could-no-longer-defend-the-american-policy-robert-ford/. 
Source: 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/cia-helping-arms-shipments-to-syria-rebels-
through-turkey-report.aspx?pageID=238&nid=43580, accessed March 24, 2018. 
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 While the previous two chapters set the stage for the dissertation by 
detailing the research design, methodology, data collection strategy, and 
literature review, this chapter begins the analytical portion that provides the logic-
chain that links the first, second, and third key questions to the original research 
question, the hypothesis, and ultimately to the findings.  This chapter addresses 
the first of those three key questions: Was there a viable and acceptable 
resistance force in Syria during the period March 2011 to June 2014? 
 To answer the overall research question of why the US failed to provide 
military support to the Syrian resistance from 2011-2014, one must first establish 
that there indeed was a viable and acceptable resistance force in Syria and that it 
was recognizable during this period.  The purpose of this chapter is to present 
that argument, using data and information openly available during this period, 
with no benefit of subsequent data. 
 The steps to unfold this argument – the major sections of this chapter – 
are listed below:63 
• Framing the Analysis 
  --The Time Period 
  --Documenting the Resistance: A Note on Sources and Methods 
																																																								63	Some of the text of this chapter was from a research paper “The Syrian Resistance 
2011-2014” that I submitted at the University of South Florida for course CPO 5935 
(Comparative Politics in the Middle East) on November 24, 2016. Portions of this text 
also appeared in an unpublished paper that I emailed to my dissertation chair, Dr. 
Mohsen Milani, on November 6, 2016.  Portions of this chapter also appeared in the 
author’s section of Paul S. Lieber, Richard Rubright, Tom Searle, Seth Leuthner, Will 
Irwin, and Konrad Trautman, Syria Train and Equip: an Academic Study (MacDill Air 
Force Base, Florida: JSOU Press, 2016). 
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  --Temporal Roots of the Rebellion:  The Pre-Arab Spring Years 
Show the Political, Economic, Historical, and Social Underpinnings to the 
Rebellion 
  --Spatial Roots of the Rebellion:  The Arab Spring Provides the 
Regional Context and Spark 
• The Viable and Acceptable Resistance 
 --Defining the Viable and Acceptable Resistance 
 -- Evolution of Two Sequential and Overlapping Organizations 
 --Time Period 1:  The Bottom-Up, Grassroots Rebellion (Summer of 2011 
through December 2012) (See Figure 8 below for a graphic depiction of these 
four time periods.) 
 --Time Period 2: The Sunni Extremists Rise and Eventually Dominate the 
Anti-Assad Fight (September 2012 through June 2014 and later) 
 --Time Period 3:  The Emergence of Political and Military Leadership in 
Exile (December 2012 through June 2014 and later) 
 --Time Period 4:  Iranian Quds Force, Lebanese Hizballah, and other 
Iranian Surrogates Shift the Balance of Forces (February 2013 through June 
2014 and later) 
• The Counterargument: “Yes, the resistance did exist, but it was too 
fractured to be useful.”  The Rebuttal: “Advise and Assist.” 
• Synthesis: The Missed Windows of Opportunity 
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Framing the Analysis  
 The Time Period 
 As a reminder, this dissertation is scoped to the time period of March 2011 
to June 2014, which corresponds to the outbreak of violence in Deraa and 
concludes when the US administration finally decided to provide military support 
to the resistance when Mosul fell to ISIS.  
 This time period is significant because the grassroots resistance 
movement at that time emerged from Sunni cities and towns throughout Syria.  
Moreover, the resistance was politically moderate, non-Salafist, and trending 
2011    2012     2013     2014  
 !
1.  The Bottom-Up, Grassroots Rebellion (Summer of 2011 through December 2012) 
2.  The Sunni Extremists Rise and Eventually Dominate the Anti-Assad Fight  
(September 2012 through June 2014 and later) 
3.  The Emergence of Political and Military Leadership in Exile  
(December 2012 through June 2014 and later) 
4.  Iranian Quds Force, Lebanese Hizballah,  
and other Iranian Surrogates Shift the Balance of Forces 
(February 2013 through June 2014 and later) 
8 
For each of these time periods, 
I show: 
•  Description 
•  Political organization and  
leadership 
•  Military operations 
•  Strengths and weaknesses 
Figure 8: Four Time Periods in Analyzing the Resistance 
	 62 
towards gaining strength against the Assad regime.  As this resistance 
movement was gaining capability, paradoxically, it was essentially ignored and 
received little support from the United States.  Over time many of its fighters and 
new recruits then shifted their allegiance to the rising extremist organizations, like 
al Qaeda’s al Nusra Front and ISIS, both organizations being better armed and 
supported from outside powers.  The 2014 end point for this analysis is 
important: in June 2014 Mosul fell to ISIS and the nature of this internal Syrian 
rebellion became trans-regional with ISIS becoming the major anti-regime armed 
element.  The period from the summer of 2011 to the summer of 2013 was, 
however, a missed opportunity when the United States could have supported a 
moderate, local, resistance element that may have successfully challenged the 
Assad regime while denying recruits to the then-fledgling Islamic State.  This will 
be explained in detail throughout this chapter. 
 
 Documenting the Resistance: A Note on Sources and Methods 
 To present the argument that a moderate resistance force did exist in 
Syria during this March 2011 to June 2014 period – and that US intelligence and 
military officials should have seen and recognized it – it is important to show the 
existence of this force using information and data that was openly available 
during that period, with no benefit of hindsight or subsequent information.    
 Given the significantly different security environment then, as opposed to 
2018, it is not surprising that there was a rather extensive network of media 
reporters, academics, and activists operating in the Syrian cities, towns, and 
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countryside.  Moreover, resistance leaders were active on social media, including 
Skype, Facebook, and Twitter.  All of this allowed unique insights and access into 
Syria – albeit not the classic or traditional intelligence collection sources and 
methods to which the US military was accustomed.   
 One of the leading sources of information was the Syrian Observatory for 
Human Rights (SOHR), a non-governmental organization (NGO) founded in May 
2006 for the purpose of documenting and reporting the human rights conditions 
inside of Syria, even several years before the rebellion began.64  The SOHR was 
founded by Rami Abdulrahman (also known as Ossama Suleiman), himself a 
Syrian refugee, who fled to the United Kingdom in 2000 after spending three 
terms in Syrian prisons as a pro-democracy activist.65 
 Once the rebellion broke out, the SOHR shifted its focus to documenting 
the fighting. In December 2011, in an interview with Reuters, Rami Abdulrahman 
claimed to have expanded his source network from fifty-four, when the uprising 
began, to over two hundred.66  The SOHR posted these direct source reports 
onto its website that provided a running-analysis of the fighting.67 
 Media reporters from across Europe, the Middle East, and the United 
States, including the New York Times, Washington Post, and al Jazeera, 
																																																								64	Syrian Observatory for Human Rights website, accessed February 22, 2017, 
www.syriahr.com. 65	Coventry – an Unlikely Home to a Prominent Syria Activist, Reuters, accessed 
December 8, 2011, http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-syria-
idUKTRE7B71XG20111208. 66	Ibid. 67	In an interview with US Ambassador to Syria Robert S. Ford, on March 30, 2017, the 
ambassador assessed that the SOHR was reliable up through the 2012 period, but was 
accused of being politicized in the following years.	
	 64 
descended upon Syria.  One of the most famous was Washington Post’s 
Anthony Shadid, who won two Pulitzer Prizes for his coverage of the Iraq war, 
but who died in Syria while covering the rebellion in February 2012.68 
 Dr. Joshua Landis, then an assistant professor at the University of 
Oklahoma who later became its Director of the Center for Middle East Studies, 
wrote a detailed expose of the Syrian opposition in 2006-2007.  He served 
previously as a senior Fulbright researcher in Damascus in 2005, living a total of 
four years in Syria until the rebellion began.  He went on to established Syria 
Comment, a daily web-based newsletter on Syrian politics using his extensive 
contacts in Syria.  He published articles from these sources and provided his 
analysis as the rebellion unfolded.69   
 Another such organization, Syria Direct, emerged as a non-profit 
journalism organization that produced timely coverage of Syria while training 
Syrian and American journalists in professional newsgathering techniques.  
Although founded late in this time period in 2013, the organization made 
important contributions in tracking the rebellion.70 
 Indicative of the relatively open border during this time period, in May 
2013 Senator John McCain walked across the border into Syria and met with 
moderate resistance leaders of the Free Syrian Army.   																																																								68	Paul Farhi and Mary Beth Sheridan, “Correspondent Anthony Shadid, 43, Dies in 
Syria,” The Washington Post, February 17, 2012, accessed February 22, 2017, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/obituaries/correspondent-anthony-shadid-43-
dies-in-syria/2012/02/16/gIQAo2NyIR_story.html?utm_term=.b21cc5212ea0. 
69 College of International Studies, Department of International and Area Studies, 
University of Oklahoma, accessed February 28, 2017, 
http://www.ou.edu/content/cis/ias/faculty/joshua-landis.html. 70	See http://syriadirect.org/pages/about-us/ 
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 It is one thing to gather, collect, and report such information as a media 
reporter or activist would normally do, but it is quite another task to digest that 
information and produce an analysis that is useful for decision-makers.  A key 
private organization that accomplished that task was the Institute for the Study of 
War (ISW).71  A non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization, ISW 
produced six major studies during this period:  The Struggle for Syria 2011 
(December 2011), Syria’s Armed Opposition (March 2012), Syria’s Political 
Opposition (April 2012), Syria’s Maturing Insurgency (June 2012), Jihad in Syria 
(September 2012), and The Free Syrian Army (March 2013).  Together these 
documents provide 248 pages of high quality analysis of the Syrian resistance.  
Later in this chapter I introduce examples that provide a graphical display of not 
only the resistance units and leaders active during this period, but also the 
evolution and growth of their units.   
 Of special note, the ISW analysts did not just harvest reporting coming 
from the SOHR, the media, and others on the ground in Syria; they also 
established direct contact with many moderate resistance leaders via Skype, 
email, and telephone.  Utilizing fluent Arab-speaking analysts at ISW, the 
Institute established contact, rapport, and communication with resistance 
leaders.72 
																																																								71	In an interview with the US Ambassador to Syria, Robert S. Ford, on March 30, 2017, 
the ambassador gave high marks to the reporting and analysis coming from the Institute 
for the Study of War on Syria during this period.  	72	See the methodology sections in the above mentioned six studies, which can be 
found at the Institute for the Study of War’s website, www.understandingwar.org. 
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 Another private research organization or think tank actively studying and 
publishing on the Syrian resistance during this period was the Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP).  In September of 2012 WINEP produced 
a thoroughly researched study on the Syrian resistance, similar and consistent 
with ISW’s research, that documented the various fighting elements and showed 
their political and military evolution throughout the rebellion.  One of the lead 
authors of this study was Andrew Tabler, the co-founder and former editor-in-
chief of Syria Today, Syria’s first private-sector English language magazine.  
Tabler resided in the Middle East for fourteen years and achieved widespread 
access throughout Syria before the rebellion.73 
 There is one additional source and method that bears special mention.  
Near the beginning of the rebellion, Pechter Polls, which conducted opinion 
surveys in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, directed a poll of Syrian opposition 
leaders and elements in December 2011.74  Pechter Polls administered a follow-
up survey in June and July 2012 under contract for the International Republican 
Institute (IRI).75   
 The 2011 survey used the snowball polling technique with five starting 
points that polled over 186 opposition activists inside Syria.  The results showed 
																																																								73	Jeffrey White, Andrew J. Tabler, and Aaron Zelin, Syria’s Military Opposition: Howe 
Effective, United or Extremist? (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near 
East Policy, September 2013). 74	Pollock, David, “What Does the Syrian Opposition Believe?,” Wall Street Journal, May 
30, 2012 accessed February 24, 2017, http://washingtoninstitute.org/policy-
analysis/view/what-does-the-syrian-opposition-believe. 75	See 
http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2012%20August%2017%20Survey%20of%20Syrian
%20Opposition,%20June%201-July%202,%202012.pdf. 
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the opposition activists with a moderate political vision looking to Turkey as their 
governmental model.  This survey also showed only a small fraction of activists 
that strongly favored sharia law, clerical influence in government, or a heavy 
emphasis on Islamic education.76  The survey concluded that the “core of the 
Syrian opposition inside the country is not made up of the Muslim Brotherhood or 
other fundamentalist forces, and certainly not of al Qaeda or other jihadi 
organizations.”77 
 The subsequent polling in 2012 confirmed and expanded the findings of 
the earlier study. The activist respondents now expanded to 1,168.  The survey 
showed strong preferences for elections, a new constitution, a strong judiciary, 
and a need for a revitalized economy.  The respondents identified the Free 
Syrian Army and Syrian National Council as legitimate representatives of the 
Syrian people.78 
 I do acknowledge that these are low polling samples and the inherent 
limitations of the snowball polling technique; i.e., its non-random nature and 
propensity to oversample, albeit in small numbers.  Nonetheless, this is 
additional information pointing to the viable and acceptable nature of the Syrian 
resistance during this period. 
																																																								76	Pollock, David, “What Does the Syrian Opposition Believe?”, Wall Street Journal, May 
30, 2012, accessed February 24, 2017, http://washingtoninstitute.org/policy-
analysis/view/what-does-the-syrian-opposition-believe. 77	Ibid. 78	See http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2012%20August%2017%20 
Survey%20of%20Syrian%20Opposition,%20June%201-July%202,%202012.pdf. 	
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 All of this information was openly available to military, intelligence, and 
other national security practitioners during this period; however, none of this 
information was collected or reported by conventional intelligence means.  The 
above sources and methods documented a clear resistance inside Syria, a topic 
examined in the next section.   
 Finally, there was a significant source of information and analysis that was 
inherent within the US government whose reporting was credible and readily 
available to US senior military and defense leaders: the US Ambassador to Syria, 
Robert S. Ford.  Ambassador Ford served in Damascus from the very beginning 
of the rebellion until the embassy was forced to close in February 2012.  He then 
returned to Washington to lead the State Department’s Syria team for two years; 
thus, he served during the entire time of this dissertation’s frame.  Previously, he 
served five tours in Baghdad as the senior political advisor and later the deputy 
chief of mission.  In those assignments he served under Ambassadors John 
Negroponte, Zalmay Khalilzad, Ryan Crocker, and Chris Hill.79  He frequently 
visited various locales during the rebellion to meet with rebel leaders, civilians 
caught in the unfolding humanitarian disaster, and Syrian government officials.  
His insights and assessments were vital to those responsible for navigating US 
policy through these challenging shoals.  His writings and official Congressional 
testimonies figure prominently in this dissertation. 
 
																																																								79	Robert S. Ford, Testimony: US Strategy to Defeat ISIS, (Washington, DC: The Middle 
East Institute, September 24, 2014), accessed December 31, 2015, 
http://www.mei.edu/content/at/testimony-us-strategy-defeat-isis. 
	 69 
 Temporal Roots of the Rebellion: Pre-Arab Spring Years Show the 
Political, Economic, Historical, and Social Underpinnings to the Rebellion 
 There is perhaps a tendency to believe that the Arab Spring in general 
and the Syrian rebellion in particular simply sparked with the confluence of 
conditions unique to 2011 – like a chemical reaction.  That is a very incomplete 
and misleading judgment.  Indeed, the seeds of rebellion were sewn well before 
2011.  To be sure, the sprouts in Syria were weak and nascent, but they 
nonetheless existed and oppression nurtured them to blossom into rebellion by 
2011.  
 In 2010, a year before the Arab Spring uprising began in Tunisia, Dr. 
Walid Phares published The Coming Revolution: Struggle for Freedom in the 
Middle East.  In this prescient work, Dr. Phares predicted the upcoming uprisings 
and provided a constructivist description of the various social, economic, and 
political underpinnings of the upcoming upheavals that had been percolating over 
the previous decades.  Although he described the historical roots of the inevitable 
revolutions in the Maghreb, Sudan, Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, his 
descriptions of Syria are illuminating for this study.  Phares described the political 
oppression beginning in the early 1960s under the Hafez Assad regime that 
culminated with the 1982 uprising in Hama that left more than 18,000 dead.80  
With Hafez Assad’s death in June 2000, the control of the regime passed to his 
																																																								
80 Walid Phares, The Coming Revolution: Struggle for Freedom in the Middle East (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 2010), 203-210. 
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son Bashar Assad and his five security services, all involved in financial, 
business, and corrupting influences in Syria and Lebanon.”81   
 Although the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would complain in 
2012 that no one could identify moderate resistance leaders to him, Phares 
identified resistance leaders as early as 2010.  Resistance leaders like Ammar 
Abdelhamid, Michel Kilo, Riad Seif, Farid Ghadri, Abdel Halim Khaddam, and 
political organizations like the National Council for the Damascus Declaration, the 
Social Peace Movement Party, Syrian Reform Party, all of which would form the 
cadre and nucleus of much of the initial resistance activities by 2012.  Well 
before that, however, in 2006 three hundred Syrian and Lebanese intellectuals 
signed the Beirut-Damascus Declaration calling for functional democracies in 
both countries.82  Phares prophetically wrote in 2010: “When (the Syrian masses 
mobilize for change)…democracies around the world must stand by Syria’s civil 
society, all the way to a democratic revolution.  No doubt about it — it is 
coming.”83 
 Walid Phares was not the only scholar to document the existence of the 
roots of the resistance well before the uprising.  In 2006-2007 Dr. Joshua Landis 
published a detailed scholarly article in The Washington Quarterly describing the 
Syrian opposition.84   In his article, co-authored with Joe Pace, another 
researcher who spent ten months in Syria, Landis described in detail the Syrian 
																																																								
81 Phares, 211. 
82 Phares, 212-217. 
83 Phares, 220. 84	Joshua Landis and Joe Pace, “The Syrian Opposition”, The Washington Quarterly, 
30:1, Winter 2006-2007, 45. 
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regime opposition elements, including their contacts with the US embassy, 
beginning in 2000.   
 The political opposition to the Assad regime began to surface in January 
2001 when over one thousand political activists signed a manifesto demanding 
comprehensive political reform in Syria.  This Damascus Spring document was 
followed with a swift regime crackdown.85  Nonetheless, the embryos of 
resistance movements – human rights groups, civil society forums, political 
parties, and Islamist organizations like the Moslem Brotherhood – began to form.  
Twelve human rights organizations and centers plus other organizations like the 
Free Political Prisoners Committee formed and became part of the opposition.86  
Civil society forums like the Committee for the Revival of Civil Society and the 
Jamal al-Atassi Forum for Democratic Dialogue also organized.87  Kurdish 
political parties, although confined to the north, were indicative of the broad albeit 
not deep opposition efforts.  Collectively, popular protests, civil society 
gatherings, dissident presence in the media increased from 2002 through 2005.88 
 The Syrian regime’s collusion in assassinating the Lebanese political 
leader Rafik Hariri on February 14, 2005 stimulated further movement within the 
opposition ranks, particularly towards unifying efforts for a broader-based 
resistance.  The formation of the National Coordination Committee for the 
Defense of Basic Freedoms and Human Rights and a separate initiative from 
																																																								85	Ibid., 47. 86	Ibid., 48. 87	Ibid. 88	Ibid., 50. 
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another civil society group to open dialogue with the Muslim Brotherhood are two 
examples.89   
 On October 18, 2006 a diverse group of five opposition elements issued 
the Damascus Declaration that called for democratic change based on 
nonviolence and opposition unity.  Within hours, dozens of other groups pledged 
their support.  Landis evaluated this development: “For the first time in Syrian 
history, an assemblage of bickering parties and scattered intellectuals 
representing Kurdish nationalists, Arab nationalists, Socialists, Communists, 
liberals, and Islamists united under a single platform for democratic change.”90 
 Two months later, former Vice President Khaddam defected and joined 
the Muslim Brotherhood, exiling himself to Paris and eventually forming a new 
opposition coalition known as the National Salvation Front.91 
 In the few short years from the Damascus Spring of 2001, through the 
formation of a multi-group coalition advocating for democratic change in 2005, 
and to a high level defection from the regime in 2006, the seeds of Syrian 
rebellion were indeed germinating.   
 Phares’ and Landis’ works provide stunning detail to the Syrian opposition 
inside of Syria years before the rebellion began.  Had these works been stamped 
“Secret” and appeared in official military and intelligence channels, military 
leaders would likely have read them.  But because they were found in scholarly 
																																																								89	Ibid., 54. 90	Ibid., 55. 91	Ibid., 58. 
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journals and bookstores, perhaps most senior military and intelligence leaders 
never saw them. 
 
 Spatial Roots of the Rebellion:  The Arab Spring Provides the 
Regional Context and Spark 
 In addition to placing the Syrian uprising in its historical context of 
oppression and resistance beginning in the 1960s, one must also place the 
Syrian uprising within the context of the regional Arab Spring uprisings that 
began December 17, 2010 when “Tarek al-Tayeb Mohamed Bouazizi set himself 
on fire in front of a local municipal office after being harassed by police officers in 
the central Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid.”92  Given the underlying political, social, 
and economic grievances against the many corrupt and repressive regimes 
throughout the region, this spark ignited the uprisings of the Arab Spring.   
 
Figure 9: Map of the Middle East and North Africa 																																																								
92 James Brownlee, Tarek Masoud, Andrew Reynolds, The Arab Spring: Pathways of 
Repression and Reform (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 10. 
Source: 
https://arabspringanditscontexts.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/arabspring-m
ap-black-and-white.jpg accessed March 11, 2017 
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 These revolts spread rapidly to Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Syria, and 
Yemen, with protests of various intensities in Algeria, Iraq, Mauritania, Morocco, 
Sudan, and the Gulf States.93  (See Figure 9)  From December 2010 to June 
2013 approximately 90,000 people in 16 countries would die, but only the leaders 
in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen would fall.94  As Brownlee, Masoud, and 
Reynolds argued in their 2015 study, The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression 
and Reform, the variation in the outcomes seemed to be shaped by structural 
factors of relative strength of the state and the degree of pluralism within the pro-
democratic forces.95 
 Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds extended their argument with “…the 
best hope for breaking down authoritarianism was peeling off the top military 
commanders from the autocrat”96 and foreign intervention (read: foreign advisors 
as in the Libya case) plus the development of democratic institutions were also 
critical factors in their final analysis.97 
 In contrast to Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds’ text, Steven Cook, in his 
2017 work, challenged the idea of a new dawn emerging from the Arab Spring by 
arguing three factors conspired to preclude such a development: “the non-
revolutionary nature of the uprisings, the way leaders have leveraged institutions 
and their stickiness, and the search for identity among many in the region.”98  
																																																								
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid., 10, 11. 95	Ibid., 15. 96	Ibid., 219. 97	Ibid., 221-224. 98	Steven A. Cook, False Dawn: Protest, Democracy, and Violence in the New Middle 
East (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 241. 
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Cook’s thoroughly descriptive yet deeply pessimistic analysis seems to conclude 
with a prescription to do little but watch.  Moreover, his thesis suggests that short 
of a revolution, with the horrendous violence normally inherent in such 
endeavors, no democratic changes will emerge from the Arab Middle East.  
Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds seem more measured in their analysis with 
their prescription to develop democratic institutions, separate the security and 
military institutions from the autocrat, and provide foreign support and assistance 
for political reforms short of revolution.  Indeed, most violent political struggles 
are less catastrophic than full-scale revolutions.  
 
The Viable and Acceptable Resistance:  
 Defining The Viable and Acceptable Syrian Resistance 
 This phrase “viable and acceptable resistance” holds a prominent role throughout 
this dissertation.  Although I defined this term in the research design chapter, it bears 
some revisit here.   
 The word viable means feasible or capable of working successfully; in this case, 
capable of successfully executing unconventional warfare.  As cited in Chapter One, 
unconventional warfare is defined as activities to enable a resistance movement or 
insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by 
operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.  
So, in the Syrian context, viable refers to having that capability to disrupt, coerce, or 
overthrow the Assad regime.  Keeping in mind that the words “disrupt, coerce, or 
overthrown” are on a spectrum, a resistance force that is not yet able to overthrow the 
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Assad regime, but one that can still disrupt it, is also, by definition, a viable resistance 
force.  Moreover, once US support, like weapons, ammunition, and training, is 
effectively provided to such a resistance force, one would expect to see the capabilities 
of the resistance force expand from simple disruption to coercion and then overthrow. 
 The word acceptable means suitable or allowed.  Given the topic of this 
dissertation, I focus specifically on acceptable to the United States. In this case, I argue, 
an “acceptable” resistance force would need to meet three criteria.  First, the interests 
and objectives of the resistance force must align with interests and objectives of the US.  
This does not necessarily mean that the resistance force likes or supports the US, only 
that the interests and objectives align.  So, to the extent that the US sought the removal 
of the Assad regime and the resistance force did as well, then this first criteria is met 
regardless of whether the rebels were pro-US or not.  Second, the political end state of 
the resistance could not contradict US values; i.e., the resistance force could not be 
striving to establish a dictatorship while receiving US support.  Third, the resistance 
force could not use terrorist tactics, i.e. deliberately targeting civilians for political affects 
on a different entity, normally the governing or occupying power.  
 While the term resistance has many variants, most support the idea of an 
organized political opposition to a governing or occupying power.  Often this political 
opposition, or at least core elements of it, must initially remain clandestine or 
underground to avoid arrest from the governing or occupying power.  This organized 
political opposition – and the term “organized” spans a spectrum of various degrees 
from incipient to highly organized – could espouse violent and/or nonviolent measures 
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in its resistance activities.  Violent political struggles are not uncommon in world history, 
especially in the development of liberty for oppressed groups.   
 
 Evolution of Two Sequential and Overlapping Organizations 
 The timeframe of this dissertation extends from March 2011, the beginning of the 
violence in Deraa, to June 2014, the fall of Mosul and the change of US policy.  During 
this period, the resistance elements evolved both politically and militarily.  In the 
beginning of this period through December 2012, most of the grassroots, bottom-up 
resistance elements manifested themselves in the entity of the self-proclaimed Free 
Syrian Army (FSA).  These non-extremist, mostly secular fighters, made-up largely of 
Syrian military defectors, constituted the bulk of the resistance in these early years.   
 With the formation of the Supreme Military Council (SMC) – subordinate to the 
political entity of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces 
(SOC) -- in December 2012, the aperture of the resistance changed: it now included a 
wider variety of resistance elements, not just the secular-minded FSA.  The SMC 
included the Syrian Liberation Front (SLF), a Salafist but not extremist organization, and 
the Syrian Islamist Front (SIF), which included al-Nusra Front and the Ahrar al-Sham 
extremist groups.  Thus, only portions of the SMC met the litmus test of viable and 
acceptable resistance elements, as defined and framed in this dissertation. 
 These two sequential but overlapping organizations roughly align themselves to 
time periods one and three in the following sections. 
 In summary, I argue that the viable and acceptable resistance from March 2011 
to December 2012 was the Free Syrian Army.  From December 2012 to June 2014 the 
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viable and acceptable resistance rubric expanded to include the SMC, which included 
the remnants of the FSA and the SLF, but not the SIF.  To further describe this evolving 
resistance and to support my main argument, namely that the Free Syrian Army was the 
dominant oppositional force in Syria during the early years of the rebellion, the following 
four sections examine distinct but overlapping time periods, each providing a general 
description of the period, the political organization and leadership, military operations, 
and an assessment of the resistance’s strength and weaknesses during that specific 
time period.   
 
 
Source: http://www.nationsonline.org/maps/syria-map.jpg 
accessed March 11, 2017 
Figure 10: Map of Syria 
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Time Period 1:  The Bottom-Up, Grassroots Rebellion (Summer of 2011 
through December 2012) 
 
 Description 
 The resistance had its origins under the oppression of the Hafez Assad 
regime as described earlier in this chapter.  These political, social, and economic 
grievances festered under Bashar Assad and then erupted within the context of 
the regional Arab Spring.  Dr. Fouad Ajami, in his 2012 book The Syrian 
Rebellion, provided an exceptional analysis of the political, economic, and social 
underpinnings of the Syrian rebellion during this period.  With 32% of the 
population living below the poverty line, 20% unemployment (57% unemployed 
for those under 25 years of age), and a rating of 19th out of 22 for economic 
performance of Arab countries, the basis for social discontent was already 
strong.99 
 The spark for the Syrian rebellion occurred a few months before the 
summer of 2011.  In March about a dozen boys, aged 10 to 15, from Deraa were 
arrested for painting anti-Assad graffiti.  When they were finally released from 
their detention, the boys reported their abuse and torture.  One boy, Hamza al-
Khatib, died during his detention.  When residents of Deraa took to the streets, 
security forces shot and killed several protesters. 100 
																																																								99	Fouad Ajami, The Syrian Rebellion (Stanford, CA: The Hoover Institution, 2012), 73-
74. 100	Fouad Ajami, 65, 71.  See also BBC, Syrian Profile Timeline, accessed at bbc.com 
on December 10, 2015. 
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 Within Syria the viable and acceptable resistance in the summer of 2011 
through December 2014 was a Sunni-based classic local resistance to 
government repression.101  Violent resistance began in the summer of 2011 and 
became a threatening force by January 2012.102  In October 2011 the US 
Ambassador to Syria, Robert Ford, described and assessed the resistance as: 
 “The Syrian protest movement remains very large, widespread, and 
predominantly peaceful.  Yet violence is on the rise, most notably in Hama, Dayr al-Zar, 
Latakia, around Homs.  The Local Coordination Committees (LCC) are trying to keep 
protests peaceful, but as the regime continues to arrest and kill demonstrators, calls to 
take-up arms have become more common.”103   
 
 Political Organization and Leadership 
 At this time, there was no effective national leadership echelon to this 
grassroots resistance, neither within Syria nor in the expatriate community.  In 
September 2012, the Syrian National Council (SNC) formed as an umbrella 
political organization ostensibly uniting liberals, the Muslim Brotherhood, 
Salafists, and Kurds, but since the SNC was dominated by exiles supported by 
Turkey and Qatar, it had no close connection with the rebels actually doing the 
																																																								101	Jeffrey White, “The Military Opposition on the Ground,” Syria’s Military Opposition: 
How Effective, United or Extremist? (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy, September 2013), 7. 102	Ibid., 3.   103	Robert S. Ford, Syria: The Battle for Democracy and Change, Washington, DC: The 
Washington Institute, October 18, 2011, accessed at December 31, 2017, 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/syria-the-battle-for-democracy-
and-change. 
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fighting.104  Moreover, the inability of the SNC to arrange any significant Western 
support disappointed and angered most rebel elements.105 
 During the 2011 and early 2012 period, provincial military councils formed 
in Homs, Hama, Idlib, Deraa, and Damascus, each including local Free Syrian 
Army (FSA) battalions.106  The local fighters were grassroots guerrillas that 
emerged from the villages and suburbs to fight first the local security and police 
and then the Syrian military, as the latter was deployed to restore order.  Many of 
these resistance fighters were defectors from Assad’s military, Sunni soldiers 
who could not bring themselves to fire on the unarmed predominantly Sunni 
civilians.  
 In addition to the local fighters, there were three other components to the 
local resistance.  First, there was an openly public political resistance movement 
that manifested itself with a mixture of some expatriate political opponents and 
other activists still inside Syria.  Another key component of this resistance was 
the clandestine underground element within Syria.107 This was manifested in the 
village or neighborhood Local Coordination Committees, the district or city level 
Revolutionary Councils, and the major city or provincial Revolution Command 
																																																								104	Jeffrey White, “The Military Opposition on the Ground,” Syria’s Military Opposition: 
How Effective, United or Extremist? (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy, September 2013), 20. 105	Ibid 
106 Joseph Holliday, Middle East Security Report 5: Syria’s Maturing Insurgency 
(WASHINGTON, DC: Institute for the Study of War, June 2012), 7. 
107 Nathan Bos, ed., Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies, 
2nd ed. (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2013), 35-
36. This text describes the four components of a resistance as the underground, armed 
component, auxiliary, and public component. 
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Councils.108  The final key component is termed the auxiliary and consisted of the 
Syrian public, which provided either tacit or expressed support to the resistance.  
By mid-2013, the national level political-military structure took shape, as 
displayed in Figure 11.   
 
 
Figure 11: Political-Military Opposition Structure 
Source: Institute for the Study of War, Syria’s Maturing Insurgency, June 2012, 
19.   
 
 To some extent it is useful to examine line-and-block charts of 
organizations.  But often it is more useful to actually “meet the leaders.”  This is 																																																								
108 Elizabeth O’Bagy, Middle East Security Report 4: Syria’s Political Opposition 
(Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, April 2012), 16-25. 
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particularly relevant when one recalls how the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff during this period chastised his questioners and critics to actually show him 
the resistance leaders.  To that end, the following section is instrumental.  The 
Institute for the Study of War compiled this depiction of the leadership of the FSA 
in March of 2012.  As one can see from the photos, this layout is based on these 
leaders’ announcements on YouTube and Skype sessions where they explained 
their defections and described their combat activities inside Syria.  The 
depictions of these leaders follow on the next eight pages, beginning with the 
leadership element based in Turkey and then progressing to show the leaders by 
their operating regions.109 
 The first two of these eight pages show key FSA leaders in Turkey.  These 
commanders included Lieutenant Colonel Hussein Harmoush who founded the 
Free Officers’ Movement in June 2011 and Colonel Riad Asaad, the first 
commander of the FSA. 
																																																								109	Institute for the Study of War, Syria’s Armed Opposition, March 2012, 39-45.   
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Figure 12: Free Syrian Army Leadership in Turkey110 
 
																																																								110	Ibid., 39. 
Lieutenant	Colonel	Hussein	Harmoush	
Aﬃliated	With:	 	Free	Oﬃcers	Movement	
Area	of	Opera1ons:	 	N/A	
Lieutenant	Colonel	Harmoush	started	the	Free	Oﬃcers	Movement	when	he	announced	
his	defec>on	in	an	early	June	2011	video	statement.		Syrian	security	forces	detained	
Harmoush	in		mid-September	2011	and	executed	him	in	January	2012.	
Colonel	Malik	al-Kurdi	
Deputy	Commander:	 	Free	Syrian	Army	
Area	of	Opera1ons:	 	N/A	
Colonel	Malik	al-Kurdi	escaped	to	Turkey	aMer	his	late	August	defec>on	from	the	Syrian	
Navy.		He	has	made	numerous	video	and	press	statements	during	his	>me	in	with	the	FSA	
leadership.	
Captain	Mohammed	Hamdo	
Spokesman:	 	Free	Syrian	Army	
Area	of	Opera1ons:	 	N/A	
Captain	Mohammed	Hamdo	has	not	appeared	in	video	statements	but	frequently	
conducts	press	interviews	in	which	he	is	cited	as	a	“spokesman”	or	“senior	leader”	in	the	
FSA’s	media	headquarters	in	Turkey.	
	
Free Syrian Army Leadership in Turkey 
Colonel	Riad	Asaad	
Commander:	 	Free	Syrian	Army	
Area	of	Opera1ons:	 	N/A	
Colonel	Riad	Asaad	formed	the	Free	Syrian	Army	at	the	end	of	July	2011,	and	by	mid-
October	his	umbrella	group	was	aﬃliated	with	many	of	the	key	rebel	groups	opera>ng	on	
the	ground	in	Syria.	
Colonel	Ahmed	Hijazi	
Deputy	Commander:	 	Free	Syrian	Army	
Area	of	Opera1ons:	 	N/A	
Colonel	Hijazi	escaped	to	Turkey	aMer	his	frequently	par>cipates	in	video	statements	and	
press	interviews	from	the	Free	Syrian	Army	headquarters	in	Turkey	where	he	acts	as	a	
deputy	to	Colonel	Asaad.	
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 Figure 13: Free Syrian Army Leadership in Turkey (continued)111 
 
 The next five commanders led units in key cities, like Aleppo, Damascus, and 
Jebel al-Zawiya, all outside of the provincial organizations depicted on subsequent 
pages. 																																																								111	Ibid., 39-40. 
	
Free Syrian Army Leadership in Turkey 
Colonel	Abdul	Satar	Yunsu	
Commander:	 	Hamza	Ba(alion	
Area	of	Opera.ons:	 	Idlib	city	and	suburbs	
Colonel	Yunsu	has	par;cipated	in	a	number	of	video	statements	from	the	FSA	
headquarters	in	Turkey,	and	ostensibly	leads	the	Hamza	Ba(alion	around	Idlib.		However,	
there	is	li(le	evidence	that		links	him	to	eﬀec;ve	rebel	groups	in	Idilb.	
Captain	Baseem	al-Khalid	
Aﬃliated	With:	 	Syrian	Higher	Revolu;onary	Council	
Area	of	Opera.ons:	 	N/A	
Captain	al-Khalid	made	the	video	statement	that	announced	the	forma;on	of	the	Higher	
Revolu;onary	Council,	in	which	he	said	he	would	act	as	General	Mustafa	al-Sheikh’s	aide.	
Captain	Ahyam	al-Kurdi	
Commander:	 	Qashoush	Ba(alion	
Area	of	Opera.ons:	 	Hama	
FSA	leadership		named	Captain	al-Kurdi	the	commander	of	the	Qashoush	Ba(alion	in	
Hama	province.		While	al-Kurdi	con;nues	to	appear	in	FSA	statements;	however,	there	is	
li(le	evidence	that	links	him	to	eﬀec;ve	rebel	groups	in	Hama.	
General	Mustafa	Ahmed	al-Sheikh	
Commander:	 	Syrian	Higher	Revolu;onary	Council	
Area	of	Opera.ons:	 	N/A	
General	Mustafa	al-Sheikh	did	not	defect	un;l		late	January	2012,	but	when	he	did	he	
became	the	highest	ranking	oﬃcer	to	defect.		He	formed	the	Higher	Revolu;onary	
Council	outside	of	the	FSA,	but	the	two	groups	merged	in	February.	
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Figure 14: Free Syrian Army Unit Leaders112 
 
  
 
																																																								112	Ibid., 40-41. 
	
Free Syrian Army Unit Leaders 
Captain	Ibrahim	Munir	Majmour	
Commander:	 	Hourriyeh	Ba-alion	
Area	of	Opera.ons:	 	Aleppo	
Captain	Majmour	par7cipatesdin	several	video	statements	from	Turkey	in		July	and	
September	of	2011	before		returning	to	Syria	to	lead	a	rebel	group	in	November.		It	is	
diﬃcult	to	a-ribute	limited	engagements	around	Aleppo	to	Captain	Majmour’s	group.	
Major	Maher	Rahman	al-Nuemi	
Commander:	 	Moawiyah	Bin	Abi	Suﬁan	Ba-alion	
Area	of	Opera.ons:	 	Damascus	
Major	al-Nuemi’s	oratory	skill	and	press	interviews	from	inside	Syria	have	made	him	a	key	
ﬁgure	in	the	movement.		His	unit	has	conducted	some	of	the	a-acks	around	Damascus.	
Unlike	other	FSA	leaders	he	was	ini7ally	included	by	the	Higher	Revolu7onary	Council.	
Captain	Ammar	al-Wawi	
Commander:	 	Ababeel	Ba-alion	
Area	of	Opera.ons:	 	Aleppo	
Captain	al-Wawi	ostensibly	leads	a	rebel	unit	in	Aleppo,	and	he	has	reported	on		the	
groups	opera7ons	there.	However,	the	frequency	of	his	video	and	press	statements	
suggest	that	he	has	remained	in	Turkey	and	has	become	closely	aligned	with	FSA	leaders.	
Captain	Qais	Qataneh	
Commander:	 	Omari	Ba-alion	
Area	of	Opera.ons:	 	Dera’a	province	
Captain	Qataneh	leads	the	most	eﬀec7ve	rebel	organiza7on	on	the	Hawran	plain.		He	
leading	raids	and	ambushes	along	an	arc	of	small	towns	and	avoids	sustained	conﬂict	with	
security	forces.		He	has	also	coordinatetd	with	other	rebel	units	in	Dera’a	province.	
Captain	Yousif	al-Din	Yahya	
Commander:	 	Harmoush	Ba-alion	
Area	of	Opera.ons:	 	Jebel	al-Zawiya,	Idlib	
Captain	Yahya	joined	up	with	FSA	leadership	in	Turkey	a\er	his	August	defec7on	from	the	
Syrian	Army.		He	returned	to	the	mountainous	Jebel-al	Zawiya	region	to	lead	a	large	rebel	
force	conduc7ng	raids	and	ambushes.	
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 The following three pages show the FSA commanders and officers operating in 
Homs province in early 2012. 
 
Figure 15: Khalid bin Walid Brigade, Homs Province113 
 
																																																								113	Ibid., 41-42. 
Major	Ali	Mohammed	Ayoub	
Commander:	 	Hamza	Ba(alion	
Area	of	Opera.ons:	 	Rastan	
Major	Ayoub	commands	Khalid	bin	Walid’s	Hamza	Ba(alion.		Although	he	appears	to	be	a	
late-comer	to	the	broader	organizaBon,	he	played	a	key	role	in	wresBng	control	of	
Rastan’s	western	neighborhoods	from	loyalists	in	late	January	2012.	
Lieutenant	Ibrahim	Ayoub	
Deputy	Commander:	 	Farouq	Ba(alion	
Area	of	Opera.ons:	 	Rastan	
AMer	his	defecBon	in	July	2010,	Lieutenant	Ayoub	was	a	key	parBcipant	in	the	formaBon	
of	the	Khalid	bin	Walid	Brigade.	He	currently	acts	as	a	leader	within	the	Hamza	Ba(alion	
and	conBnued	his	leadership	role	during	the	late	January	2012	Rastan	oﬀensive.	
Major	Abdul	Rahman	Sheikh	Ali	
Commander:	 	Khalid	bin	Walid	Brigade	
Area	of	Opera.ons:	 	Rastan	
Major	Shiekh	Ali	became	the	leader	of	the	armed	resistance	movement	around	Homs	in	
September	2011,	organizing	the	various	defected	oﬃcers	under	the	Khalid	bin	Walid	
Brigade.		
Major	Ahmad	Bahboh	
Aﬃliated	with:	 	Khalid	bin	Walid	Brigade	
Area	of	Opera.ons:	 	Rastan	
Major	Bahboh	was	the	ﬁrst	leader	of	Khalid	bin	Walid	in	June	2011,	and	his	brother	
Abdullah	has	maintained	close	Bes	with	MAJ	Sheikh	Ali.		Bahboh	lead	rebels	against	
loyalist	forces	in	Rastan,	January-February	2012.	
Captain	Abdullah	Bahboh	
Commander:	 	Mohammed	Tlas	Ba(alion	
Area	of	Opera.ons:	 	Rastan	
Captain	Abdullah	Bahboh	joined	his	brother	Ahmad	during	iniBal	formaBon	of	Khalid	bin	
Walid,	and	has	maintained	close	Bes	with	Major	Sheikh	Ali	since	then,	appearing	in	a	
number	of	key	video	statements.		He	fought	with	Ahmad	in	Rastan	in	February	2012.	
	
Khalid bin Walid Brigade, Homs Province 
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Figure 16: Khalid bin Walid Brigade, Homs Province (continued)114 
 
																																																								114	Ibid., 42. 
Lieutenant	Faez	Ahmed	al-Abdullah	
Commander:	 	Ali	bin	Abi	Talib	Company	
Area	of	Opera.ons:	 	Houleh	region,	Homs	countryside	
Lieutenant	al-Abdullah	par<cipated	in	early	video	statements	before	appearing	days	a?er	
the	late	September	2011	Rastan	baEle	to	announce	the	Khalid	bin	Walid	Brigade’s	
withdrawal	and	claim	responsibility	for	eﬀec<ve	aEacks	in	the	Homs	countryside.	
Captain	Rawad	Ahmed	al-Aksah	
Commander:	 	Special	Tasks	BaEalion	
Area	of	Opera.ons:	 	Zafaraneh	
A	rela<ve	late-comer	within	Khalid	bin	Walid,	CPT	al-Aksah	announced	his	defec<on	at	the	
end	of	December	2011,	when	he	formed	the	Special	Task	BaEalion	under	the	leadership	
of	Khalid	bin	Walid.	
Captain	Yousef	al-Hamoud	
Commander:	 	Fadi	al-Qassim	BaEalion	
Area	of	Opera.ons:	 	Bab	Dreib,	Homs	city	
Captain	al-Hamoud	was	one	of	the	ﬁrst	member	of	Khalid	bin	Walid	under	Major	Ahmad	
Bahboh.		In	January	and	February	2012	he	led	rebels	against	loyalist	forces	in	Homs’	Bab	
Dreib	neighborhood.	
	
Khalid bin Walid Brigade, Homs Province 
Lieutenant	Walid	al-Abdullah	
Deputy	Commander:	 	Farouq	BaEalion	
Area	of	Opera.ons:	 	Bab	Amr,	Homs	city	
Lieutenant	al-Abdullah	has	appeared	beside	Lieutenant	Abd	al-Razaq	Tlass	in	both	video	
statements	and	clips	showing	the	two	young	defectors	working	with	their	mili<a	group	
inside	Homs’	Bab	Amr	neighborhood.	
Lieutenant	Abd	al-Razaq	Tlass	
Commander:	 	Farouq	BaEalion	
Area	of	Opera.ons:	 	Bab	Amr,	Homs	city	
Lieutenant	Tlass,	nephew	of	a	long-<me	Syrian	Defense	Minister,	was	an	inspira<onal	
leader	in	command	of	Khalid	bin	Walid’s	Farouq	BaEalion	in	Bab	Amr,	Homs.		He	was	
killed	in	a	regime	ar<llery	barrage	on	9	February	2012.	
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Figure 17: Khalid bin Walid Brigade, Homs Province (continued)115 
 
 
 
 																																																								115	Ibid., 43. 
Lieutenant	Amjad	al-Hamid	
Aﬃliated	with:	 	Khalid	bin	Walid	Brigade	
Area	of	Opera2ons:	 	Rastan	
Lieutenant	al-Hamid	was	an	early	member	of	the	Rastan	Free	Oﬃcer’s	movement	before	
joining	Khalid	bin	Walid	in	September	2011.		The	Rastan	naIve	appeared	in	a	number	of	
key	video	statements	during	Khalid	bin	Walid’s	formaIve	period.	
Lieutenant	Ahmed	Mustafa	Khalaf	
Aﬃliated	with:	 	Khalid	bin	Walid	Brigade	
Area	of	Opera2ons:	 	Rastan	
Lieutenant	Khalaf	was	one	of	the	ﬁrst	and	most	respected	free	oﬃcers	around	Homs	
aMer	his	defecIon	in	late	June	2011	and	subsequent	involvement	with	Khalid	bin	Walid.		
He	was	killed	in	acIon	during	the	late	September	2011	regime	assault	on	Rastan.		
Lieutenant	Mohammed	Abd	al-Aziz	Tlass	
Aﬃliated	with:	 	Khalid	bin	Walid	Brigade	
Area	of	Opera2ons:	 	Rastan	
Lieutenant	Abd	al-Aziz	Tlass		ambushed	security	forces	along	the	road	from	Homs	to	
Rastan	in	September	and	fought	in	Rastan	at	the	end	of	that.	He	has	not	appeared	in	
video	statements	since	then,	and	may	have	been	killed.	
	
Khalid bin Walid Brigade, Homs Province 
Captain	Ayad	al-Deek	
Aﬃliated	with:	 	Khalid	bin	Walid	Brigade	
Area	of	Opera2ons:	 	Rastan	
Captain	al-Deek,	who	has	been	called	Khalid	bin	Walid’s	chief	of	staﬀ,	was	one	of	the	
inaugural	members	of	the	organizaIon	under	Major	Ahmad	Bahboh,	and	has	parIcipated	
in	a	series	of	video	statements	claiming	responsibility	for	operaIons	in	Rastan.		
Lieutenant	Omar	Shamsi	
Aﬃliated	With:	 	Khalid	bin	al-Walid	Brigade	
Area	of	Opera2ons:	 	Rastan	
Lieutenant	Shamsi	was	an	early	member	of	the	Rastan	Free	Oﬃcer’s	movement	before	
joining	Khalid	bin	Walid	in	September	2011.		He	appeared	in	a	number	of	key	video	
statements	during	Khalid	bin	Walid’s	formaIve	period.	
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 The following two pages show the FSA commanders and officers operating in the 
Hama area in early 2012. 
 
Figure 18: Hama Countryside & South Idlib116 
 
																																																								116	Ibid., 43-44. 
	
Hama Countryside & South Idlib 
Captain	Zuhair	Al-Sheikh	
Commander:	 	Osama	bin	Zaid	Ba-alion	
Area	of	Opera.ons:	 	Idlib	&	Hama	
Captain	al-Sheikh	announce	his	defec>on,	joining	the	Abou	al-Fidaa	Ba-alion	in	early	
November.		At	the	end	of	that	month,	he	announced	the	forma>on	of	the	Osama	bin	Zaid	
Ba-alion	from	the	head	of	over	75	rebels	organized	into		5	‘companies.’	
Lieutenant	Ayman	Hallaq	
Aﬃliated	with:	 	Abou	al-Fidaa,	Osama	bin	Zaid	Ba-alions	
Area	of	Opera.ons:	 	Northern	Hama	countryside	
Lieutenant	Hallaq	appears	alternately	as	the	commander	of	the	Mohammed	Hussein	al-
Hallaq	Company	and	the	Iman	bin	Hussein	Abdallah	Company.		In	February		2012	his	unit	
captured	and	then	released	11	Iranian	pilgrims	travelling	through	Hama.	
Lieutenant	Abdel	Majid	Ayoub	
Commander:	 	Kifah	Sirmala	Company,	Osama	bin	Zaid	Bn	
Area	of	Opera.ons:	 	Khan	Shaykhun,	Idlb	
Lieutenant	Ayoub	has	appeared	as	a	‘company’	commander	under	Zuhair	al-Sheikh.	In	an	
early	December	video	statement		claimed	credit	for	defending	a	demonstra>on	in	Khan	
Shaykhun	and	destroying	armored	troop	carriers	in	the	engagement.	
Lieutenant	Mahmoud	Ahmed	Hummadi	
Commander:	 	Hassan	Al-Hassan	Company,	Osama	bin	Zaid	Bn	
Area	of	Opera.ons:	 	Idlib	&	Hama	
Lieutenant	Hummadi	has	appeared	in	two	videos	with	Cpatain	Zuhair	al-Sheikh	as	a	
subordinate	leader	in	his	organiza>on..	
Lieutenant	Mohammed	Base	
Commander:	 	Mohammed	al-Sheikh	Company,	Osama	bin	Zaid	Bn	
Area	of	Opera.ons:	 	Idlib	&	Hama	
Lieutenant	Base	has	appeared	in	two	videos	with	Cpatain	Zuhair	al-Sheikh	as	a	
subordinate	leader	in	his	organiza>on.	
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Figure 19: Hama Countryside & South Idlib (continued)117 
 
 To summarize the annotated photos of the previous eight pages, these self-
identified leaders described their defections, activities, and intentions on publically 
available media.  To an outsider, it is probably difficult to understand why and how the 																																																								117	Ibid., 44-45. 
Captain	Zahir	Abdul	Karim	
Aﬃliated	With:	 	Suleiman	Ba,alion	
Area	of	Opera1ons:	 	Karnaz	&	Muhradeh,	Hama	
Captain	Karim	claimed	responsibility	for	some	of	the	earliest	eﬀec@ve	a,acks	against	
regime	convoys	travelling	through	the	Hama	countryside	in	September	2011.		He	was	
severely	wounded	in	the	same	raid	that	killed	Radwan	al-Madloush.	
Brigadier	General	Radwan	al-Madloush	
Commander:	 	Suleiman	Ba,alion	
Area	of	Opera1ons:	 	Maarat	al-Numan,	Idilb	
General	Madloush	defected		Air	Force	Intelligence,	a	rare	example	of	defec@on	from	the	
regime	intelligence	apparatus.		The	FSA	named	him	commander	of	the	Suleiman	Ba,alion	
in	Idlib.		Loyalist	forces	killed	him	when	they	raided	his	safe	house	in	November	2011	
	
Hama Countryside & South Idlib 
Lieutenant	Talal	al-Masri	
Aﬃliated	With:	 	Khouder	al-Sharif	Company,	Osama	bin	Zaid	Bn	
Area	of	Opera1ons:	 	Kafr	Nabuda,	Hama	
Lieutenant	al-Masri	announced	his	defec@on	from	Syrian	Special	Forces	in	December	
2011	and	appeared	in	mid-February	video,	sta@ng	his	connec@on	to	both	Osama	bin	Zaid	
and	Abou	al-Fidaa	Ba,alions	before	engaging	regime	forces	with	an	advanced	AT	
weapon.			
	Lieutenant	Mohammed	al-Khal	
Aﬃliated	With:	 	Kouder	al-Sharif	Company,	Osama	bin	Zaid	Bn	
Area	of	Opera1ons:	 	Kafr	Nabuda,	Hama	
In	December	2011	Lieutenant	Mohammed	al-Khal	announced	his	defec@on	from	the	
Syrian	Army	and	the	forma@on	of	the	Khouder	a-Sharif	Company	of	the	Osama	bin	Zaid	
Ba,alion.		
Colonel	Adnan	Hallaq	
Aﬃliated	With:	 	Abou	al-Fidaa	Ba,alion	
Area	of	Opera1ons:	 	Hama	
Colonel		Hallaq	defected	in	December	2011	with	a	small	group	of	soldiers,	announcing	his	
plans	to	joint	the	Abou	al-Fidaa	ba,alion	of	the	Free	Syrian	Army	“under	the	leadership	
of	Riad	Asaad.	
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US military and intelligence community failed to see, understand, and present such 
information to senior US military leaders.  (But that is the subject of the next chapter.) 
 
Military Operations 
 
Source: Institute for the Study of War, The Struggle for Syria in 2011, December 
2011, 12. 
 
Figure 20: Fighting in 2011 
 
 In March 2011, protests began in Deraa, which were immediately suppressed by 
regime forces.118  The resistance spread to Homs in May, but by September the regime 
was effectively reacting to those events.119  Demonstrations then flared in Damascus, 
																																																								118Joseph Holliday, Middle East Security Report 2: The Struggle for Syria in 2011 
(Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, December 2011), 7. 119	Ibid. 
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but never materialized to the extent of threatening the regime.120  Then the first 
significant armed resistance emerged in the border area with Turkey in June.121  The 
regime fought back again, only to have the armed resistance re-appear in Idlib by 
October, by some reports under the direction of the Free Syrian Army.122 
 By the spring and summer of 2012, the rebels extended their control over 
large areas of northern Syria.123  Indeed, fighting had spread throughout most of 
Syria.124  In March 2012 the three most effective rebel units inside Syria included 
the Khalid bin Walid Brigade operating near Homs, the Harmoush Battalion in the 
northern Jebel al-Zaiya mountains, and the Omari Battalion in the southern 
Hawran plain.125  Figure 21 depicts the above-mentioned Harmoush Battalion 
and Figure 22 shows a map of the fighting by March 2012. 
Source: Institute for the Study of War, Syria’s Armed Opposition, March 2012, 
27.   
 
Figure 21: Harmoush Battalion in Formation, March 2012 																																																								120	Ibid. 121	Ibid. 122	Ibid. 123	Jeffrey White, “The Military Opposition on the Ground,” Syria’s Military Opposition: 
How Effective, United or Extremist? (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy, September 2013), 3. 124	Ibid., 4.  
125 Joseph Holliday, Middle East Security Report 3: Syria’s Armed Opposition 
(Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, March 2012), 6. 
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Source: Institute for the Study of War, Syria’s Armed Opposition, March 2012, 8.  
Note: References to page numbers in this map refer to the original ISW 
publication, not this dissertation. 
 
Figure 22: Map of Fighting, March 2012 
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 By June 2012, liberated rebel safe zones appeared in Idlib, as shown in 
the map in Figure 23, and resistance activities progressed, as shown in the map 
of Figure 24.  At this time, the private research group Institute for the Study of 
War was publishing not only detailed line-and-block organizational charts, but 
also the analytically more significant link-diagram charts detailing the various 
subordinate leaders and their relationships with others.  These link-diagram 
charts identified and displayed the rebels’ military councils and leaders in Homs, 
Hama, Idlib, and Deraa. 
 
Source: Institute for the Study of War, Syria’s Maturing Insurgency, June 2012, 
12.   
Figure 23: Rebel Safe Zones in Idlib 
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Source: Institute for the Study of War, Syria’s Maturing Insurgency, June 2012, 8.  
Note: References to page numbers in this map refer to the original ISW 
publication, not this dissertation. 
 
Figure 24: Map of Fighting, June 2012 
 
	 97 
 By the winter of 2012 to 2013, the rebels controlled large portions of Idlib, 
Aleppo, Raqqa, and Deir Ezzor plus portions of Homs province, Quneitra, Daraa, 
and Hasaka provinces.126 
 
 Strength and Weaknesses 
 By May 2012 this non-extremist resistance force grew to 40,000 
fighters.127  However, that number can be misleading since there was a wide 
spectrum of capabilities within that seemingly impressive number.  That said, 
even during this period it was possible for researchers to discern the capable 
from the not-so-capable units.  The below chart is an example of one of those 
assessments that triages the various rebel units between those that were 
effective and affiliated with the FSA, those displaying little evidence of their 
effectiveness, those with the FSA but infrequently engaging regime units, and 
those claiming to operate in areas with little to no reported engagements. 
 
																																																								126	Jeffrey White, “The Military Opposition on the Ground,” Syria’s Military Opposition: 
How Effective, United or Extremist? (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy, September 2013), 3. 
127 Joseph Holliday, Middle East Security Report 5: Syria’s Maturing Insurgency 
(Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, June 2012), 7. 
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Source: Institute for the Study of War, Syria’s Armed Opposition, March 2012, 
15.   
 
Figure 25: Free Syrian Army Units, March 2012 
 
 During this period, the rebels enjoyed an increase in the number of 
recruits and the provision of significant quantities of arms and ammunition, 
primarily from captured regime stocks.128  The rebels now had heavy machine 
guns, shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles, mortars, recoilless rifles, and 
artillery rocket launchers.129  External sources of arms and ammunition reportedly 
came from the Gulf States and Western countries, with the weapons smuggled in 
through Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq.130  The rebels seized facilities and 
inflicted losses on regime forces, all while the government forces became less 
capable.131 
																																																								128	Jeffrey White, “The Military Opposition on the Ground,” Syria’s Military Opposition: 
How Effective, United or Extremist? (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy, September 2013), 3. 129	Ibid., 8. 130	Ibid., 10. 131	Ibid., 4. 
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 Although conventional military personnel and researchers would judge 
such a loose organization without a unified political organization as a negative 
feature,132 to a rebellion or insurgency this is a desirable feature as it denies the 
regime the ability to identify and then strike a critical command and control 
headquarters or leader.  The diffused nature of any rebellion is useful and often 
necessary for its survival in these early stages. 
 The resistance was still weak in its ability to forge cooperation above the tactical 
fighting level.  Moreover, of significance, extremist Islamist fighters that later announced 
themselves as ISIS began to emerge on the battlefields.133  I will describe this in detail 
in the following time period section. 
 Despite the rebels growing strength by the late summer, in relative terms the tide 
began to turn, primarily due to Iran, Lebanese Hizballah, and Iraqi Shia militias direct 
and increasing involvement in the fighting.  As another researcher wrote, “Without this 
assistance, the regime’s downward trajectory very likely would have continued and 
perhaps even steepened.”134  I detail the Iranian involvement later in this chapter. 
 
Time Period 2: The Sunni Extremists Rise and Eventually Dominate the 
Anti-Assad Fight (September 2012 through June 2014 and later) 
 
 																																																								132	Ibid.,10. 
133 Elizabeth O’Bagy, Middle East Security Report 6: Jihad in Syria (Washington, DC: 
Institute for the Study of War, September 2012), 6, 18, 21-26. 134	Jeffrey White, “The Military Opposition on the Ground,” Syria’s Military Opposition: 
How Effective, United or Extremist? (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy, September 2013), 4. 
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 Description 
 By September 2012, however, other groups emerged on the battlefield as 
well.  Figure 26 shows the array of various rebel groups along a religious 
ideology spectrum.  Extremist groups like Jabhat al-Nusra, Fatah al-Islam, and al 
Qaeda in Iraq (predecessor organization of ISIS) appeared, while less extreme 
Islamist groups like Ahrar al-Sham appeared, too.  These latter Islamist groups 
rejected the killing of innocents and working with al Qaeda, but were still 
markedly distinct from the more secular FSA, which did remain the largest force 
in the 2012 to 2013 period.  
 Of significance to this dissertation and the definition of the viable and 
acceptable resistance, neither Jabhat al-Nusra nor Ahrar al-Sham fit the criteria 
of “acceptable.”  In Jabhat al-Nusra’s case, neither its political goals nor terrorist 
tactics were acceptable.  In Ahrar al-Sham’s case, its political goal of establishing 
an Islamist state in Syria was not congruent with US objectives.   The fact that 
Ahrar al-Sham would eventually lead the umbrella group Syrian Islamic Front 
(SIF) as part of the SOC would complicate US support to the SOC.135 
																																																								135	Aaron Y. Zelin, “Causes for Pause: Spoilers and Risks,” Syria’s Military Opposition: 
How Effective, United or Extremist? (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy, September 2013), 28. 
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Source: Institute for the Study of War, Jihad in Syria, September 2012, 18.   
 
Figure 26: Spectrum of Ideology, September 2012 
 
 Political Organization and Leadership 
 In the 2012 to 2013 period, the two major fighting elements that can be described 
as violent Salafists were Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham.  The former was 
established July 2011 and led by Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, who pledged his support 
to al Qaeda’s leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.136  The latter, Ahrar al-Sham, publically 
announced itself in January 2012 and is led by Abu Abdullah al-Hamawi.137 
 Although both groups are violent Salafists, they have distinctly different political 
goals and objectives.  Jabhat al-Nusra, an off-shoot and affiliate of al Qaeda, has trans-
regional and global aspirations and has no reservations about attacking innocent men, 
woman, and children if it serves the larger purpose of influencing political leaders to 
																																																								136	Ibid., 31. 137	Ibid., 25-28.	
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alter their course – the classic definition of terrorism.138  Indeed, the US officially 
declared Jabhat al-Nusra a terrorist organization on December 11, 2012.139 
 By contrast, Ahrar al-Sham has not practiced such terrorist tactics and has not 
called for a global caliphate; instead, it advocated for the establishment of an Islamic 
state only within Syria.140 
 
 Military Operations 
 Unlike most of the grassroots resistance elements described elsewhere in this 
chapter, Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham operated throughout the country.  This can 
be at least partially explained due to the groundwork (the underground) laid by Jabhat 
al-Nusra’s predecessor al Qaeda in Iraq inside Syria during the US-Iraq war.  It can also 
be explained by the role of foreign fighters who entered the conflict in Syria without the 
responsibility of defending their hometowns and villages that is inherent in any 
grassroots resistance element.   
 Both Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham had forces deployed in each of the 
geographic fronts of the fighting.  In most cases, both Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-
Sham partnered with non-extremist resistance elements to orchestrate tactical military 
operations against regime forces.  Indeed, many of the military engagements described 
earlier in this chapter included elements from Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham. 
 
 
																																																								138	Ibid., 27. 139	Ibid., 30. 140	Ibid., 27. 
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 Strength and Weaknesses 
 Some researchers assessed that the Salafist groups Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar 
al-Sham became stronger relative to the other groups due to better foreign support and 
more effective governance in areas they controlled.141  Others have noted that their 
ascendency is at least partially attributable to the lack of Western leadership and 
support to the more moderate factions, like the FSA.142  Another factor attributed to the 
rise of these Salafist groups is their better performance at addressing local grievances 
than the other groups, including the FSA.143 
 Acknowledging that obtaining an exact count of such irregular forces while 
fighting was still occurring was difficult and obviously imprecise, some researchers 
suggested that Jabhat al-Nusra’s strength was between 5,000 and 10,000 fighters by 
early 2013.144  Similarly, Ahrar al-Sham’s strength was estimated at 5,000 to 6,000 
fighters during this same period.145  These personnel numbers are much lower than the 
estimates for the FSA, but their fighting ability was consistently rated as higher due to 
the better outside support they received from their sponsors and their ideological 
commitment and motivation.   
 
																																																								141	Patrick Clawson, “Introduction: Posing the Question,” Syria’s Military Opposition: 
Howe Effective, United or Extremist? (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy, September 2013), 1. 142	Aaron Y. Zelin, “Causes for Pause: Spoilers and Risks,” Syria’s Military Opposition: 
How Effective, United or Extremist? (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy, September 2013), 25. 143	Ibid. 144	Ibid., 27. 145	Ibid., 28. 
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Time Period 3:  The Emergence of Political and Military Leadership in Exile 
(December 2012 through June 2014 and later) 
 
 Description 
 November and December 2012 was a significant time period marking the 
establishment of both political and military nodes at the national echelons for the 
resistance, although both nodes remained outside of Syria.  In December the United 
States Government (USG) and much of the international community recognized this 
national political entity as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people -- not an 
inconsequential event.   
 Prior to this time, the resistance was a grassroots, bottom-up led activity.  Now it 
had a national-level political organization, albeit outside of Syria for its own security, that 
presumably would unify behind a common political vision.  Moreover, a centralized 
military organization would supposedly provide a specific node for outside military 
assistance to then funnel weapons, ammunition, and logistics support to the resistance.  
This section describes the evolution of these political and military organizations, their 
leadership, and analyzes the strengths and weaknesses inherent in these 
developments. 
 
 Political Organization and Leadership 
 In November 2012, the Syrian National Council met in Qatar and 
transitioned its authority to the newly founded National Coalition for Syrian 
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Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (SOC).146  In December 2012 in Morocco, 
the United States and its partners in the Friends of Syria framework, recognized 
the SOC as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people.147  The SOC 
formed a military component, the Supreme Military Council (SMC) to manage the 
armed resistance.148 Over time both of these organizations evolved with 
changing relationships to other groups.  Of note, the FSA, headquartered in 
Turkey, also associated itself with the SMC; yet other FSA units and other non-
FSA units were also active as grassroots fighting elements inside Syria.149   
 On December 7 in Antalya, Turkey, the various rebel groups agreed to 
merge their coordination efforts into one organization, the Supreme Joint Military 
Command Council (SMC) in an effort to provide both a coordination platform for 
military operations and to provide a more streamlined conduit for funding support 
from the various foreign countries assisting the different rebel groups.150  By this 
time the rebels had organized themselves into five major fronts (northern, Homs, 
southern, western/middle, and eastern fronts) each with varying combinations of 
fighters including forces from the Syrian Liberation Front, Syrian Islamic Front, 
																																																								146	Jeffrey White, “The Military Opposition on the Ground,” Syria’s Military Opposition: 
How Effective, United or Extremist? (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy, September 2013), 21. 
147 U.S. Policy Toward Syria: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 113th 
Cong. 11 (2013) (statement of Ambassador Robert Ford, U.S. Ambassador to Syria). 
148 Ibid., 10.   
149 Holliday, Syria’s Maturing Insurgency, 9-10. 150	Jeffrey White, “The Military Opposition on the Ground,” Syria’s Military Opposition: 
How Effective, United or Extremist? (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy, September 2013), 21. 
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Jabhat Nusra, and other units.151  Of significance, this new SMC structure 
merged the previously separate support networks from Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar.152 
 While the grassroots elements of the rebellion existed inside Syria, the 
senior political and military leaders were in sanctuaries outside the country.  
Moaz al-Khatib, an Imam from the Umayyad Mosque, the largest mosque in 
Damascus, became the President of the SOC.153 General Salim Idriss became 
the leader of its military component, the SMC.154 The US provided $117 million in 
non-lethal assistance to the SOC in 2012-2013, which included training for over 
1500 local leaders and activists inside of Syria.155		
	
Figure 27: Moaz al-Khatib, President of the Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC) 																																																								
151 Elizabeth O’Bagy, Middle East Security Report: The Free Syrian Army 
(WASHINGTON, DC: Institute for the Study of War, March 2013), 6. 152	Jeffrey White, “The Military Opposition on the Ground,” Syria’s Military Opposition: 
How Effective, United or Extremist? (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy, September 2013), 21. 
153 U.S. Policy Toward Syria, 10.  
154 U.S. Policy Toward Syria, 10. 
155 U.S. Policy Toward Syria, 11. 
Source: voltairenet.org 
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		Figure 28: General Salim Idriss, leader of the Supreme Military Council (SMC) 
 
The following chart shows the structure of the Supreme Military Council.156 
 
Figure 29: Structure of the Supreme Military Council 																																																								156Jeffrey White, “The Military Opposition on the Ground,” Syria’s Military Opposition: 
How Effective, United or Extremist? (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy, September 2013),  22.  A clearer version of this same graphic was 
accessed from http://sspolicyblog.files.worldpress.com/2013/01/smc-structure.jpg on 
September 30, 2017. 
Source: chronicle.co.zw 
	 108 
 By March 2013 the resistance organized into five fronts as depicted below. 
 
Source: Institute for the Study of War, The Free Syrian Army, March 2013, 18.   
 
Figure 30: The Five Fronts and their Areas of Operation, March 2013 
 
 
 Of significant note, however, for all the advantages inherent in such an 
umbrella organization as the SMC, there were some disadvantages.  The 
resistance, as embodied now in the SMC, was not just limited to secular 
defectors from the Syrian military and other grassroots local fighters.  Salafist 
organizations were now part of the formal political structure of the resistance.157  
The color codes in Figure 31 are noteworthy: this figure shows the integration of 
three ideologically distinct organizations integrated into geographical commands 
																																																								157	Jeffrey White, “The Military Opposition on the Ground,” Syria’s Military Opposition: 
How Effective, United or Extremist? (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy, September 2013), 22. 
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fighting the regime.158  The yellow icons represent units of the Syrian Liberation 
Front (SLF); units that supported FSA units, but not the leadership in Turkey.  
The blue icons represent units of the Syrian Islamic Front (SIF), which had a 
Salafist ideology, aspired to a theocratic state, but were Syrian and without global 
or regional ambitions.   The red icons represent units of Jabhat al-Nusra, an al 
Qaeda affiliate with local, regional, and ultimately global ambitions.  This triage of 
these units is important for two reasons.  First, for local and tactical survival and 
effectiveness against the regime, the various forces united despite their 
ideological differences.  Second, in terms of the “viable and acceptable” litmus 
test for the resistance, the SLF would be acceptable, but not the SIF or, of 
course, Jabhat Nusra.  This complicated matters for US policy makers and 
planners, but it should not have been a showstopper. However, it could also be 
reasonably argued that if the US had channelized military support to the FSA and 
SLF, while denying support to the SIF, the US would have strengthened the very 
units whose goals were aligned with those of the US.159 
																																																								158	The description of these units is found in Elizabeth O’Bagy, Middle East Security 
Report 4: Syria’s Political Opposition (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, 
April 2012), 38-39. 159	Jeffrey White, “The Military Opposition on the Ground,” Syria’s Military Opposition: 
How Effective, United or Extremist? (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy, September 2013), 23-24. 
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Source: Institute for the Study of War, The Free Syrian Army, March 2013, 39. 
Figure 31: Opposition Groups by Front, March 2013 
 
 
 Military Operations 
  During this period, rebels seized the majority of the eastern sections of 
Syria including the provincial capital of al-Raqqa in March 2013.  However, in the 
western portions of Syria (e.g. Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and Damascus) the fighting 
essentially stalemated.160  It appeared to some researchers that the rebels had 
reached their limit in their ability to challenge regime strongholds.161 
																																																								160	Elizabeth O’Bagy, The Free Syrian Army (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of 
War, March 2013), 6. 161	Ibid., 9. 
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 Major General Idriss of the SMC stated that the top priority for the rebels 
would be to attack and seize regime airfields, targeting the regime’s strength and 
capabilities for air support.162  When the rebel’s northern front conducted their 
operations in the Idlib and Aleppo areas during this period, they correspondingly 
focused on seizing the Taftanaz airfield, which they did on January 11, 2013.163  
The rebels subsequently seized the airfield at al-Jarra.164  In the eastern front, in 
addition to seizing al-Raqqa city, the rebels seized Syria’s largest hydroelectric 
dam at al-Thawra and then placed the airfield at Deir ez-Zour under siege.165  In 
the central/west front, the rebels strengthened their positions in Jabal al-Akrad 
and Jabal al-Turkman, causing the local Alawite population to flee to Tartus and 
Latakia.166  In the Homs front, the rebels were forced to withdraw from Homs city 
due to regime counterattacks.167  In the southern front, rebels captured the Marj 
al-Sultan airport on the outskirts of Damascus on November 12, 2012.168  
Violence in Damascus escalated during this period, due in part to coordinated 
FSA and Jabhat al-Nusra operations.169 
 Strength and Weaknesses 
 In April 2013 Ambassador Ford, provided this assessment of the 
opposition during this period: 
																																																								162	Ibid., 23. 163	Ibid., 25. 164	Ibid., 26. 165	Ibid. 166	Ibid., 27. 167	Ibid. 168	Ibid. 169	Ibid. 
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 “The balance on the ground already has changed against the regime, and 
if you look at a map of what the regime controls now compared to what it 
controlled four or five months ago, you will see that the armed opposition has 
made steady, slow but steady gains.”170   
 Other researchers have highlighted weaknesses;  a shortage of heavy 
weapons, inadequate logistics, weak command structures, ideological divisions, 
and disconnection from political opposition.171 
 Casualties on both sides climbed during this period.  The Syrian 
Observatory for Human Rights estimated that as of June 2013, the number killed 
amounted to:172 
 13,539 Syrian rebels 
 2,518 foreign fighters (minus Lebanese Hizballah and other Iranian Shia 
militias) 
 25,407 Syrian soldiers 
 17,311 pro-regime, shabbiha irregular fighters and pro-regime militias 
 169 Lebanese Hizballah fighters 
 
 It was hoped that the formation of the SMC would assist in battlefield 
successes, too, but the legitimacy of the rebellion was ultimately based on the 																																																								170	US Policy Toward Syria. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations 
United States Senate, 113th Congress, April 11, 2013, 34.	171	Patrick Clawson, “Introduction: Posing the Question,” Syria’s Military Opposition: 
Howe Effective, United or Extremist? (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy, September 2013), 1. 172	Jeffrey White, “The Military Opposition on the Ground,” Syria’s Military Opposition: 
How Effective, United or Extremist? (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy, September 2013), 13. 
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effectiveness of the fighting forces on the ground and not the higher-level 
headquarters in exile.  On the other hand, if the SMC had become an effective 
conduit for the receipt and allocation of targeted US military support to select 
rebel units, it could be argued, such an efficient transfusion of aid could have 
inspired and led to greater tactical results on the battlefield.   
 Although the rebel’s strength grew during these three years, the 
resistance never approached the capability to topple the Assad regime.  That is 
not surprising, however, for two key reasons.  First, the US military never 
provided assistance until the December 2014 Train and Equip legislation was 
signed into law, with assistance not beginning until 2015.173  Second, by contrast, 
the large scale intervention to support the Assad regime forces provided by Iran, 
Lebanese Hizballah, and Iranian-sponsored Iraqi Shia militia groups Kata’ib 
Hizballah (KH) and Asa’ib Ahi al-Haq (AAH) escalated in 2012-13.  This re-
balance of power effectively checked the developing moderate resistance force 
strength and capabilities.  The final tipping point then occurred when Russia 
intervened with its own military forces in September 2015.  Moreover, in the 
closing years of this period in late 2013 and early 2014, as the extremist Islamist 
rebel units (ISIS and al Nusrah Front) received arms, ammunition, and other 
military support from other suppliers, individual grassroots and otherwise 
moderate fighters were enticed to join the ranks of these better-equipped and 
capable units.   
																																																								173	Congressional Research Services, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and US 
Response (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service report RL33487, October 
9, 2015), 3.	
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Time Period 4:  Iranian Quds Force, Lebanese Hizballah, and other Iranian 
Surrogates Shift the Balance of Forces (February 2013 through June 2014 
and later) 
 
 Description 
 As early of 2011, it was evident that Iran had deployed a multi-prong 
advisory effort into Syria to assist the Assad regime’s fight against the rebellion.  
The advisory effort included specialists from the Iranian ground forces, 
intelligence, law enforcement, and special forces organizations.  Some would 
argue that such a deployment of forces, perhaps characterized as advisors, is 
not much different than US advisory efforts in other crisis areas of the world.  
However, the Iranian effort also involved the commitment of its surrogate force 
Lebanese Hizballah, the deployment of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps 
Quds Forces (IRGC-QF) trained Shia militants from Iraq, and the formation of 
Syrian militant groups.  By early 2013, if not before, it became unmistakably clear 
that Lebanese Hizballah (LH), Shia militants from Iraq, and militants formed and 
trained from within Syria, all under the guidance and direction of the IRGC-QF, 
were directly engaged in combat operations and were able to ultimately shift the 
balance of forces in favor of the regime.174 
																																																								174	For a concise report of these activities and events, see Will Fulton, Joseph Holiday, 
and Sam Wyer, Iranian Strategy in Syria (Washington, DC: Joint Report by the 
American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project and the Institute for the Study of 
War, May 2012). 
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 One element that confirms these activities well before February 2013 is 
the US Department of Treasury’s designation of the IRCG-QF Commander, 
Qassan Suleimani, for his role in the “violent repression against the Syrian 
people” in May 2011.175  The following month, the European Union sanctioned 
the IRGC’s intelligence chief Hossein Taeb for his role in helping the “Syrian 
regime suppress protests.”176  Additional Treasury designations in 2011-2012 
designated three Iranian airlines, Yas Air, Iran Air, and Mahan Air, for their roles 
in smuggling weapons and personnel into Syria.177 
 A second element that confirms these activities is the words from the 
leaders themselves.  In April 2013, LH’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, 
along with the leadership of the Iraqi militants Kata’ib Hizballah (KH) and Asa’ib 
Ahl al-Haq (AAH), confirmed their involvement in combat operations in Syria.178  
 
 Political Organization and Leadership 
 With the IRGC-QF immediately subordinate to the Iranian Supreme Leader 
Seyyed Ali Khamenei, there is no doubt that Khamenei is responsible for authorizing 
and ordering these activities.   Under his direction, a combined expeditionary force of 
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Ground Forces (IRGC-GF), Quds Forces, 
intelligence services, and law enforcement elements operated inside Syria in support of 
the Assad regime.179 
																																																								175	Ibid., 10. 176	Ibid., 14-15. 177	Ibid., 16. 178	Ibid., 6. 179	Ibid., 6. 
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 In executing these activities, the IRCG-QF Commander, Qassan Suleimani, 
undoubtedly played the key leadership role in orchestrating the involvement of LH, KH, 
AAH, and the various Syrian militia units.    
  
 Military Operations 
 In the early years of the rebellion, LH simply augmented regime units with 
specialized support like providing snipers to assist with regime military operations.  But 
by 2012, when the regime began losing control over parts of Syria, LH began to take on 
a direct combat role.180  A battle in early 2012 in Zabadani near the Lebanese border 
saw LH deployed and engaged with rebel forces along this historical supply route from 
Baalbek to Damascus.181  In February 2013, LH fighters launched a ground offensive 
against rebel forces near al-Qusayr, with the FSA publicizing the fact of direct LH 
intervention in the fight.182 
 In April 2013, both KH and AAH fought in the Damascus suburb of Sayyeda 
Zeinah, with these two groups actually publishing videos and photos on the internet to 
document their operations.183 
 In addition to the employing LH, KH, and AAH, the IRGC-QF formed pro-regime 
militias, like the Jaysh al-Shaibi, that provided native irregular forces to fight on behalf of 
the regime.184  
 
																																																								180	Ibid., 21-22. 181	Ibid., 22. 182	Ibid., 23. 183	Ibid., 24. 184	Ibid., 20. 
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 Strength and Weaknesses 
 There are two key strengths to the Iranian use of LH and other surrogates in this 
conflict.  First is the sheer size of the fighting force that the Iranians generated.  Not 
including the LH, KH, and AAH fighting strength numbers, which were both formidable 
in size yet difficult to obtain, the IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari 
identified the Jaysh al-Shaibi Syrian irregular forces as numbering 50,000 fighters in 
September of 2012.185  Such a force size actually exceeded the 40,000 force identified 
with the FSA during this same period.   
 The second strength to the Iranian use of LH and other surrogates is Iran’s ability 
to generate or surge additional support as required.  As described in the opening 
paragraph of this section, Iran employed advisors from its ground forces, intelligence, 
law enforcement, and special forces organizations.  The Iranians also committed its 
surrogate force of Lebanese Hizballah.  The IRGC-QF trained and deployed Shia 
militants from Iraq and formed parallel militant groups from Syrian irregular fighters.  
Iran could ratchet-up additional support as required, taking full advantage of geography 
as a regional power with ground and air supply lines through Iraq into Syria and 
Lebanon. 
 The major weakness of these activities would not manifest themselves in 
immediate military capabilities; rather, they would weaken the long-term strategic 
mystique or psychological value of LH.  Long considered and billed as an Arab 
resistance force against Israel, LH demonstrated itself as a force that fought Syrian 
rebels attempting to overthrow their oppressive autocrat.  Those Sunni rebels could and 
																																																								185	Ibid., 19. 
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would be seen as the true resistance fighters, with the modern age LH emerging as a 
force that supported the repression of Sunni Arabs.  This psychological shift is not yet 
fully manifested, but indeed it will emerge as a key weakness and vulnerability for LH in 
the future.   
 These Iranian-directed reinforcements to the Assad regime shifted the balance of 
forces away from the rebels and back towards the regime.  But it took the arrival of the 
Russian forces and the further dissipation of rebels from the moderate factions to the 
extremists of ISIS and the al Nusrah forces to decisively tip the scales against the viable 
and acceptable resistance force.   
 
The Counterargument: “Yes, the resistance did exist, but it was too 
fractured to be useful.”  The Rebuttal: “Advise and Assist.” 
 A careful review of this chapter clearly shows that a variable and 
acceptable resistance did exist in Syria in the time period of 2011 to 2014.  The 
maps, charts, photographs, and screen shots from video testimonies – all 
contemporaneous to this time period – demonstrates the existence of this force.  
Moreover, analysis from academics, other researchers, and think tanks – again 
during this same time period – document that this information was publically 
known.   
 At this point, the skeptic might now acknowledge that a viable and 
acceptable resistance did exist, but the critic would be quick to add that it was too 
fractured to be useful or not dominant within the rebel coalition that formed in 
2012. Indeed, the nature of a grassroots uprising suggests there would be no 
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unified command and control structure to such an organization.  The skeptic 
would also add that when the national-level political and military headquarters 
finally did appear, they were located well outside of Syria and they enjoyed little 
respect from the actual fighters in Syria.   
 I acknowledge the above points.  But I add that having a diffused 
leadership structure is actually advantageous for an emerging resistance 
organization.  Had there been one unified headquarters, leader, or command 
post, it would have been catastrophic for the resistance if the regime identified 
and raided that location.  By contrast, a diffused leadership structure, like a multi-
headed hydra, would be able to absorb the loss of any one particular 
headquarters, leader, or command post.  That said, ultimately the resistance 
would need to unify itself, express one clear political vision for the future, and 
provide strategic guidance and direction for all of the resistance, but in 2011-
2012 that was neither necessary nor desirable.  This chapter also showed that 
the resistance was subsequently on track with the political SOC and its 
subordinate military SMC to achieve these political objectives of a unified vision.  
I would also add that with the formation of the SMC, Western supporters now had 
a central node to funnel support into the resistance, and such channelized 
support is also a useful means to align the activities of individual resistance units 
towards common goals and objectives. 
 Although the SMC could perform the above function at the strategic level, 
once weapons and supplies got into Syria, the function of further infiltrating and 
disseminating these supplies to the right units in the proper amounts needed to 
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be supervised and executed by a reliable infrastructure within Syria.  Here 
diffused distribution networks would not be advantageous.  But this is precisely 
the role that Western or other competent military advisors could have performed.  
To be sure, this is not a conventional military activity to advise and assist rebels 
behind enemy lines, but it is the classic doctrinal mission of US Army Special 
Forces units.   
 It is interesting to highlight a relevant historical case study that 
demonstrates the utility and effectiveness of an advise and assist mission in a 
denied area behind enemy lines.186  Prior to the Allied invasion of France in 
World War II, British, Free French, and American “Jedburgh” teams parachuted 
into France.  These teams made contact with existing Free French resistance 
fighters hundreds of miles behind German lines and trained, armed, advised, and 
assisted these local resistance fighters in guerrilla warfare and sabotage actions 
against German forces.  There were less than one hundred Jedburgh teams 
(three members in each team), which included eighty-three Americans.187  Their 
battlefield successes are well known to military historians, but the Jedburghs also 
achieved success in organizing and orchestrating the various resistance bands to 
have a common strategic and political vision, united behind French General 
Charles de Gaulle, with sequenced combat activities in support of the larger 
strategic campaign.  Without the Jedburghs, it is doubtful that the French 
resistance would have organized into anything more effective than local and 
																																																								186	This case study comes from Will Irwin, The Jedburghs: The Secret History of the 
Allied Special Force, France 1944 (New York: Public Affairs, 2005). 187	Ibid., xvii and xxii 
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disparate raiding bands.  Researcher Will Irwin, in a remarkable case study of the 
Jedburghs, succinctly stated:   
An often unrecognized contribution of the Jedburghs was their ability to 
keep marquis groups of wide-ranging political and ideological 
backgrounds focused on working together to defeat the common enemy – 
the Germans.  More than a few Jedburgh veterans have told me that they 
expended as much effort in preventing clashes between rival marquis 
groups as they did in fighting the Germans.”188 
 
 
 After reviewing the maps, charts, and photos of the Syrian resistance in 
this chapter, one might wonder about how a small element of modern day 
Jedburghs would have enabled the resistance to more effectively fight the Assad 
regime and the Iranian surrogates, while keeping the emerging ISIS organization 
at bay. 
 A viable and acceptable resistance force did exist, and an US military 
advise and assist effort could have enabled their effectiveness by organizing, 
training, equipping, and arming these proper resistance elements within Syria. 
 
Synthesis: The Missed Windows of Opportunity 
 This chapter reveals that not only did a viable and acceptable resistance 
exist during this period, but also, as time went on over this three-year period, 
other factors and players emerged that impacted the military conditions on the 
ground.  Clearly, the rise of the Sunni extremists and the increasing Iranian 
involvement complicated the calculus for when and how best to support to 
resistance. 
																																																								188	Ibid., 236. 
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 Given these conditions, when would have been the best period or periods 
to support the resistance?  The analysis of the four time periods addressed in 
this chapter suggest that the primary window of opportunity would have been 
between the summer of 2011 through December 2012.  (See Figure 32)  During 
the window, the resistance was bottom-up and grassroots in nature.  Similar to 
the Jedburgh experience described above, small Special Forces elements could 
have made direct contact with several of the various fighting units, assessed their 
capabilities and intentions against the litmus text of “viable and acceptable”, and 
supported the proper resistance units accordingly.  Moreover, of significance, 
during this time neither the Islamist extremists nor the Iranians had established 
Figure 32: Windows of Opportunity to Support the Resistance 
2011    2012     2013     2014  
 !
1.  The Bottom-Up, Grassroots Rebellion (Summer of 2011 through December 2012) 
2.  The Sunni Extremists Rise and Eventually Dominate the Anti-Assad Fight  
(September 2012 through June 2014 and later) 
3.  The Emergence of Political and Military Leadership in Exile  
(December 2012 through June 2014 and later) 
4.  Iranian Quds Force, Lebanese Hizballah,  
and other Iranian Surrogates Shift the Balance of Forces 
(February 2013 through June 2014 and later) 
24 
For each of these time periods, 
I show: 
•  Description 
•  Political organization and  
leadership 
•  Military operations 
•  Strengths and weaknesses 
Primary Window 
 of Opportunity 
Secondary Window 
 of Opportunity 
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powerful forces; the balance of power shifted from the regime forces to the FSA.  
A second window of opportunity existed with the establishment of the SOC and 
SMC in December 2012 and extended until roughly the summer of 2013.  By the 
time this six-month window closed, the Sunni extremists, the Iranians, and the 
Iranian surrogates had established sufficient strength to shift the balance of 
power away from the FSA and the SMC.  Supporting the latter was still viable, 
but became much more difficult with these shifting conditions and force ratios.  
All this said, the best way to judge and assess these actual windows of 
opportunity would have been to dispatch contact or assessment teams to the 
resistance forces to determine a ground-truth assessment.  However, it is clear 
that these windows of opportunity did exist and no US military action was taken 
to assess the resistance force units’ viability and acceptability. 
 
Chapter Summary 
 This chapter showed that a viable and acceptable Syrian resistance 
element did exist in the March 2011 to June 2014 time period.  The chapter 
detailed the pre-Arab Spring political, economic, and social underpinnings to the 
rebellion, as well as the regional context and spark of the Arab Spring.  The 
chapter detailed a concise yet thorough description of the Syrian resistance of 
2011-2014 using sources and information contemporaneous to this period. 
 In this chapter I also addressed the counterargument that the resistance 
was too fractured to be useful by providing the rebuttal that a diffused command 
and control element is actually desirable in this stage of resistance development 
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and that an advisory and assistance effort would have enabled both the 
development of more effective combat capabilities and a more unified chain of 
command at a more appropriate time.  I concluded this chapter with an 
assessment of a primary and secondary window of opportunity for supporting the 
resistance that the US ignored.   
 As will be shown in the following chapter, the conventional US military, 
perhaps looking for a well organized conventional military force vice a resistance 
movement, failed to see, recognize, and understand the significance of this 
resistance.  Perhaps too the conventional intelligence establishment was 
oblivious to or prejudiced against the manifestation of the resistance via social 
media, YouTube videos, and real-time Skype interviews vice conventional 
intelligence collection.  Perhaps both deficiencies together conspired to form 
glaucoma against what should have been seen and understood. 
 Regardless, no serious US military planning or effort occurred to assess or 
support the resistance during this period.  This void subsequently became filled 
with Iranian, LH, and other Iranian surrogates – and later Russian military 
intervention – that tipped the balance against the resistance.  Why and how this 
US military failure occurred is the subject of the upcoming chapter.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
WHY AND HOW DID THE US MISS THE OPPORTUNITY TO TRAIN, ADVISE, 
AND EQUIP THE SYRIAN RESISTANCE? 
 
 
“A broad study of special operations seems to 
indicate a trained incapacity, a deformation 
professionnelle, on the part of conventional military 
minds to grasp the principles of special warfare…. 
A civilian generally will have difficulty grasping just 
how alien and even distasteful special operations 
often appear to those trained and socialized in 
regular military behavior.  This point is important 
because if superior commanders do not appreciate 
or do not like what special operations forces might 
do, the strategic utility of those forces will be 
strictly moot.  In many cases the strategic utility of 
special operations rests in the hands of military 
officers who have attitudes, interests, and an 
understanding of war unfriendly to the potential of 
special warfare.”189 
     --Colin S. Gray, British-American strategic 
theorist and defense analyst. 
 
 
“Culture, psychology, and decision-making 
structure place limits on the development, delivery, 
and impact of effective military voice in national 
security policy discussions.”190   
 --Retired U.S. Army Major General William E. 
Rapp, former Commandant of the U.S. Army War 
College 																																																								189	Colin S. Gray, Explorations in Strategy (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1998), 
150-151. 190	William E. Rapp, Major General, “Toward Strategic Solvency: Ensuring Effective 
Military Voice,” Parameters: The US Army War College Quarterly, Vol. 46, No. 4, Winter 
2016-2017, 13. 
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 This chapter is the heart of the dissertation.  Once it is clear that a viable 
and acceptable resistance did exist in Syria in the March 2011 to June 2014 
period, as the previous chapter explained, one can reasonably expect answers 
as to why and how the US missed the opportunity to train, advise, and equip 
these resistance elements.   
 In this chapter I first review some elements of the research methodology 
described in chapter one that provide the framework for the analysis in this 
chapter. I will then transition to the following major sections of this chapter: 
• The Evolving US Policy and Strategy 
• Process-Tracing the Key National Security Decision-Making 
• The Conceptual Framework Applied to the How and Why Questions 
• How Did the US Make this Decision? 
• Why Did the US Make this Decision? 
 The dissertation is a qualitative methods single case study with using process-
tracing as described by Alexander L. George, Andrew Bennett, and Jeffrey T. 
Checkel.191  Primary source evidence included Congressional testimonies and memoirs 
from the key participants in the decision-making plus senior-level interviews.  This 
research also included reviewing and harvesting dozens of US government policy 
statements that both reacted to and attempted to influence events in Syria.  It was very 
important to place those information pieces onto a timeline and to then look for the 
																																																								191	Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in 
the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005).  See also Andrew Bennett and 
Jeffrey T. Checkel, Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool (Cambridge, UK: 
University Printing House, 2015).	
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relationships between the events that either influenced or reflected the US decision-
making. 
 To answer the “how and why” the US made this decision, I based the analysis on 
Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory as the conceptual framework.  Luhmann’s analysis of 
as to how systems or organizations deal with complexity, and specifically how they tend 
to deflect or dismiss developments or ideas that do not fit their established paths of 
similar decision-making, is remarkable for its similarity to the Syrian situation and how 
the US military assessed or failed to properly assess this complex situation.  To answer 
the “how” portion I used this systems theory and the more simplistic structural-
functionalism theory approach to examine the military decision-making process for 
providing inputs to the National Security Council.  This approach revealed the inherent 
flaws for developing military support to resistance activities by marginalizing 
unconventional warfare experts from the key operational positions in the decision-
making.  To answer the “why” portion, I showed that the conventional senior military 
leaders, in accordance with Luhmann’s theory, are prone to see and react to 
developments in their environments that make sense only from their autopoiesis-based 
frame of reference.  The military leaders – intelligence, operations, and planners – 
showed no ability to generate an unconventional response to complex unconventional 
situation unfolding in Syria, as this chapter will show.   
 In both of these cases – the how and the why – the analysis is fully congruent not 
only with Luhmann’s system theory but also with Alex Mintz’ Integrated Cognitive and 
Rationale Theory of Foreign Policy Decision-Making, as described in chapter one.  
Moreover, the “how” portion is consistent with classic structural-functionalism and the 
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“why” portion is consistent with institutional (or bureaucracy) culture theory, which would 
suggest that conventional military officers would offer conventional military solutions. 
 Examining the analysis, writings, and decision-making inputs from the key 
national security participants was essential.  These leaders included the President, 
Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the US 
Ambassador to Syria and lower ranking but key persons privy to the decision-making.  
In addition to the background research of this data, I interviewed the US Ambassador to 
Syria at the time, Robert Ford, and retired Lieutenant General Charles Cleveland, who 
was the most senior Special Forces (Green Beret) commander in the US during this 
period.  Ambassador Ford’s insights to the US decision-making were key and essential, 
while General Cleveland’s decades-long observations on the cultural conflict between 
conventional and unconventional military forces was equally significant to the causal 
analysis of the research question. 
 Given the data above, I constructed both macro-level process-trace charts that 
highlighted important events on one timeline, and then I distilled seven key decision-
making events into micro-level process-trace charts that dissected the decision-making 
by showing who made what input, when, how, and why.  It is important that readers 
familiarize themselves with the macro-level process-trace charts in Appendix A before 
proceeding in this chapter.    
 But first, to set the context of the decision-making, a review of the evolution of the 
US policy during this period is essential. 
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The Evolving US Policy and Strategy 
 From 2011 to 2014 – and indeed beyond this time as well – US policy evolved in 
reaction to and with the aim of influencing events on the ground.  What began as public 
expressions of support to the viable and acceptable resistance elements, coupled with 
the provision of non-lethal assistance to activist networks within Syria, evolved through 
calls for Assad’s removal from power, the establishment of “red lines” over regime use 
of chemical weapons, the disregard of violations of that red line, an apparent limited 
provision of weapons to the resistance, to a somewhat passive US response to the 
military interventions from Iran, Lebanese Hizballah, and Russia.  Only after Mosul’s fall 
to ISIS in June 2014, which marks the end of the time period focus for this dissertation, 
did the US president decide to provide military support to the Syrian resistance, albeit in 
the form of a train-and-equip program vice MSRA/UW.   
 Appendix A provides the macro-level process-tracing charts and data in a mosaic 
depiction of this evolving picture.  The first section of the appendix shows the activities 
on an integrated timeline organizing the events by actions taken by Syrian elements 
(e.g., regime, resistance forces, ISIS), other regional actors and international 
organizations (e.g., Iran and the United Nations), and the US government.  The second 
section of the appendix provides the detailed public statements issued by the US 
government during this period. 
 Beginning with a press statement on July 5, 2011, the US government urged the 
Assad regime to stop its repression against the protests that blossomed in the opening 
months of the Arab Spring.  The statement expressed support for a transition to 
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democracy and stated that the US would stand with the people of Syria in seeking their 
human rights.192 
 On February 24, 2012 the first meeting of the Group of Friends of the Syrian 
People, an organization of more than sixty countries with representatives from the 
United Nations, the European Union, and the Arab League, met in Tunis to discuss the 
Syrian situation.  In a joint statement, the participants strongly condemned the Assad 
regime and called for a political transition to a democratic, plural political system.  The 
statement also specified that Assad would need to delegate his full authority to his First 
Deputy during the transition period. The Friends Group also expressed disappointment 
at the UN Security Council’s inability to produce similar statements due to Russian and 
Chinese opposition.  The Friends Group also recognized the Syrian National Council as 
the legitimate representative of the Syrian people and called for increased support to 
the Syrian opposition.193 
 In February 2013, the US government would back these calls for a political 
transition to a democratic and pluralist system of government with significant material 
support.  In an official statement, the State Department noted that over seventy 
thousand Syrians had been killed in the previous two years of political unrest and that 
the regime had “sacrificed all legitimacy in a vicious effort to cling to power.”194  The 
statement specified that the US government had provided nearly $385 million in 																																																								192	Victoria Nuland, Department of State, Washington, DC, July 5, 2011, accessed 
March 3, 2017, https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/07/167577.htm. 193	Office of the Spokesperson, Department of State, Washington, DC, February 24, 
2012, accessed March 3, 2017,  https://2009-
2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/02/184642.htm. 194	Office of the Spokesperson, Department of State, Washington, DC, February 22, 
2013, accessed March 3, 2017,  https://2009-
2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/02/205092.htm. 
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humanitarian assistance and over $54 million in non-lethal support for local opposition 
councils and civil society inside Syria.195  Of significance, this support to the opposition 
included “training and equipment to build the capacity of a nation-wide network of 
ethnically and religiously diverse civilian activists to link Syrian citizens with nascent 
government structures.”196 This support was also intended to enhance the information 
security of Syrian activists, human rights organizations, and media outlets.”197 
  Within two months Secretary of State John Kerry announced the doubling of this 
non-lethal support to the opposition to $123 million, specifically mentioning the 
resistance force’s Supreme Military Council (SMC) as the recipient of some of this 
support.198  The total for non-lethal support to the resistance was now pledged at $250 
million.199 
 In April 2013 Elizabeth Jones, the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near 
Eastern Affairs, summarized US policy and strategy during testimony to the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee.  She reiterated US policy for a political transition in Syria 
that removes Assad and assures that Assad has no role during the political transition.  
She stated, “Assad has long lost his legitimacy…(he) will not play any role in that 
transitional governing body.”200  She added, “We are preparing for a Syria without 
Assad by helping the opposition lay the foundation for a democratic transition…. (We) 
and our partners are helping build the Syrian political opposition, including by 																																																								195	Ibid. 196	Ibid. 197	Ibid. 198	Office of the Spokesperson, Department of State, Washington, DC, April 20, 2013, 
accessed March 3, 2017, https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/04/207810.htm. 199	Ibid. 200	US Policy Toward Syria. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations 
United States Senate. 113th Congress, April 11, 2013, 6. 
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recognizing the Syrian Opposition Coalition as the legitimate representative of the 
Syrian people.”201   
 Jones highlighted the international coalition that was backing this political goal.  
In her statement she referred to the Geneva communiqué and its framework for the 
political transition that was agreed to in June 2012 by the members of the UN Security 
Council, Turkey, and the Arab League.202  In this testimony she added that the United 
States did not believe it to be in its best interests to provide lethal support to the Syrian 
opposition at this time.203 
 At this same hearing, the US Ambassador to Syria, Robert S. Ford, in response 
to a question to list the key strategic objectives for the US in Syria, replied that the US 
goals consisted of ensuring Syria’s chemical weapons do not fall into the hands of 
terrorist groups, Syria does not become a base for terrorist operations, Syria becomes a 
source of stability in the region (more specifically, ensuring the refugee flow does not 
destabilize the region), and a political transition occurs that removes Assad from regime 
from power and transitions the government to a democratic and pluralistic form.204 
 Ambassador Ford continued, “The groups that we are supporting, Senator, are 
talking about a vision of a country and a vision of a state that is inclusive and that will 
treat citizens equally regardless of their religion or their ethnicity.  And that is the best 
opportunity we have to isolate extremists.  I do not think it will be easy to isolate those 
extremists, Senator, but I think there is an opportunity to contain the sectarian divisions 
																																																								201	Ibid., 5.	202	Ibid., 8. 203	Ibid., 6.	204	Ibid., 22. 
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with the kind of outreach that I mentioned from both the political opposition as well as 
the Syrian Supreme Military Command.”205 
 Six months later, testifying to the same committee, Ambassador Ford, added to 
this policy description by stating the transition governing body would be established by 
mutual agreement between the Syrian regime and the opposition.  He stated, “Mutual 
consent would mean the opposition has a veto on the formation and the details of that 
transition government…. That said, the regime also has a veto.”206  Ambassador Ford 
underscored the fact that the USG had already identified and was working with the 
moderate armed opposition when he stated, “Our nonlethal support of a moderate 
armed opposition is therefore vital and is a point that General Idris of the Supreme 
Military Council has made to me repeatedly.”207 
 On August 21, 2013 chemical weapons were used on protestors near Damascus 
resulting in the deaths of 1,429 people; on August 30, the US formally attributed to 
attack to the Syrian regime.208 
 President Obama on September 7, 2013 called for limited military actions to “hold 
the Assad regime accountable for its violation of international norms prohibiting the use 
																																																								205	Ibid. 206	Robert S. Ford. Opening Statement Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
Washington, DC, October 31, 2013, accessed February 8, 2016,  
http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/216163.htm. 207	Ibid. 208	The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Government Assessment of the 
Syrian Government’s Use of Chemical Weapons on August 21, 2013”, August 30, 2013, 
accessed March 3, 2017, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2013/08/30/government-assessment-syrian-government-s-use-chemical-
weapons-august-21. 
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of chemical weapons.”209  He asked Congress to vote to authorize this use of force; a 
vote that never occurred. 
 Four months later the State Department announced that the USG was now 
providing nearly $260 million in direct support to the moderate Syrian opposition.  This 
January 17, 2014 statement specifically mentioned the “Supreme Military Council 
(SMC) of the Free Syria Army” and detailed the assistance as including support to local 
councils to create linkages among opposition groups, and strengthen grassroots 
organizations and local administrative bodies.  This statement specified that training and 
equipment would go towards a network of “over 2,000 grassroots activists…from more 
than 100 opposition councils and organizations” within Syria.  The stated purpose of this 
support was to enhance “the linkages between Syrian activists, human rights 
organizations, and independent media outlets…(and) training for networks of citizen 
journalists, bloggers, and cyber activists.”  This statement also detailed the provision of 
vehicles, tons of medical equipment, satellite access equipment, laptops, and radio 
communication equipment to the Supreme Military Council.210  It is striking to note that 
during the years of 2012-2014, the US military would excuse its lack of developing 
MSRA/UW options on the “fact” that no one could identify an opposition in sufficient 
detail or organization to properly support.  
																																																								209	The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Weekly Address: Calling for 
Limited Military Action in Syria,” September 7, 2013, accessed March 3, 2017, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/07/weekly-address-
calling-limited-military-action-syria. 210	Office of the Spokesperson, Department of State, Washington, DC, January 17, 
2014, accessed March 3, 2017, https://2009-
2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/01/220029.htm.  
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 With this brief overview of the evolving US policy and strategy as background, 
acknowledging that more details can be found in Appendix A, I now turn to process-
tracing the key decision-making events.  
 
Process-Tracing the Key National Security Decision-Making 
 Before presenting the analysis as to how and why this decision-making occurred, 
it is necessary to clearly describe the decision-making events themselves.  In this 
dissertation, I used Alexander George and Andrew Bennett’s technique of process-
tracing, which they define and describe as a method “to identify the intervening causal 
process—the causal chain and causal mechanism—between an independent variable 
(or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable.”211  George and Bennett 
describe several varieties of this technique, each rooted in detailed descriptions or 
narratives of the events, but each using theories in varying degrees.212 
 In my application of process-tracing in this dissertation, I first recorded the 
important political, military, social, and economic events occurring within the context of 
the Syrian rebellion of March 2011 to June 2014, to include those related events 
occurring prior to and after this period.  I then categorized and arranged over one 
hundred of those events not only by date but also of events by Syrian actors (Assad 
regime, resistance elements) and ISIS, actions by other states (minus the US) and 
international organizations, and actions by the US government to include internal 
decision-making events.  This categorization and arrangement of these events more 
																																																								
211 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development 
in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 206. 
212Ibid., 210-232. 
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clearly show the constructivist-like relationships between some of these events.  This 
thirty-plus page chart is captured in Appendix A to this dissertation.  The reader should 
review that appendix before proceeding to the next section of this chapter. 
 Appendix A is divided into two sections: the first is the chart of the events and the 
second contains the detailed and exact policy statements from the White House and 
State Department that are associated with the policy pronouncement events of the 
process-tracing chart.  Having these exact words is essential to chart the decision-
making process.   
 Next, from within this chart I identified and extracted seven key US government 
decision-making events, which are highlighted in blue ink in the appendix.  These key 
events require a further deep analysis to examine their contribution to and illumination 
of the US government decision-making.  These events are: 
1. Senior US defense and military leaders assess that “it is not clear what 
constitutes the Syrian armed opposition”  (February and March 2012). 
2. Interagency senior leaders express frustration at DoD’s thinking (mid-2012). 
3. President Obama rejects National Security Council recommendation for the 
CIA to arm the rebels (September 2012). 
4. Significant divergence apparent between DoD senior leaders and the US 
Ambassador in Syria on assessing the resistance (April 2013). 
5. Two months later President Obama approves plan for CIA to arm the 
resistance (June 2013). 
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6. In the wake of the fall of Mosul, President Obama orders the military to train 
and equip the resistance in their fight against ISIS, but not the Assad regime 
(June 2014). 
7. Congress approves the funding for the DoD train and equip operation 
(December 2014). 
 
 
 I next arrayed these seven events on a synchronization matrix that shows their 
relationship to each other over time and by principal actor.  (See Figure 33 above.)  The 
principal actors are shown as the President, the Secretary of State, the US Ambassador 
to Syria, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (the highest 
Figure 33: Overview of Process Tracing the Decision-Making  
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uniformed member in the US military and the principal military advisor to the President), 
the Commander of the US Central Command (the military command with operational 
responsibility for the geographic area in the middle east and south-central Asia that 
includes Syria), and the Director of the CIA.  Since the actual people that held these 
positions varied over this three-year period from March 2011 to June 2014, with the 
exception of the president, the individuals’ names are listed on the chart with a timeline.  
 In other words, the charts dissect the decision-making in these seven events by 
capturing which senior national security leader said what, where, when, why, and how. 
What follows is an examination of each of these seven key events. 
 
 Event One:  Senior US Defense and Military Leaders Assess that “It is Not 
Clear What Constitutes the Syrian Armed Opposition”  (February and March 2012) 
 The first key event occurred in February and March of 2012 when the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, and the Secretary of Defense, 
Leon Panetta, made separate statements to separate audiences that there was no 
identifiable armed opposition in Syria.  (See Figure 34)  In an interview with CNN’s 
Fareed Zakaria that aired on February 19, 2012, General Dempsey stated "I think it's 
premature to take a decision to arm the opposition movement in Syria, because I would 
challenge anyone to clearly identify for me the opposition movement in Syria at this 
point.”213 The Chairman would continue to echo this sentiment for the next two years, 
much to the resulting frustration of US Ambassador to Syria, the Secretary of State, and 
eventually even Leon Panetta.  But at this time, Secretary of Defense Panetta was in 																																																								
213 “U.S. Military Chief Dubious About Arming Syrian Rebels,” CNN, accessed February 
4, 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/19/us/syria/. 
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lockstep with the General Dempsey as they testified to the Senate Armed Services 
Committee March 7, 2012. 
 
 Panetta testified, “It is not clear what constitutes the Syrian armed opposition.  
There has been no single unifying military alternative that can be recognized, appointed, 
or contacted” Panetta testified.214  
 General Dempsey added that there are “…approximately one hundred groups 
that we’ve identified as part of the opposition….(but) some kind of coherent core…it 
doesn’t exist today.”215 																																																								214	The Situation in Syria, Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services United 
States Senate, 100th Congress, 2nd session (March 7, 2012), accessed September 23, 
2014, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsy/pkg/CHRG-112shrg76271/html/CHRG-
112shrg7621.htm. 
Figure 34: Senior US Defense and Military Leaders Assess That 
 “it is not clear what constitutes the Syrian armed opposition”   
(February and March 2012) 
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 It is important to view this military testimony in March of 2012 and its contrasting 
assessment to what Jeffrey D. Feltman, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near 
Eastern Affairs, testified to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee 
on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs just four months prior on 
November 9, 2011.  The assistant secretary testified that armed resistance to the 
regime was increasing, and that: 
 “One of the more promising recent developments is the establishment of the 
Syrian National Council (SNC), a coalition including secularists, Christians, Islamists, 
Druze, Alawis, Kurds, and other groups from both inside and outside of Syria who have 
joined together to form a united front against the Assad regime…. We continue to meet 
regularly with members of the opposition, including, but not exclusively, many SNC 
members.”216 
 Returning to General Dempsey’s testimony on March 7, 2012, a heated 
exchange developed between the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs on one side and Senator John McCain on the other, when Panetta stated, “It is 
not clear what constitutes the Syrian armed opposition.”217  With General Dempsey at 
Secretary Panetta’s side, Senator McCain responded, “General Dempsey, again I hear 
the same old refrain that I’ve heard for many, many years: ‘It’s not clear what constitutes 																																																																																																																																																																																		215	Ibid. 
216 U.S. Policy on Syria, written statement from Jeffrey D. Feltman, Assistant Secretary 
of State for Near Eastern Affairs, to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 
Subcommittee on Near Eastern Affairs and South and Central Asian Affairs, November 
9, 2011, accessed February 7, 2017, 
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Jeffrey_Feltman_Revised.pdf. 
217 The Situation in Syria, Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services United 
States Senate, 100th Congress, 2nd session (March 7, 2012), accessed September 23, 
2014, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsy/pkg/CHRG-112shrg76271/html/CHRG-
112shrg7621.htm. 
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the Syrian armed opposition.’  That was the same argument that this administration 
used for not intervening in Libya at the beginning.”218   
 Senator McCain continued, “We can find out who they are.  They’re not fighting 
and dying because they’re al Qaeda.  They’re not fighting and dying and sacrificing their 
lives because they’re Muslim extremists.  They’re fighting and dying because they want 
the same universal rights and freedom that we are guaranteed in our Constitution.  So I 
reject the argument that we ‘don’t know who they are’…. We should know who these 
people are and it would be easy enough to find out.  The best way, of course, to help 
them organize is to provide them with a safe haven where they can organize and train 
and equip.”219  (Of note, in a highly publicized move in May 2013 Senator McCain 
himself would cross into Syria from Turkey to meet with rebel commanders.) 
 In trying to rectify the apparent conflicting comments coming from the 
Departments of Defense and State leaders, the reader may focus on the words “armed 
opposition” rather than the political opposition that Feltman referred.  While this is a 
valid distinction, it seems inconceivable that at least some of the political opposition 
leaders inside Syria would not know at least some of the armed resistance leaders.   
 What General Dempsey was failing to appreciate about MSRM/UW – and what 
Senator McCain actually did – is that given information gaps of “exactly who are these 
people” with their “lack of organization”, the best course of action may be to dispatch a 
small team to make contact with those resistance leaders, assess their capabilities and 
intentions, and if so warranted, to assist them in organizing into a more coherent 
resistance.  This was not only the approach that the Department of State was pursuing 																																																								
218 Ibid. 
219 Ibid. 
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with the political opposition leaders, but this is exactly the approach that General 
Joseph Votel, a recent commander of US Special Operations Command, described in 
his article Unconventional Warfare in the Grey Zone.  General Votel described the 
World War II era example of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Jedburgh teams 
who parachuted into German-occupied France to assist in organizing, arming, and 
advising the French resistance.   
 “Many Jedburgh veterans later testified that they spent much of their time 
preventing the various resistance factions—each with different postwar political 
agendas and often violently opposed to one another—from fighting each other and 
keeping them focused on the common enemy, the German occupiers.”220 
 General Votel continued, “One need look no further than Syria today to imagine 
how much more difficult the Allied ground campaign to liberate France might have been 
had this internecine rivalry not been held in check.  With all of their tactical and 
operational successes, the Jedburgh’s greatest strategic contribution might have been 
in keeping the tenuous French Forces of the Interior coalition intact.”221 
 Although General Votel’s advice and counsel cited above would occur four years 
after General Dempsey’s testimony, Will Irwin, a co-author with General Votel, 
published a 2005 book documenting the history and operational use of the Jedburgh 
																																																								
220 Joseph L. Votel, Charles T. Cleveland, Charles T. Connett, and Will Irwin, 
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teams.  In that text he described the Jedburgh’s role in unifying the various resistance 
elements by making contact with them and embedding as advisors.222   
 
 Event Two:  Interagency Senior Leaders Express Frustration at DoD’s 
Thinking (mid-2012) 
 
 The second event involved interagency senior leaders – including Secretary of 
Defense Panetta – expressing frustration at DoD’s conventional thinking.  As Figure 35 
																																																								222	Will Irwin. The Jedburghs: The Secret History of the Allied Special Forces, 
France 1944 (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 236, based on correspondence 
and interviews with more than sixty US, British, and French Jedburgh veterans 
from 1985 to 2005. 
 
Figure 35: Interagency Senior Leaders Express Frustration at DoD’s 
Thinking (July 2012) 
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shows above, in July 2012 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and CIA Director David 
Petraeus discussed supporting the Syrian resistance with weapons.  As Clinton writes in 
her memoirs, DoD was reluctant to get involved and consistently offered dire 
projections.  She added that even Leon Panetta – then the Secretary of Defense – was 
frustrated with the lack of military options coming from his generals.  “He knew from his 
own time leading the CIA what our intelligence operatives could do.”223 
 Here not only do we see frustration within the elite levels of the National Security 
Council (the Secretaries of Defense and State, plus the Director of the CIA), but we see 
frustration at the very top of the Department of Defense with the assessments and 
options being presented by the conventional generals.   
 
 Event Three: President Obama Rejects National Security Council 
Recommendation for the CIA to Arm the Rebels (September 2012) 
  According to Clinton, this frustration would lead to CIA Director Petraeus 
to not wait for the military and instead independently recommend a proposal to the 
president for the CIA to arm and assist the Syrian resistance.  This is the third key event 
in this decision-making, which occurred in September 2012.  Petraeus’ proposal was 
supported by both the Department of State and the Department of Defense; however, 
as Clinton later described the event, the president was “worried that arming the rebels 
was not likely to be enough to drive Assad from power…. unintended consequences to 
consider.”224  (See Figure 36) 
 																																																								
223 Hillary Clinton, Hard Choices (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2014), 462. 
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 While this may seem prudent to the casual observer, it really suggests that the 
planners either did not present a comprehensive and coherent campaign plan, which 
would link individual tactical actions to a holistic approach with strategic objectives – in 
this case to topple the Assad regime – or that the president simply did not agree with 
either that assessment or projected outcome.  What we do know, according to Clinton in 
her memoirs, is that the president did reject such a course of action from the CIA and 
the senior interagency leaders at this time.  He would reverse his own decision, 
however, by the following year after the Assad regime used chemical weapons against 
his own people. 
Figure 36: President Obama Rejects National Security Council 
Recommendation for CIA to Arm the Rebels (Sept 2012) 
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 It is also important to note the timing of this decision, which occurred within two 
months of the presidential elections of 2012.  One could reasonably argue that 
President Obama, who campaigned in 2008 in large part with themes of no more wars 
and bring the troops home, would not support any re-insertion of US troops into the 
Middle East, especially during the run-up to the election.  After all, President Obama did 
withdraw all combat troops from Iraq by December 2011, as he promised in his 2008 
election campaign.  But there is a distinction between overtly committing US troops to a 
combat role and authorizing a presumably secret CIA activity.  However, that could 
arguably be a distinction without a difference, given the backdrop of the upcoming 
election.  As mentioned above, the president would reverse this decision nine months 
later in June 2013, after the Syrian regime used chemical weapons against its own 
people – and seven months after he won re-election. 
 Did the backdrop of the 2012 election affect the military’s thinking?  Certainly 
given the president’s campaign rhetoric and his action of withdrawing US troops from 
Iraq, it would appear unlikely that the military would recommend any re-insertion of 
conventional US troops absent any significant threat to US national security interests.  
At the same time, however, it is important to note the increasing role of the State 
Department in addressing the Syrian situation in 2012, which included orchestrating a 
coalition to condemn the Assad regime and call for his removal, recognizing the Syrian 
National Council as the legitimate representatives of the Syrian people, and increasing 
humanitarian aid to the Syrian people.  During this 2012 election campaign season, 
while the State Department increased its efforts in Syria, there was no supporting US 
military involvement and no serious consideration for unconventional warfare. 
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 Event Four: Significant Divergence Apparent Between DoD Senior Leaders 
and the US Ambassador in Syria on Assessing the Resistance (April 2013) 
 
 As described above in Figure 37, the fourth event involved two separate 
testimonies to different Congressional committees which occurred within seven days of 
each other in April 2013 which demonstrated the significant disconnect between the US 
Ambassador to Syria – living in Damascus at this time – and the senior generals in 
Washington.  On April 11, 2013 the US Ambassador to Syria, Robert S. Ford, testified 
to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Department of State, under his 
cognizance as the ambassador, trained and equipped over 1,500 local leaders and 
Figure 37: Significant Divergence Apparent Between DoD Senior 
Leaders and the US Ambassador in Syria on Assessing the Resistance 
(April 2013) 
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activists inside Syria.225  To be sure, this training, advice, and equipment were all non-
lethal, but any student of resistance movements knows that advice and assistance on 
organizing a resistance movement is essential to both non-violent and violent resistance 
activities.226 
 In describing and presenting this critical event, it is important to read the actual 
words from these senior leaders.  Ambassador Ford testified: 
Since December 2012, the United States, along with our international partners, 
has recognized the Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC) as the legitimate 
representative of the Syrian people.  Comprised of diverse representatives inside 
and outside Syria free from the influence of violent extremists.227 
 
We are providing $117 million in non-lethal, transition assistance to the Coalition 
and a range of local councils and grassroots groups inside Syria to build a 
network of ethnically and religiously diverse civilian activist from the top down as 
well as the bottom up.  These funds are strengthening local councils, civil society 
groups, unarmed political activists, and free media to improve governance, 
accountability, and service delivery at the subnational and national level…. The 
United States has supplied Syrian activists with thousands of pieces of 
communications gear…. We boosted private radio station signals, extending the 
reach of broadcast on FM stations, and funded media outlets….228 
 
The United States also trained over 1,500 local leaders and activists…from over 
one hundred different provincial councils.229 
  
																																																								225	In a subsequent interview with Ambassador Ford by the author, the ambassador 
added that this 1,500 number was a cumulative accounting of recipients of this training 
and not a current student roster.  Moreover, some of this number could have been a 
recipient of more than one type of training event.  Ambassador Robert S. Ford, former 
ambassador to Syria, in an interview with the author March 30, 2017. 
226 Nathan Bos, ed., Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies, 
2nd ed. (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2013), 35-
36, 290-293. 227	US Policy Toward Syria. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations 
United States Senate. 113th Congress, April 11, 2013, 11.	228	Ibid.	
229 Ibid. 
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 Of note, Ambassador Ford also spoke of the vetting of these leaders:230 “To 
mitigate the risk that our assistance might end up in the hands of extremists, we will 
continue to rely on the effective, formal processes that have been established across 
various agencies in the government to vet the recipients of US assistance.”231 
 Thus, in this concise pronouncement of US diplomatic objectives for Syria in 
early 2013, one clearly sees significant levels of support ($117 million) to an obviously 
identifiable network of activists.  The network included leaders both inside and outside 
of Syria, over 1,500 local leaders and activists from over 100 different provincial 
councils, a military or armed component, and with a “formal (and) effective” interagency 
vetting process. 
  During this testimony Ambassador Ford mentioned that in the previous week, he 
had personally met with the commander of the opposition armed forces in the Aleppo 
region.232  Such a statement would be in sharp contrast to the following week’s 
Congressional testimony from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
 A significant divergence became apparent with conflicting assessments 
concerning the identification of these resistance elements between the Department of 
State and the Department of Defense.  The April 2013 Department of State statements 
to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, cited above, were not congruent with the 
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Martin 																																																								
230 The following several paragraphs – through the exchange between Senator McCain 
and General Dempsey – are taken verbatim from the author’s previously published 
work, Paul S. Lieber, Richard Rubright, Tom Searle, Seth Leuthner, Will Irwin, and 
Konrad Trautman, Syria Train and Equip: an Academic Study (MacDill Air Force Base, 
FL: JSOU Press, 2016). 
231 US Policy Toward Syria. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations 
United States Senate, 113th Congress, April 11, 2013, 11. 232	Ibid., 9. 
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Dempsey’s testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee just six days later.  In 
that testimony General Dempsey, while acknowledging that State, Defense, and the CIA 
all supported the late-2012 CIA initiative to provide arms to the resistance (which 
President Obama disapproved), by implication General Dempsey acknowledged that 
the US government did identify supportable resistance elements in 2012.  More 
incredulous, however, in this 2013 testimony the general then stated that he could no 
longer identify the proper elements within the resistance to support.  The exchange with 
Senator McCain is illuminating: 
Senator McCain: General Dempsey, when you and Secretary Panetta testified 
that both of you recommended the supply of weapons to the resistance, what led 
you to that conclusion and recommendation? 
 
General Dempsey: At the time, the recommendation was based on – we felt like 
we had a clear enough understanding of the moderate opposition and we felt as 
though it was in the long term interest of Syria as a nation state, that the 
institutions would not fail.  At that time, it was proper at that moment to intervene 
that way. 
 
Senator McCain: Is it proper now to provide them with weapons? 
General Dempsey: To tell you the truth, it is actually more confusing on the 
opposition side today than it was six months ago.  There are more weapons in 
Syria. 
 
Senator McCain: So if we had made the decision then to supply them with 
weapons, it would have been less complicated than now? 
 
General Dempsey: That is a potential conclusion yes, sir. 
 
Senator McCain: I do not know about potential.  Let me get this straight.  So now 
you think the situation is too complex to provide the resistance with weapons?  
Have you changed your recommendation? 
 
General Dempsey: I have not been asked for a recommendation. 
 
Senator McCain: I am asking for your opinion. 
 
General Dempsey: My military judgment is that now that we have seen the 
emergence of al-Nusrah and Ahrar al-Sham notably and now that we have seen 
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photographs of some of the weapons that have been flowing into Syria in the 
hands of those groups, now I am more concerned than I was before. 
 
Senator McCain: Does that mean you do not think we should supply the 
resistance with weapons, the right people? 
 
General Dempsey: If we could clearly identify the right people, I would support 
it.233 
 
 Thus, in another heated exchange between Senator McCain and General 
Dempsey, this time over the revelation that the Chairman supported the previous year’s 
recommendation from Petraeus to arm the resistance, but during this 2013 testimony 
General Dempsey was again saying he could no longer identify the proper resistance 
elements.   
 Contrast this testimony from General Dempsey with that provided by 
Ambassador Ford the previous week.  Not only did Ambassador Ford detail the $117 
million in assistance to 1,500 activists, he stated that he had personally met with the 
commander of the armed opposition in the Aleppo region in the previous week.  
Moreover, the following exchange between the ambassador and Senator Robert 
Menendez is striking: 
Senator Menendez: How confident are we that we can differentiate between 
groups that espouse our values and those who do not within Syria? 
 
Ambassador Ford: Mr. Chairman, we know a lot more about the armed 
opposition then we did six months ago or a year ago.  It is dynamic.  It is always 
evolving and new groups appear and there are mergers and others.  But we do 
know a set of commanders, for example, the gentlemen that I met in Gaziantep 
on Tuesday, Colonel Abdel Jabar al-Akidey, who was reached out to Alawis.  He 
has reached out to Christians.  His fellow commander in Idlib province next to 
Aleppo, Afef Soleimani, has done the same.  People like them have facilitated 
United Nations humanitarian convoys to get to camps and to people in need.  																																																								
233 Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 113th Congress, 1st Session, 
April 17, 2013. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013, accessed 
September 23, 2014, www.gpo.gov/fdsys. 
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They have actually tamped down in some cases the extremists.  For example, 
extremists tried to block the UN humanitarian convoys up in Idlib, and the 
gentleman I met actually intervened on the ground himself to stop that…. There 
are good people that we could work with, Senator.234 
 
 Event Five: Two Months Later President Obama Approves Plan for CIA to 
Arm the Resistance (June 2013) 
 
 As the above figure shows, the fifth event would occur only two months later in 
June of 2013.  During an NSC meeting, the president approved a CIA plan to arm the 
moderate resistance in the aftermath of the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons 
																																																								234	US Policy Toward Syria. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations 
United States Senate. 113th Congress, April 11, 2013, 20. 
Figure 38: Two Months Later President Obama Approves Plan for CIA to 
Arm the Resistance (June 2013) 
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against his own people.  The US military concurred with this proposal.235  As significant 
as the use of chemical weapons is in its own right, one is struck with how did the DoD 
so quickly come to now recognize the existence of a moderate resistance force that 
they denied existed just two months prior? 
 Another interesting piece to this puzzle is a memorandum from General 
Dempsey to Senator Carl Levin, the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, on July 19, 2013 – just one month after President Obama approved the CIA 
proposal to arm resistance elements.  In the memorandum, General Dempsey outlines 
five options “on how military force could be used in order to decide whether it should be 
used.”236  General Dempsey listed the five options as: train, advise, and assist the 
opposition; conduct limited stand-off strikes; establish a no-fly zone; establish a buffer 
zone; and control chemical weapons.  In describing the train, advise, and assist the 
opposition, the general labeled the advisory force as a “nonlethal force,” implying the 
advisors would be in a sanctuary area outside of Syria and not advising the resistance 
elements in combat in Syria.  Moreover, while acknowledging that these options could 
not be assessed without the context of an overall whole-of-government strategy for 
achieving policy objectives, the general framed the option as one that would “help 
develop a moderate opposition – including their military capabilities – while maintaining 
pressure on the Assad regime.”237  It is interesting to note that this July option sounds 
very similar to what the general stated he could not support in his April testimony, and 																																																								
235 Leon Panetta, Worthy Fights: A Memoir of Leadership in War and Peace (New York: 
Penguin Group, 2014), 450. 236	Dempsey, Martin E., General, untitled memorandum to Senator Carl Levin, 
Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, July 19, 2013, accessed at 
thehill.com/images/stories/news/2013/07_july/22/Dempsey.pdf on November 17, 2017. 237	Ibid. 
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then what he concurred to for the CIA to undertake in June.  When did the unfeasible 
option become feasible again?  Only after CIA planners crafted such an option? 
 
 Event Six: In the Wake of the Fall of Mosul, President Obama Orders the 
Military to Train and Equip the Resistance in Their Fight Against ISIS, but not the 
Assad Regime (June 2014) 
 
 In June 2014 the major northern Iraqi city of Mosul fell to ISIS insurgents.  This 
sixth significant event sent reverberations throughout Baghdad and Washington.  
Suddenly, Washington felt compelled to do something to respond, react, and reverse 
the ISIS advances.  (See Figure 39 above.)  In the wake of Mosul’s fall, the US 
Figure 39: In the Wake of the Fall of Mosul, President Obama Orders the 
Military to Train and Equip the Resistance; Requests Funding from 
Congress (June 2014) 
2011     2012     2013     2014   
!
President or NSC Actions 
 
Department of State Actions 
 
 
Secretaries of State      ß--Clinton----------------------------------------------------------------àFeb 1ß-----------Kerry---------------------à 
 
Ambassador Ford    ß----Ford------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------àFeb 28 
 
 
 
Department of Defense Actions 
 
 
Secretaries of Defense   ß---Gates----àJuly 1ß---Panetta--------------------------------------àFeb 27ß---Hagel----------------------à 
 
Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ß---Mullen--------àOct 1ß--------------------Dempsey--------------------------------------------------------------à 
 
Central Command Commander  ß---Mattis-----------------------------------------------------------------------------àMar 22ß---Austin-------------à 
 
 
 
CIA Actions 
 
CIA Directors     <Panetta>Jul 1<Morrell>Sep6ß------Petraeus----->Nov 9ßMorrell-->Mar 13ß---Brennan-------------à 
July       Sept                  June                    June Dec 
Feb 
Mar 
Apr 
Apr 
June 2014: Administration requests funding from Congress to begin the military’s 
Train and Equip program for Syria.  (Congressional Research Service, T&E Program,  
June 9, 2015) 
6!5!
4!
3!2!
1!
7!
	 155 
president directed and approved DoD plans to not only deploy US troops back to Iraq to 
assist the Iraqi military, but also to train and equip Syrian resistance forces to fight ISIS 
– but not Assad’s forces.  The administration requested the necessary appropriations 
from Congress in June.238  Did the viable and acceptable Syrian resistance suddenly 
and coincidentally present themselves to US government representatives? 
 
 Event Seven: Congress Approves the Funding for the DoD Train and Equip 
Operation (December 2014) 
 																																																								
238 Congressional Research Services, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and US 
Response (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service report RL33487, 
October 9, 2015), 2. 
Figure 40: Congress Approves Funding for DoD’s Train and Equip 
Mission (Dec 2014) 
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 The seventh and final decision-making event occurred in December 2014 when 
Congress finally passed legislation authorizing funding for the military’s train-and-equip 
mission with the Syrian resistance.239  (See Figure 40 above.)  Nearly four years after 
the Syrian rebels rose up in opposition to the Assad regime did the US government 
appropriate money for the military to assist them – and then, only with the very limited 
aim of the counter-ISIS fight, with prohibitions on fighting Assad’s forces except in self-
defense. 
 Given the full context of the framework behind these seven key events in the 
macro-level process-tracing chart in Appendix A, and the resulting detailed analysis of 
the seven events in the micro-level process-tracing charts above that shows which 
national security decision-maker provided what input, when, why, and how, the reader 
should clearly see the following findings.  First, a viable and acceptable Syrian 
resistance did exist.  It was manifested not only in the sheer number of fighters, as 
shown in chapter 3, but in a loose but recognizable organization that allowed the US 
embassy in Damascus to establish contact with local resistance leaders and provide 
them with advice, assistance, and equipment to enable a network of resistance activists 
that numbered 1,500.  Second, what is even more remarkable than the first finding 
above, is that the US military did not recognize this and conducted no commensurate 
planning that could have supported the resistance.  The US military did not provide such 
an MSRA/UW plan for the president to consider beyond the thin list of options provided 
																																																								
239 Ibid., 3. 
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in July 2013.240  The frustration level that the Secretary of State and even the Secretary 
Defense would express towards the conventional military’s inability to provide such 
options is striking.   
 
Did President Obama’s Views on War Skew his Subordinates’ Inputs? 
 This is a valid concern.  Skeptics might say that the preceding charts are too 
antiseptic and sterile; they fail to include the fact that the president was arguably largely 
elected by running a campaign focused on ending two unpopular wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  Deliberately or inadvertently initiating another war would unravel his 
domestic and international political goals.  Moreover, even if he never overtly or directly 
made such comments to his department and agency chiefs, they would have clearly 
understood them from witnessing the political campaign and being with the president for 
many months, or in some cases years.  The skeptic would argue that this accounts for 
the decision-making and it might not be apparent in a frame-by-frame depicted that I 
presented. 
 I would disagree.  First, there would be no reason for Clinton and Panetta to 
mask that presidential guidance – either delivered formally or informally – in their 
accounts of these events in their memoirs.  Moreover, the president himself, in a lengthy 
interview he conducted with the television news program 60 Minutes, instead talked 
about his desire to assist the Syrian resistance to replace or coerce Assad to negotiate 
a political transition, but he had doubts it was achievable.  In his words, he wanted to, 
																																																								240	Martin E. Dempsey, General, untitled memorandum to Senator Carl Levin, Chairman 
of the Senate Armed Services Committee, July 19, 2013, accessed at 
thehill.com/images/stories/news/2013/07_july/22/Dempsey.pdf on November 17, 2017. 
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“explore all the various options that are available”.241  As Janine Davison, the former 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans wrote, ultimately the military failed to 
“deliver the type of nuanced advice in the form of creative options that the president 
needs.”242 
 I will elaborate and dissect this interview in detail in Chapter Five when I address 
the rival hypotheses, including this one, in much more detail.   
 To close this section, however, it is important to remember that regardless of a 
president’s desires or political tendencies towards when, how, and why the US uses its 
military forces, it is incumbent upon the US military to provide the best military advice, 
which should include a full menu of options.  The shortcoming was not with the 
president, but with his conventional military advisers who could not comprehend the 
idea of supporting the resistance as a suitable and feasible option.  This argument is 
further advanced in the following sections of this chapter. 
 
The Conceptual Framework Applied to the How and Why Questions 
 The theoretical basis for this dissertation is Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory 
that addresses complexity and an organization’s tendency to reproduce or reinforce its 
own structure and activities rather than to more openly or holistically address the 
																																																								241	Interview by Steve Kroft, 60 Minutes, which aired October 11, 2015, and was 
accessed February 5, 2016, http://cbsnews.com/news/president-obama-60-minutes-
syria-isis-2016-presidential-race. 242	Janine Davidson, “The Contemporary Presidency: Civil-Military Friction and 
Presidential Decision Making: Explaining the Broken Dialogue,” Presidential Studies 
Quarterly, 43 no.1, March 2013, 129. 
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challenge of change.243  This focus from Luhmann on complexity and an organization’s 
processing of complexity is significantly more advanced than earlier systems theorists’ 
work that tended to focus on structural-functionalism and relatively simple input and 
output designs.  Although I refer to structural-functionalism in a later portion of this 
chapter, I frame this under the more useful theoretical construct of Luhmann’s systems 
theory, which captures complexity and ultimately organizational culture in a much more 
illuminating and applicable manner.  Specifically, Luhmann suggests that when an 
organization has established a mechanism to reduce uncertainty, other alternative 
options are likely to be discarded.  As such, Luhmann’s approach to system theory and 
its work with complexity are more applicable to today’s national security environment 
than the earlier simplistic structural-functionalism theories.   
 There are several main components to Luhmann’s theory applicable to 
answering the how and why questions in this dissertation: autopoiesis, complexity, 
rationality, communications, and decisions. 
  Autopoiesis, literally meaning self-production or creation, refers to a system or 
organization that reproduces or maintains itself or its boundaries like a biological cell.  
Luhmann emphasized the reflective and self-reproductive nature of this action for 
systems or organizations.244  Luhmann argued that the environment is a distinct 
element that exists outside or beyond the boundaries of the autopoiesis system.  In this 
case of this dissertation, “environment” refers to the Arab Spring uprisings in general 
and the Syrian rebellion in particular.  How well the system or organization could 
																																																								243	Niklas Luhmann, Introduction to Systems Theory, trans. Peter Gilgen (Malden, MA: 
Polity Press, 2013). 244	Ibid., viii-xiv.  
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recognize and respond to developments in the environment, especially with the 
organization’s desire to continue to reproduce itself in its current image (of a 
conventional military), bears a strong resemblance to how the US military responded – 
or did not respond -- to the rebellion in Syria. 
 Luhmann’s writings on complexity provide an insightful lens to view the Syria 
case.  Luhmann argued that a system or organization “bundles” complex developments 
in the environment and then undertakes indifference or other arrangements to deal with 
this complexity.  The system engages in a “reduction of complexity” by ignoring or 
treating the new developments with a template or design that it previously experienced 
under different conditions.245  Consequently, the organization is not fully seeing, 
understanding, and then developing appropriate responses to the new development   
Instead, the system or organization has a “tendency to limit the problem to the question 
of the arrangements that a system has at its disposal.”246  As the reader saw in the 
preceding section, this helps to explain how and why the conventional military 
essentially generated only conventional military responses to the Syria situation.  
 In his discussion on rationality, Luhmann posits that systems or organizations will 
avoid or exclude developments that are deemed risky before they then rationally 
evaluate possible response options.  In Luhmann’s words, there is “always a non-
rational zone outside the marked space” for rational consideration.247  Although the 
military planners mentioned supporting the resistance, this option always appeared as 
outside the list of the “rational” options more readily under consideration. 
																																																								245	Ibid., 121. 246	Ibid., 124. 247	Ibid., 136. 
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 Luhmann considered communications as essential for the system or organization 
to reproduce or reinforce itself.248  The flow of information, from recognition, to 
understanding, to crafting responses, all underscore the significance of 
communications, or the transmission and reception of information, to shaping decision-
making for an organization or system.  This flow of information was the focus of the 
process-tracing methodology used to examine the decision-making associated with the 
Syrian rebellion, and in this upcoming section I provide additional research that 
underscores how the structure and culture of the US military excludes subject matter 
expertise of unconventional warfare community from effectively entering the decision-
making process.    
 Luhmann considered organizations as social systems that would reproduce 
themselves on the basis of their internal decisions.249  Based upon the organization’s 
processing of information, the organization would decide what actions to take and these 
decisions would shape the conditions for future decisions or adaptation.  Thus, prior 
conventional warfare decisions, like the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, would form a 
precedent for shaping future decisions and adaptations. 
 Joseph Pilotta, Timothy Widman, and Susan Jasko further developed 
Luhmann’s theory with a focus on organizational culture.  The authors argued 
“organizational culture serves the maintenance and development of 
organizations by providing important ordering mechanisms that further the 
																																																								248	Ibid. 249	Ibid., 15. 
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organization’s domination of complex information environments.”250  They argued 
Luhmann reduced “complexity by simultaneously transmitting both a selected 
alternative from among multiple action possibilities and the motivation for the 
acceptance of that selection.”251  Of significance, they added, “Organizational 
culture consists primarily of open-ended context framed by significant symbols 
and modes of legitimated social action that enables selective responses to 
changes.”252  As this dissertation shows, the “selective responses to change” 
would not include MSRA options. 
 Luhmann’s theory raises the question: Was the conventional military open 
to new or creative ideas to support the Syrian resistance?  A glimpse of the 
answer may be found with research published at the Army War College in 
2013.253   Researchers Stephen J. Gerras and Leonard Wong wrote, “Personality 
data gathered at the US Army War College from lieutenant colonel and colonel 
students show that the most successful officers score lower in openness than the 
general US population…. To make matters worse, though, those … students 
selected for brigade command score even lower than the overall (student) 
average.  This raises an interesting paradox: The leaders recognized and 
																																																								250	Joseph J. Pilotta, Timothy J. Widman, and Susan A. Jasko, “Meaning and Action in 
the Organizational Setting: An Interpretive Approach”, in An Introduction to Niklas 
Luhmann: Logic and Investigations,  ed. Joseph J. Pilotta and Wei-San Sun (New York: 
Hampton Press, 2014, 148. 251	Ibid., 154. 252	Ibid., 155. 253	The Army War College is one of several senior service colleges that the military 
operates for senior military officers one or two grade levels below the rank of general or 
admiral.  Indeed, it is intended to be the last military education for these officers before 
some of them are selected to become generals or admirals, and thus, becomes their 
last educational preparation before that rank.   
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selected by the Army to serve at strategic levels – where uncertainty and 
complexity are greatest – tend to have lower levels of one of the attributes most 
related to success at strategic levels.”254  Of note, this is not to say that Army 
senior officers are not intelligent, indeed, their IQs are above average; however, 
the research suggests that the highly successful officers may have narrow career 
paths that result in their deflection of considering options that do not fit their 
experiences.  This finding is very much in accordance with Niklas Luhmann’s 
theory of how an entity deals with complexity by rejecting or deflecting new 
information that does not comport with its views.  As Gerras and Wong continue, 
the officer can “…often fail at exploring the issue fully to appreciate other 
perspectives and perhaps change their minds.”255 
 With this review of the theoretical construct of the dissertation as a 
prelude, the stage is set to examine the how and why questions. 
 
How Did the US Make this Decision? 
 To answer the “how” with greater specificity, I used a systems theory approach 
that that included structural-functionalism to examine the military decision-making 
process for providing inputs to the National Security Council.  This approach revealed 
the inherent flaws for developing military support to resistance activities by 
marginalizing such experts from they key operational positions in the decision-making 
process. 																																																								254	Stephen J. Gerras and Leonard Wong, Changing Minds in the Army: Why It Is So 
Difficult And What To Do About It (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 
October 2013), 9. 255	Ibid., 10. 
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 There are two supporting structural-functionalism elements to the “how” 
explanation. The first is the split in operational responsibilities between the two types of 
combatant commands of the military, which consequently marginalizes the operational 
contributions of US Special Operations Command and its inherent UW expertise.  The 
second is the assignment of Special Forces generals primarily to positions in these non-
operational commands.  I examine each of these in the following sections. 
 
            Structural-Functionalism: The Split in Operational Responsibilities 
and Marginalization of US Special Operations Command 
 The US military’s decision-making process, and how it provides inputs to the 
National Security Council deliberations, is a classic example of systems theory and 
structural-functionalism.  The process is codified in military directives and doctrinal 
publications and is taught throughout the various military universities and colleges.  The 
directives and doctrine define and prescribe the various planning inputs and outputs; 
who produces what estimate, plan or order; and how it is provided to the Secretary of 
Defense and President for a decision. 
 The highest echelon of this military decision-making process is the Secretary of 
Defense.  He is directly responsible to the President, and indeed, only the President and 
the Secretary of Defense are authorized to provide orders to the military to execute 
combat operations.256  The senior generals and admirals of the military cannot make 
such orders without the prior order of the President or Secretary of Defense. 
																																																								
256 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operational 
Planning (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, August 11, 2011), II-15. 
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 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military advisor to the 
President and to the Secretary.  When the President or Secretary issue orders to the 
various elements of the military, the President and Secretary use the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs and his Joint Staff to prepare, write, and transmit those orders to the major 
combatant commands of the US military. 
 
 As Figure 41 above shows, there are two distinct types of combatant commands: 
the geographic combatant commands (shown in the top two rows of the above figure) 
and the functional combatant commands (shown in the bottom row).  The former are 
responsible for conducting military operations in a geographic region of the world while 
the latter are responsible for functional activities, like special operations (i.e., US Special 
http://intercepts.defensenews.com/2014/03/cocom-not-official-acronym-for-combatant-command-but-
dod-uses-it-anyway/ accessed February 8, 2017 
Figure 41: The Nine Combatant Commands:  
Six Regional and Three Functional 
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Operations Command) or strategic nuclear weapons (i.e., the US Strategic Command).  
Within this dichotomy of responsibilities, however, the geographic combatant 
commands have emerged as the first among equals.  Indeed, US Special Operations 
Command’s mission is largely constrained to providing special operations forces to the 
geographic commands for the latter to actually conduct the operations.  To be sure, US 
Special Operations Command is also responsible for synchronizing the planning of 
special operations worldwide, but the actual conduct and execution of those operations 
are almost exclusively the responsibility of the geographic combatant command.257  
(See Figure 42 below.) 
 
																																																								
257 US Special Operations Command, Special Operations Forces Reference Manual 
(MacDill Air Force Base, FL: Joint Special Operations University Press, June 2015), 2-1. 
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 Given that construct, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon procedurally would task the geographic combatant 
command for a strategic estimate and plan to address an emerging conflict or 
contingency, like the Syrian rebellion.  By doctrine this tasking would go to any 
combatant command, geographic or function, but in practice, in situations like the Syrian 
rebellion, it would go to the geographic combatant command, in this case US Central 
Command.258  In the opening years of the Syrian rebellion, according to testimony 
																																																								
258 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operational 
Planning (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, August 11, 2011), B-1, xiii.  It is interesting 
to note that although the text of this joint publication states that this guidance applies to 
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provided by General Dempsey in March 2012, the options under consideration were all 
conventional military responses – “humanitarian relief, no-fly zone, maritime interdiction, 
humanitarian corridor, and limited aerial strikes.”259  As confirming evidence to the 
above, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta would write in his 2014 memoirs, “We 
presented a set of options to the National Security Council — ranging from…limited air 
strikes…protecting refugee camps and supporting regional allies.”260  However, as 
referenced earlier in this chapter, in July 2013 the Chairman did provide a list of options 
that included training, advising, and assisting the opposition, but that list of options was 
neither a plan nor a recommendation for one specific option.261 
 
  Structural-Functionalism: The Assignment of Special Forces General 
Officers to Non-Operational Positions 
 Given the split of combat responsibilities between the types of commands, it is 
significant to examine where the Special Forces general officers are assigned to see if 
the UW expertise is “plugged into” the organizations with operational responsibilities 
(the geographic combatant commands) or to the commands with supporting 
responsibilities (e.g., Special Operations Command).  Additionally, one needs to 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
combatant commands (implying both the geographical and functional types) it is listed 
under the heading of “geographical combatant commanders”.  	259	The Situation in Syria, Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services United 
States Senate, 100th Congress, 2nd session (March 7, 2012), accessed September 23, 
2014, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsy/pkg/CHRG-112shrg76271/html/CHRG-
112shrg7621.htm. 
260 Leon Panetta, Worthy Fights: A Memoir of Leadership in War and Peace (New York: 
Penguin Press, 2014), 448. 261	Dempsey, Martin E., General, untitled memorandum to Senator Carl Levin, 
Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, July 19, 2013, accessed at 
thehill.com/images/stories/news/2013/07_july/22/Dempsey.pdf on November 17, 2017. 
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examine the Joint Staff structure to see if Special Forces general officers hold influential 
positions there. (See Figures 43 and 44 below.) 
 
Figure 43: Senior Leader Legend to Describe Figure 44 
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 The key operational military decision-making positions – the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, his Vice Chairman, the Director of the Joint Staff, the Joint Staff’s 
senior intelligence (J-2), operations (J-3), and plans (J-5) officers, and the 
commensurate positions in the geographic combatant commands – are almost always 
held by conventional military officers with neither experience nor significant education in 
UW.  Rarely has a Special Forces general officer been assigned to one of these 
positions.  Indeed, since 9/11 and through 2013, only once has a Special Forces 
general officer been assigned to any of these positions, and then for only a one-year 
period.262  
 Aside from the key positions within the geographic combatant commands of the 
commander, the deputy commander, the chief of staff, and the intelligence, operations, 
and plans staff principals, there is also the position of the commander of the subordinate 
theater special operations command (TSOC), which is under the operational control of 
the geographic combatant commander.  The TSOC commander is always a Special 
Operations Forces (SOF) general or admiral, whose career path is usually not Special 
Forces.  He could be a special operations pilot, SEAL (naval special warfare operator; 
the acronym stands for “sea, air, or land” infiltration environments), Marine Raider, or 
Army Ranger.  But recall that none of these other special operations officers are 
immersed by their professional career in the mission area of UW.  By the military’s 
design, structure, doctrine, training, and career patterns, UW is the domain of the 																																																								
262 This one exception was Major General Sal Cambria who held the J3 position in the 
Africa Command from 2011-2012.  One might also argue that General Hugh Shelton, 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1997-2001 also fits this categorization.  
Although General Shelton did serve with Special Forces in Vietnam for sixteen months, 
that is the extent of his Special Forces experience.  For the remainder of his career, he 
served in conventional Infantry officer assignments.  See his biography at jcs.mil. 
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Special Forces profession.  Consequently, although each geographic combatant 
command has a SOF general officer or admiral commanding a subordinate SOF 
headquarters, one is as likely to see a non-Special Forces SOF officer commanding a 
TSOC as one is to find a Special Forces general in command.  Even then, however, this 
is a subordinate element to the geographic combatant command, so any mission tasks 
or responses for the development of UW plans or operations is still subject to the review 
and filter from the conventional senior officers in the higher geographic combatant 
command headquarters. 
 Within this structure the influence or clout exercised by a TSOC within a 
geographic command may not be as strong and influential as an outsider might believe.  
In a recent study from the Council on Foreign Relations, Linda Robinson, who 
specializes in researching SOF, wrote: “They (the TSOCs) are supposed to be the 
principal advisors on special operations to their respective geographic combatant 
commanders, but they rarely have received the respect and support of the four-star 
command.”263   
 Robinson details her findings with, “The most glaring and critical operational 
deficit is the fact that, according to doctrine, the theater special operations commands 
are supposed to be the principal node for planning and conducting special operations in 
a given theater – yet they are the most severely under-resourced commands.  Rather 
than world-class integrators of …capabilities, TSOCs are egregiously short of sufficient 
quantity and quality of staff and intelligence, analytical, and planning resources.”264  
																																																								263	Linda Robinson, The Future of US Special Operations Forces (New York: Council of 
Foreign Relations, Special Report No. 66, April 2013), 15. 264	Ibid. 
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Robinson concludes with, “Because of this lack of resources, theater special operations 
commands have been unable to fulfill their role of planning and conducting special 
operations.”265 
 Given the structural handicaps, one may reasonably ask, where are the Special 
Forces general officers?  Many are assigned to Fort Bragg, North Carolina where they 
are in key positions within the Army’s Special Operations Command, the subordinate 
Army command to the US Special Operations Command.  The Army Special Operations 
Command is responsible for training, manning, and equipping all Army SOF, which 
includes the Special Forces units.  In other words, the Army Special Operations 
Command prepares its units for combat as opposed to leading them in combat.   
 Thus, by structure and function, the military has both an organizational design 
and a decision-making process that marginalizes the Special Forces and their UW 
expertise from operational decision-making.   
 
Why Did the US Make this Decision?  Institutional Culture: The Military’s 
Conservative and Conventional Culture 
 As I wrote in the introduction to this chapter, to answer the “why” portion, I show 
that the conventional senior military leaders, in accordance with Luhmann’s theory, are 
prone to see and react to developments in their environments that make sense only 
from their autopoiesis-based frame of reference.  In other words, they are biased 
towards providing conventional warfare solutions.  This aspect of Luhmann’s Systems 
																																																								265	Ibid. 
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Theory is congruent with classic institutional or bureaucracy culture theory, which 
suggests that conventional military officers would offer conventional military solutions.  
 I divide this section into three supporting elements: first, an overview of some 
data points which underscore the small size of unconventional warfare expertise within 
the US military; second, an overview of current research on this topic; and third, results 
of interviews with two retired senior military officers and one former senior Department 
of Defense official, which are key to seeing the relationship between this institutional 
culture and military inputs to national security decision-making. 
 First, some data points are illuminating.  Using the rubric of follow the money, 
less than 4% of the defense budget is allocated towards special operations forces 
(SOF), the remaining 96% going to the conventional military.266  The 4% figure covers 
both SOF-unique costs, like the specialized training and equipment required for SOF, 
but also broader support services provided by the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines.  
Of important note, this 4% covers the entire range of SOF missions – like the expensive 
counter-terrorist operations – while UW remains just one of twelve missions or core 
activities assigned to SOF.267  Thus, the actual percentage of DoD dollars applied to the 
UW mission set is arguably well below 2% of the DoD budget.   
 In addition to examining where defense dollars are allocated, it is very revealing 
to examine the military’s doctrinal writings.  Although the US Army has published Army 
doctrine on UW for several decades, the joint force doctrine (that doctrine used by all 																																																								266	William McRaven, Admiral, Posture Statement of the US Special Operations 
Command to the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 6, 2012, accessed March 
12, 2017, http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/McRaven%2003-06-
121.pdf. 267	US Special Operations Command, Special Operations Forces Reference Manual 
(MacDill Air Force Base, FL: Joint Special Operations University Press, June 2015), 1-6. 
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the services – Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines – to fight as a complete or “joint” 
team) for UW was not published until September 2015, actually after the focus period of 
this dissertation.268  This is clear evidence of the lack of attention and focus the 
conventional military has had towards UW.   
 To the extent that military doctrine is a foundational element for the professional 
education of US military officers, this lack of joint doctrine is an indicator of the absence 
of UW within the professional development of the officer corps.  Indeed, a review of the 
curriculum for the National War College (one of several senior level colleges for military 
officers at the grade immediately prior to becoming a general officer or admiral) reveals 
no mention of unconventional warfare.269  Dr. Hy Rothstein, in his case study of 
Afghanistan and unconventional warfare, wrote, “There appears to be precious little 
thinking about UW going on in the institution of the profession of arms.  The war 
colleges are dedicated to the principle of thinking, but they appear to have produced 
senior military leaders skilled in the art of attrition warfare, the war fighting approach that 
succeeded in two world wars, (but) resulted in stalemate in Korea, and lost in 
Vietnam.”270 
 Second, the US military’s conservative and conventional culture is well 
documented in a wealth of national security and military literature and research.  Morton 
Halperin’s seminal work on bureaucracy theory and foreign policy documented this 
																																																								268	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-05.1, Unconventional 
Warfare (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, September 2015). 
269 National War College Student Catalog. National Defense University, 
Academic Year 2015/2016. 270	Hy Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 169. 
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finding in his first edition in 1974 through his current edition in 2006.271 Similarly, Amos 
Jordan’s research on American National Security first published in 1981 and updated 
through 2009 also highlighted and confirmed the conservative and conventional nature 
of these institutions, their culture, and resulting way of thinking.272  Roger Z. George and 
Harvey Rishikof’s textbook The National Security Enterprise highlights the various 
institutional cultures of the national security departments and agencies, and spares no 
criticism of the military services’ cultures and “tribalism” that affect policy-making.273  
Colin Gray, who I cited in the opening quotation to this chapter, extended this argument 
and showed how the conservative and conventional officers exhibit a disdain towards 
special operations, which include UW operations.274  
 To those that would argue the above literature is outdated, that the US military’s 
wartime activities since 9/11 have upended such traditional writings, I highlight the case 
study research that Dr. Hy Rothstein conducted on SOF in Afghanistan, which also 
underscored the cultural cleavages between the conventional and unconventional 
military forces, and within SOF between the direct action forces and the unconventional 
warfare elements of Army Special Forces.  Although his findings and recommendations 
																																																								
271 Morton H. Halperin and Priscilla A. Clapp, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, 
2nd ed. (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 2006), 32-33; 274, 304-305. 
272 Amos A. Jordan et al., American National Security, 6th ed. (Baltimore, MD: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 174-178, 336-344. 273	Roger Z. George and Harvey Rishikof, eds., The National Security Enterprise: 
Navigating the Labyrinth (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), 117-
135. 
274 Colin S. Gray, Explorations in Strategy (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1996), 
151, 154-155.  
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are different than mine from this Syrian case study (I review those differences in chapter 
6), the analysis of the cultural cleavages is quite similar.275 
 To continue this line of reasoning that challenges the presupposition that the 
military’s post-9/11 operations have upended the traditional writings cited above, it is 
illuminating to read Janine Davidson, the Deputy Assistance Secretary of Defense for 
Plans from 2009-2012.  In 2013 she wrote about the military’s organizational culture and 
detailed planning process that ultimately fails to deliver creative options that the 
president needs. 
What often appears to be a personality-driven or political debate between the 
commander-in-chief and his strong-minded military advisors actually has deeper 
institutional and cultural roots.  The ‘professional’ military officer has certain 
expectations about how to craft ‘best military advice’ for the president that are 
deeply embedded into the organizational culture and in fact hard-wired into the 
institutionalized and incredibly detailed military planning process…. Ultimately, 
the output of the military’s planning process fails to deliver the type of nuanced 
advice in the form of creative options that the president needs.276 
 
 Davidson’s reference to “creative options that the president needs” links to 
President Obama’s views voiced in an interview in 2016: 
The goal here as been to find a way in which we can help moderate opposition 
on the ground….  I’ve been skeptical from the get go about the notion that we 
were going to effectively create this proxy army inside of Syria.  My goal has 
been to try to test that proposition….  I think it is important for us to make sure 
that we explore all of the various options that are available.277 
 
																																																								275	Hy Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006), xiv, xvi, 176, 177. 276	Janine Davidson, “The Contemporary Presidency: Civil-Military Friction and 
Presidential Decision-Making: Explaining the Broken Dialogue,” Presidential Studies 
Quarterly, 43 no.1, March 2013, 129. 277	Interview by Steve Kroft, 60 Minutes, which aired October 11, 2015, and was 
accessed February 5, 2016, at http://cbsnews.com/news/president-obama-60-minutes-
syria-isis-2016-presidential-race. 
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 A military option for supporting the resistance would not reach the president until 
after Mosul fell in 2014, and then it was constrained to a counter-terrorism operation 
against ISIS, not the unconventional warfare task focused on the Assad regime. 
 The impact of institutional culture and military decision-making was the topic in a 
recently article in the US Army War College’s journal, Parameters.  Written by its then-
Commandant, Major General William E. Rapp, the article directly addressed this 
institutional culture impact on decision-making.  In examining military inputs to national 
security policy discussions, he found, “Culture, psychology, and decision-making 
structure place limits on the development, delivery, and impact of effective military voice 
in national security policy discussions.”278  He went on to specifically highlight the 
limiting factor that institutional culture has on providing military advice: “Strongly 
ingrained military culture and the psychological biases of individual military leaders, and 
those who support them, provide the first set of limits on effectively providing 
unconstrained and high-quality military advice.”279  In direct accordance with Alex Mintz 
theory on foreign policy decision-making, Major General Rapp added, “(these) biases 
are ingrained, and cognitive heuristics guide our perceptions and interpretations of 
reality.”280 
 Briefly making an excursion here from the institutional culture section of this 
chapter and returning to the previous section dealing with structure and function, Major 
General Rapp ties these two aspects together by noting, “Purposeful, restrictive access 
																																																								278	William E. Rapp, Major General, “Toward Strategic Solvency: Ensuring Effective 
Military Voice,” Parameters: The US Army War College Quarterly, Vol. 46, No. 4, Winter 
2016-2017, 13. 279	Ibid., 15. 280	Ibid., 17. 
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to the decision-making process is perhaps the most pernicious structural factor limiting 
full and honest expressions of effective military advice.”281  He cautions there are 
gatekeepers to the decision-makers that would act as “mind-guards” to “prevent off-
azimuth opinions from reaching the top decision-makers.”282 
 In an interview concerning this dissertation, Major General Rapp, now retired, 
also added these institutional cultural divides exist not only between the conventional 
military and special operations forces, but are also found within SOF between the direct 
action units that specialize in the direct action missions of kill/capture raids and the 
unconventional warfare elements traditionally in the US Army Special Forces units.  In 
his assessment, perhaps some of the confusion in crafting options to support resistance 
activities actually emanates from within the SOF ranks themselves.283   
 Dr. Christopher Lamb, a former senior Department of Defense and State official 
who served as the director of policy planning in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, offered this precise 
assessment:   
 
Most officers at the senior ranks who deal with political leaders have no 
experience with special operations and have only a limited understanding of the 
requirements and risks of these missions.... The military has traditionally not 
valued SOF as much as it has conventional forces…. The combination of 
ignorance of and prejudice against SOF that marks conventional commanders 
means that those with whom civilians are most in contact and who hold positions 
in the military bureaucracy between politicians and special operations are limited 
																																																								281	Ibid., 20 282	Ibid., 21. 283	William E. Rapp, Major General, US Army (retired), former Commandant of the US 
Army War College, in an interview with the author November 1, 2017. 
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in their ability to provide the risk assessments and control that should accompany 
any consideration of using these forces.284   
 
 In a subsequent interview with Dr. Lamb, he also extended this argument to 
inside the SOF ranks, highlighting the divide between the direct action forces and those 
who specialize in unconventional warfare.  He spoke of the “different ethos, cultures, 
and histories” of the two camps, and he experienced that divide even within his office at 
the Assistance Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict 
by the various officers assigned to his section.285 
 Additional discourse to this topic came from Lieutenant General Charles T. 
Cleveland, US Army (retired) in an interview concerning this dissertation, too.   General 
Cleveland was the three-star commander of the US Army Special Operations Command 
from 2012 to 2015, making him the senior Green Beret commander during nearly all of 
the time period focus of this dissertation.  Of significance to this dissertation, he spent a 
thirty-plus year career in Special Forces living the experience of these organizational, 
cultural, and structural issues.  General Cleveland affirmed that in Syria the US did miss 
this opportunity and that we were structured improperly. 286   But he cautioned against 
an overly critical approach towards conventional military officers and likewise an overly 
focused approach on expanding Special Forces officer assignments as the remedy.  
Instead, he stressed the responsibility of the military, as an institution, to train and 
																																																								284	David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 230-231.  This assessment was 
confirmed during an interview with the author on November 17, 2017. 285	Dr. Christopher J. Lamb, in an interview with the author November 17, 2017. 286	Charles Cleveland T. Cleveland, Lieutenant General, US Army (retired), (three-star 
Commanding General, U.S. Army Special Operations Command from 2012-2015) in an 
interview with the author March 27, 2017. 
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educate conventional military officers on these irregular and unconventional types of 
warfare so that they can better represent all of these options to the geographic 
combatant commanders and to the joint staff.  In his words, “We don’t necessarily need 
Green Berets in key positions; we need senior officers better educated and experienced 
in Special Warfare, including unconventional warfare.”287  
 In summary, in addition to the rich literature that documents the conventional and 
conservative nature of the US military; a review of current resourcing, doctrine, and 
educational curriculum for senior officers; and three senior leader interviews -- 
especially the interview with the senior Green Beret officer during this period – all point 
to a conventional US military culture that will by its very nature marginalize 
unconventional warfare expertise, sometimes even within the SOF ranks itself.  In 
Lieutenant General Cleveland’s words, “In Syria, we did miss this opportunity.  We are 
structured improperly and there are people who don’t believe in this type of warfare.”288 
 
Chapter Summary 
 This chapter is the heart of the dissertation.  The previous chapter clearly 
showed that a viable and acceptable resistance did exist in Syria in the March 2011 to 
June 2014 period.  With that fact established, this chapter then explained how and why 
the US missed the opportunity to train, advise, and equip these resistance elements. 
 To answer the “how and why” the US made this decision, I based the analysis on 
Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory as the conceptual framework.  To answer the “how” 
portion, in addition to Luhmann’s system theory, I added a supporting structural-																																																								287	Ibid. 288	Ibid. 
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functionalism approach to examine the military decision-making process for providing 
inputs to the National Security Council.  This approach revealed the inherent flaws for 
developing military support to resistance activities by marginalizing unconventional 
warfare experts from the key operational positions in the decision-making.  To answer 
the “why” portion, I showed that the conventional senior military leaders, in accordance 
with Luhmann’s theory, are prone to see and react to developments in their 
environments that make sense only from their autopoiesis-based frame of reference.  In 
other words, they are predisposed to select those options – in this case conventional 
warfare options – that they are comfortable with when faced with a complex situation, 
the dynamics or details of which they are unfamiliar or unaccustomed. 
 In both of these cases – the how and the why – the analysis is fully congruent 
with Alex Mintz’ Integrated Cognitive and Rationale Theory of Foreign Policy Decision-
Making, as described in chapter one.  Moreover, the “how” portion is consistent with 
classic structural-functionalism and the “why” portion is consistent with institutional 
culture theory, which would suggest that conventional military officers would offer 
conventional military solutions. 
 The co-reading of this chapter with Appendix A, the process-trace chart, was 
essential.  This methodology showed the interrelationship of over one hundred 
significant events, which allowed for the distillation of seven key US national security 
decision-making events that crystalized the decision outputs to the National Security 
Council.    
 Moreover, reviewing and analyzing the decision-making inputs from the key 
national security participants was equally important.  These leaders include the 
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Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the US 
Ambassador to Syria and other lower ranking but key persons privy to the decision-
making.  Ambassador Ford’s insights to the US decision-making were key and 
essential, while General Cleveland’s decades-long observations and experience with 
the cultural conflict between conventional and unconventional military forces was 
equally significant in the causal analysis of the research question.  
 Collectively, this chapter showed a US military structure and process for 
providing advice to the president as flawed due to the marginalization of UW expertise.  
This marginalization resulted in inadequate consideration for applying UW as a strategic 
option to the nation. 
 However, before we review the implications of these findings, I must explain and 
analyze the counter-arguments and plausible rival hypotheses, the subject of the next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
THE COUNTER-ARGUMENTS, PLAUSIBLE RIVAL HYPOTHESES, AND 
SYNTHESIZING THE RESULTS 
 
--“The goal here has been to find a way in which we 
can help moderate opposition on the ground, but we’ve 
never been under any illusion that militarily we 
ourselves can solve the problem inside of Syria. 
 --“Over time, the community of nations will all get rid of 
them (ISIS) and we will be leading getting rid of them.  
But we are not going to be able to get rid of them 
unless there is an environment inside of Syria and in 
portions of Iraq in which local populations, local Sunni 
populations, are working in a concerted way with us to 
get rid of them. 
--“I’ve been skeptical from the get go about the notion 
that we were going to effectively create this proxy army 
inside of Syria.  My goal has been to try to test that 
proposition, can we be able to train and equip a 
moderate opposition that’s willing to fight ISIL?  And 
what we’ve learned is that as long as Assad remains in 
power, it is very difficult to get those folks to focus their 
attention on ISIL. 
--“I think it is important for us to make sure that we 
explore all the various options that are available.”289 
     --President Barack Obama 
 
 
 
 Before moving to the final of the three questions in this dissertation (what 
are the implications for national security practitioners?), which is covered in the 																																																								289	Interview by Steve Kroft, 60 Minutes, which aired October 11, 2015 and was 
accessed February 5, 2016, http://cbsnews.com/news/president-obama-60-minutes-
syria-isis-2016-presidential-race. 	
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next chapter, one needs to carefully consider the counter-arguments and 
plausible rival hypotheses to this dissertation that challenge the findings of the 
first two questions (was there a viable and acceptable resistance force in Syria in 
the period March 2011 – June 2014? and why and how did the US miss the 
opportunity to train, advise, and assist them?)  If the analysis that answers the 
first two questions is faulty, the third question becomes irrelevant. 
 
The Counter-Arguments 
 There are four counter-arguments that need to be understood and 
addressed.  First, the US historically fails at military support to resistance 
movements (MSRM); it is not a good national security option to pursue in the first 
place.  Second, if one accepts the validity of this dissertation’s findings -- the 
resistance did exist and that the military failed to recognize and plan accordingly 
because unconventional warfare (UW) expertise was marginalized -- then the 
subsequent events of 2014-2015, when the president did decide to allow the US 
military to train and equip the moderate resistance, contradict this dissertation’s 
hypothesis.  This counter-argument states in the final analysis the military did 
present a UW option to the president.  Third, the CIA should conduct MSRA/UW, 
not the Department of Defense; this type of operation is inappropriate for the US 
military.  Fourth, the current military structure can adequately consider UW 
options; it just did not occur in this anomalous case. We need to review each of 
these counter-arguments.  The following paragraphs will unpack, document, and 
analyze these arguments. 
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 At the president’s direction, in 2013 the CIA reviewed historical cases of 
US support to resistance movements to gauge the effectiveness of this option. 
Reporters immediately published articles claiming support to resistance 
movements usually failed.290  However, evidence from the former commanding 
general of the US Special Operations Command, General Joseph Votel, 
contradicts this.  In an openly published article on UW he lists the initial invasion 
of Afghanistan (350 SOF and 110 interagency operatives embedded with 15,000 
Afghan resistance fighters overthrew the Taliban regime), US support to the 
mujahedeen in Afghanistan to eject Soviet forces, US support to the contra 
resistance to the Nicaraguan Sandinista regime, US support to Croatian 
resistance in the Balkans conflict, US support to Kurdish Peshmerga forces 
during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, as recent examples to the contrary.291  One 
could argue that when US advisors were present and directly involved with 
overseeing the delivery of the weapons and the necessary training, the degree of 
success was markedly higher. In addition, one must note that even when the 
conventional US military (non-SOF) is involved in arming a partner nation, there 
is a risk that weapons will eventually fall into an enemy’s hands.  Indeed, ISIS 
recovered many weapons – including armored vehicles – when Iraqi 
conventional army units deserted and fled in advance of ISIS forces on Mosul in 
																																																								290Mark Mazzetti, “C.I.A. Study of Covert Aid Fueled Skepticism About Helping Syrian 
Rebels,” The New York Times, October 14, 2014, accessed at February 24, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/15/us/politics/cia-study-says-arming-rebels-seldom-
works.html. 291Joseph L. Votel, Charles T. Cleveland, Charles T. Connett, and Will Irwin, 
“Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone,” Joint Forces Quarterly, 1st Quarter 
2016, 101-109. 
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2014.  Thus, even setting aside General Votel’s cogent points, this 
counterargument is not unique to UW activities and arguably not supported by 
the facts.  The significant factor of having US advisors with these resistance 
elements should not be lost.  This factor emerges again in the analysis of the 
implications of these findings in the next chapter. 
 The second counter-argument states that since the president ultimately 
did decide to train and equip the resistance in 2014, this is clear refutation of the 
dissertation’s findings.  However, upon closer examination, this is not the case. 
The president’s decision to allow the US military to train and equip the Syrian 
resistance in 2014 was just that – a train and equip program.  It was not UW.  It 
was a counterterrorism program focused exclusively against ISIS vice a UW 
activity to disrupt, coerce, or overthrow the Assad regime; thus, it was not UW.  
Indeed, constraining the purpose of the assistance exclusively as an anti-ISIS 
fight alienated much of the Syrian resistance that was more concerned with 
unseating the brutal dictator in Damascus than in fighting ISIS.   
 The third counter-argument is the CIA should conduct MSRA, not the 
Department of Defense.  Proponents of this counter-argument state that activities 
such as MSRA and UW belong to the CIA not the military.  They would harvest 
many of my points – e.g., the military is too conventional – to make this counter-
argument, plus they would add that such activities require secrecy and the 
avoidance of publicity, something these antagonists would argue is anathema to 
the military.   While making some degree of sense on face value, and perhaps 
much sense to a conventional military officer, this counter-argument is overly 
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simplistic.  The complexity and sophistication of MSRA and UW are such that it is 
not the sole domain of any one agency or department.  Successful MSRA 
requires the partnership and teaming of both the CIA and the military.  The CIA is 
most useful when deniability is paramount; after all, covert action is by definition 
deniable and a primary mission set of the CIA.292  But when a larger-scale UW 
operation is required, such as toppling the Taliban regime in 2001 or harnessing 
the Kurds in the opening stage of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the military’s 
Special Forces are the force of choice.  The sophisticated planner would realize 
that it is the combination of both of these elements, sometimes in a synchronized 
fashion taking advantages of the unique advantages of each, becomes the 
preferred method of employment.  Indeed, even with the 9/11 Commission 
recommendation that US Special Operations Command assume lead 
responsibility for directing and executing all paramilitary operations (both the CIA 
and military’s) a closer examination of the recommendation by the military 
concluded that having capabilities resident in both the CIA and US Special 
Operations Command was the most preferred solution.293 Thus, this counter-
argument presents a binary option of either the CIA or SOF; the optimum solution 
is to recognize the unique roles that each play and to orchestrate them 
accordingly. 
																																																								292	For a precise accounting of the differences between the CIA’s covert actions and the 
military’s sensitive activities see Mark M. Lowenthal’s Intelligence from Secrets to 
Policy, 5th ed. (Los Angeles, CA: SAGE CQ Press, 2012), 181-197.  For a more 
practitioner’s view, see William J. Daugherty’s Executive Secrets: Covert Action and the 
Presidency (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2004).  293	The 9/11 Commission Report, Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton & Company), 415-416. 
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 The fourth counter-argument is that the current military structure can 
adequately consider UW options; it just did not occur in this anomalous case.  
Although one may want to believe this – the status quo structure works – the 
events described in the earlier chapters of this dissertation show this is not the 
case.  However, if you accept General Votel’s earlier argument that UW does 
work, then apparently the structure is sufficient.  It seems like the current 
structure can work at times, and if so, why and how?  For now, let me set this 
argument aside until the synthesis section of this chapter and the following 
chapter.  There is more to this point than meets the eye, but it is important to 
provide a complete and holistic look at the research question, hypothesis, and 
the findings that were exposed in the previous two chapters.  This can best be 
done in the following chapter.  The structural-functionalist and cultural-
bureaucracy frame is necessary to answer the research question, but it may not 
be sufficient to completely address the issue. 
 In sum, these four counter-arguments are important to consider and 
address.  The first, that MSRA/UW national security options rarely succeed, is 
shown to be not quite true.  The cited study does point to an important fact that 
when US advisors are embedded with the resistance forces, the degree of 
success was markedly higher.  The second counter-argument that the president 
ultimately did decide to support to the resistance with an MSRA/UW option is 
shown to be false.  The president decided to provide a military “train and equip” 
program, with restrictions against sending advisors across the border into Syria 
and constraining the resistance elements to purely counter-ISIS objectives.  By 
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definition, a UW mission is intended to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a 
government or occupying power; consequently, the train and equip program was 
not UW.  The third counter-argument, that this paramilitary realm should be the 
exclusive domain of the CIA, is also shown to be too simplistic.  Both the CIA and 
the SOF have complementary roles in this important MSRA/UW arena.  
However, the fourth counterargument – that the current US military structure can 
adequately support UW planning and activities – deserves further study.  
Although this dissertation makes a compelling case to the contrary, it is 
irrefutable that the US has conducted some successful MSRA/UW activities, as 
General Votel has pointed out.  So it seems that addressing the structural-
functionalism and cultural-bureaucracy issues described in chapter four are 
necessary, perhaps they are insufficient to fully address this issue.  I will return to 
this point in the concluding section of this chapter after the review of the rival 
hypotheses.   
 
Rival Hypotheses 
 As previewed in Chapter One, there are two rival hypotheses that need to be 
addressed.  In the analysis below, it is clear that the research evidence best supports 
the original hypothesis and not the rival hypotheses.  However, over time as more 
information concerning the interagency decision-making proceedings on the Syria issue 
becomes declassified, perhaps the new information will challenge this dissertation’s 
findings and conclusions.  Future researchers interested in this topic should be attuned 
for such information releases.  Of particular note would be any new public statements or 
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newly declassified documents from the now retired generals, Martin Dempsey and 
James Mattis.  Mattis was the commanding general of the US Central Command from 
August 2010 through March 2013 and became the Secretary of Defense in 2017.  His 
public statements and writings concerning Syria during this time frame of 2011-2014 
have been very sparse and worded at such a general level as to not shed any 
meaningful light on this research question – at least at the time of writing this 
dissertation in 2017. 
 With the above as prelude, the two rival hypotheses are: 
• Presidential guidance pre-empted any consideration of MSRA 
• DoD leaders deliberately suppressed the MSRA/UW option and did not 
present it to the NSC 
 
 Rival Hypothesis #1: Presidential Guidance Pre-Empted any Consideration 
of MSRA.  
 Under this rival hypothesis, the president would have provided guidance to the 
NSC principals or military senior leaders to not surface any MSRA/UW options.  I found 
no evidence to support this hypothesis, although it is true that the president was 
reluctant to get involved in Syria.   
 President Obama won the election while running on a platform that included 
ending the existing wars and stopping perceived adventurous and interventionist military 
policies.  To this end, the president might also have concluded that the resistance 
elements could not win, and even if they did, they would not be able to secure a peace 
given the rising extremist forces and likely opposition from Iran.  Such a pessimistic 
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assessment could have precluded any consideration for supporting the opposition.  This 
pessimistic assessment was also reflected in surveys of the US population showing 
reluctance for any involvement in the Syrian conflict. 
 Along these lines, as discussed in chapter four, the president is known to have 
disapproved the recommendation from the CIA Director, which was endorsed by the 
Secretaries of State and Defense, to allow the CIA to provide limited arms to the 
resistance in September 2012.294  However, after the Assad regime used chemical 
weapons against his own people, the president changed his position and approved the 
CIA plan to arm the resistance in June 2013.295   
 Despite the president’s initial reluctance and subsequent approval to provide 
limited CIA arms to the resistance, there are no indications that he provided guidance to 
the military to not initiate any recommendation for a military UW option.  Given Clinton’s 
and Panetta’s disclosure and discussion of these debates in their memoirs, it seems 
unlikely they would avoid commenting on this presidential guidance to the military, if it 
occurred.  
 In an interview conducted with US Ambassador to Syria, Robert S. Ford, he 
stated that he had never received nor heard of such guidance from the President; 
however, he added he would not have necessarily known of such guidance if it did 
exist.296 
 It is important to review the exact words and texts that the president used to 
describe these events and to review the texts of the Secretaries of State and Defense in 																																																								
294 Hillary Clinton, Hard Choices (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014), 463. 
295 Leon Panetta, Worthy Fights (New York: Penguin Press, 2014), 450. 296	Ambassador Robert S. Ford, former ambassador to Syria, in an interview with the 
author March 30, 2017.	
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their memoirs to see how they recorded the president’s guidance and decisions. The 
following sections show these comments. 
 
  President Obama’s Words 
 On October 11, 2016 the television news program 60 Minutes interviewed the 
president on topics that included the Syrian moderate opposition, ISIS, and Russia’s 
intervention in Syria.  The rambling and sometimes testy interview also included topics 
of the presidential election and Congressional relations.  But as I harvested and studied 
the direct questions and answers from the 60 Minutes interviewer to the president, the 
resulting product presented itself as a de facto interview with the president on this 
dissertation. During that interview, the president made comments on his views of the 
Syrian resistance and his assessment as to what the US options were.  The president 
framed his remarks with his goals and assessment as to how best to achieve them: 
The goal here has been to find a way in which we can help moderate opposition 
on the ground, but we’ve never been under any illusion that militarily we 
ourselves can solve the problem inside of Syria.297 
 
How the president saw this occurring is important.   
 
Over time, the community of nations will all get rid of them (ISIS – my 
insertion),298 and we will be leading getting rid of them.  But we are not going to 
be able to get rid of them unless there is an environment inside of Syria and in 
																																																								
297 Interview by Steve Kroft, 60 Minutes, which aired October 11, 2015, accessed 
February 5, 2016, http://cbsnews.com/news/president-obama-60-minutes-syria-isis-
2016-presidential-race. 298	President Obama consistently referred to these Islamist extremists in Iraq and Syria 
as ISIL, meaning the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant.  By 2017 the US government 
standardized the label to ISIS, meaning the Islamist State in Iraq and Syria.  In this 
dissertation, I use the ISIS label, except in the cases where President Obama is making 
a direct quote where he used the ISIL label. 
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portions of Iraq in which local populations, local Sunni populations, are working in 
a concerted way with us to get rid of them.299  
 
In assessing the Syrian opposition, the president added:  
 
I’ve been skeptical from the get go about the notion that we were going to 
effectively create this proxy army inside of Syria.  My goal has been to try to test 
that proposition, can we be able to train and equip a moderate opposition that’s 
willing to fight ISIL?  And what we’ve learned is that as long as Assad remains in 
power, it is very difficult to get those folks to focus their attention on ISIL.300 
 
I think it is important for us to make sure that we explore all the various options 
that are available.301 
 
 
 When responding to a question concerning the Department of Defense’s train-
and-equip program for the Syrian moderate opposition – the 2014 and 2015 initiative 
that provided training and equipment to the opposition that agreed to fight ISIS, not 
Assad, and that prohibited the US trainers from crossing into Syria to become advisors 
– the president had this to say:   
 
There is no doubt that it did not work.  And, one of the challenges that I’ve had 
throughout this heartbreaking situation inside of Syria is, is that – you’ll have 
people insist that, you know, all you have to do is send in a few – you know, 
truckloads full of arms and people are ready to fight.  And then, when you start a 
train-and-equip program and it doesn’t work, then people say, ‘Well, why didn’t it 
work?’ Or, ‘If it had just started three months earlier it would’ve worked.’302 
 
 Keeping in mind that this interview occurred in 2015, outside the scope of this 
dissertation time period, the following quote is important not for its reference to the 
Iranian and Russian presence on the ground in Syria, but for the president’s comment 
																																																								
299 Steve Kroft, 60 Minutes. 
300 Ibid. 301	Ibid. 
302 Ibid. 
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of not “reinsert(ing) ourselves in a military campaign inside Syria”, a comment that may 
reflect earlier guidance he provided his military commanders.  The passage reads: 
America’s priorities has to be number one, keeping the American people safe.  
Number two, we are prepared to work both diplomatically and where we can to 
support moderate opposition that can help convince the Russians and Iranians to 
put pressure on Assad for a transition.  But that what we are not going to do is to 
try to reinsert ourselves in a military campaign inside of Syria.303 
  
 
President Obama concludes this Syrian portion of the interview with,  
 
…the solution that we’re going to have inside of Syria is ultimately going to 
depend not on the United States putting in a bunch of troops there, resolving the 
underlying crisis is going to be something that requires ultimately the key players 
there to recognize that there has to be a transition to new government.  And, in 
the absence of that, it’s not going to work.304 
 
 
 The president’s comments are significant and illuminating.  Clearly, he was 
looking for a way to assist the resistance to not only fight ISIS but also to drive towards 
a political solution that transitions the government in Syria from the Assad regime to a 
more pluralistic government that meets the aspirations and needs of the Syrian people.  
The president was clear that this fight would be dependent on the support of the Syrian 
populace – it was their fight, not something that a conventional US military invasion 
could achieve on their behalf.  Thus, a close reading shows a president hungry for 
options that could satisfy these conditions and gain the political end-state that he 
outlined.  (This desired political end-state is covered more fully in the many State 
Department public statements detailed in Appendix A.) 
 In summary, the president’s comments certainly do rule-out any consideration for 
US conventional military operations inside of Syria.  But a more careful reading of his 																																																								
303 Ibid.	
304 Ibid. 
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comments show a president searching for options that support his political objectives 
ground on his assessment that working with the local Sunni population would be the key 
to resolving the conflict.  Indeed, what the president appears to be describing is a 
prescription for – not a proscription against – an MSRA/UW option.  In the president’s 
words: “I think it is important for us to make sure that we explore all the various options 
that are available.”305 
 
  Secretary of State Clinton’s Words306  
 In her 2014 memoir, Hillary Clinton records the president’s guidance in the 
following series of passages.  She recounted in a March 2012 meeting in Riyadh with 
GCC leaders, they “…discussed the need to do more to support the rebels in Syria.”307 
She added that  “The United States was not prepared to join such efforts to arm the 
rebels, but we also didn’t want to splinter the anti-Assad coalition…. Some will be able 
to do certain things, and others will do other things.”308  This statement implies a tacit 
understanding that the resistance potential did exist, that it was recognized by at least 
some of the US partners, but that the US was unwilling to directly arm that resistance.   
Meanwhile by August 2012, in Clinton’s words, “…the casualties in Syria climbed into 
																																																								305	Ibid. 
306 The following two sections – the views of Secretary of State Clinton and Secretary of 
Defense Panetta concerning President Obama’s guidance and decisions on arming the 
Syrian moderate resistance – are taken from an earlier research paper submitted to Dr. 
Peter Funke as part of a University of South Florida course POST 6933, Doctoral Pro-
Seminar on December 9, 2014. 
307 Hillary Clinton, Hard Choices (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014), 453. 
308 Ibid. 
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the tens of thousands, and the crisis spun further out of control.”309  She continued that 
in the summer of 2012:  
I and others on the …national security team began exploring what it would take 
to stand up a carefully vetted and trained force of moderate Syrian rebels who 
could be trusted with American weapons…. if rebels could be vetted and trained 
effectively, it would be helpful….310   
 
Clinton described a July 2012 meeting with the then-Director of Central Intelligence 
Petraeus to discuss vetting, training, and equipping opposition fighters.311  She added: 
Our military’s top brass was reluctant to get involved…consistently offering dire 
projections….”312 “Secretary of Defense Panetta had become as frustrated as I 
was with the lack of options in Syria; he knew from his own time leading the CIA 
what our intelligence operatives could do.313   
 
 
 Sometime after August 2012, Petraeus presents the plan to the President, who 
“worried that arming the rebels was not likely to be enough to drive Assad from 
power…. (with) unintended consequences to consider.”314  Although Clinton concluded 
that “… the plan to arm the rebels dead in the water….”,315 it is clear from her first-hand 
account of these discussions with the NSC principals that the US foreign partners 
recognized the Syria resistance potential by March 2012 and armed them, while the US 
military did not craft or present any such options for NSC consideration.  Indeed, it 
would be Petraeus presenting such options from the CIA, with its much more limited 
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ability to support resistance movements under its authorities than what a military 
support to a resistance movement would entail. 
 More specifically to the point of what guidance the president may have 
provided, one can conclude that by the late summer of 2012 the issue of providing 
weapons to the resistance was back on the table for discussion in the NSC.  It is at this 
point, with either initial guidance or confirmatory guidance from the president, that the 
US would not arm the resistance due to concerns that it would be insufficient to drive 
Assad from power and that unintended consequence might result.  What is also clear in 
the Clinton passages is the US military’s “reluctance” and “dire projections.”  It appears 
that instead of the president simply providing guidance for the military not to get 
involved, it was perhaps the military’s “dire projections” that influenced the president’s 
concerns over the potential to drive Assad from power without unintended 
consequences that influenced the president’s decision-making.  It would appear that the 
military’s failure to properly recognize and assess the resistance potential – as chapters 
three and four show -- might have influenced the president’s decision-making.   
 Interestingly, it may have been the military shaping the president’s guidance, 
and not the president’s guidance shaping the military’s planning.   
 The next section reveals the Secretary of Defense’s recollection of these same 
events.   
 
  Secretary of Defense Panetta’s Words 
 Clinton’s account of these discussions are echoed and reinforced by Leon 
Panetta in his 2014 memoirs.  Of the 2011 and early 2012 period, he writes  “We 
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presented a set of options to the National Security Council — ranging from…limited air 
strikes…protecting refugee camps and supporting regional allies….there was no strong 
support among the president’s top advisors for direct military action.”316  He adds, 
“…there was little coordination between the opposition groups, and some had unsavory 
ties to terrorist groups…. so our initial support was nonlethal — training, for the most 
part, as well as supplies, but not weapons.”317  By late summer of 2012, Panetta’s 
assessment changed.  He confirmed the post-August 2012 NSC meeting that Clinton 
cited in her memoirs when Petraeus presented the CIA plan to provide weapons to the 
resistance.  Panetta wrote, “I supported the idea, as did David Petraeus and Hillary 
Clinton.  All of us believed that withholding weapons was impeding our ability to develop 
sway with those groups and subjecting them to withering fire from the regime.”318 
“President Obama was initially hesitant…. Only after Assad used chemical weapons in 
mid-2013 did Obama reconsider supplying those arms, a step he approved in June of 
that year.”319   
 In summary, between March and post-August 2012, the Secretaries of State 
and Defense, along with the CIA Director, would change their assessments and jointly 
recommend arming the resistance, albeit through the limited CIA channel rather than 
through a military unconventional warfare option.  Since the president made this 
decision only after Assad used chemical weapons, this refutes the contention that the 
US could not identify who the resistance leaders were or how to provide the weapons to 
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the right people.  Moreover, it is unclear if at this latter decision point (mid-2013) that the 
president now saw a way to unseat Assad and ensure no unintended consequences, 
the factors he previously cited for declining such an option earlier.  What is clear is that 
the Syrian situation continued to spin out of control in 2012-2013 – all well before the 
Russian intervention – and the US belatedly took some MSRM activities although well 
below the full capability inherent in a military unconventional warfare campaign option.   
 The Panetta and Clinton memoirs document a president who was skeptical and 
leery of options to arm the resistance, who disapproved such an option sometime after 
August 2012, but who did approve the CIA’s plan to arm the resistance in mid-2013.  No 
evidence suggests that the president pre-emptively provided guidance to preclude the 
development of an MRSA/UW option.  That said, it is also clear that the president did 
not want to commit any conventional US military forces to this conflict and this was 
undoubtedly shaped by domestic political concerns and his own beliefs.  Nonetheless, 
there is no evidence to suggest that a middle ground option of unconventional warfare 
was ever recommended to the president in his national security council deliberations.   
 
  Variant to Rival Hypothesis #1: The Iranian Negotiations Factor 
 A variant to this rival hypothesis concerns the initiation of the then-confidential 
negotiations between the US, Iran, and others to limit Iran’s development of nuclear 
capabilities in exchange for the relaxation of the economic sanctions.  Under this 
scenario, the president would not want other areas of conflict to emerge between the 
US and Iran lest they disturb or otherwise adversely affect the ongoing nuclear program 
negotiations.  In this case too, however, I have found no evidence supporting this 
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option.  That said, it is possible that this is true and that President Obama was 
concealing or masking this factor even when he gave his interview with 60 Minutes cited 
above.  It also assumes that Panetta and Clinton would deliberately conceal these 
discussions in their memoirs; a plausible statement given the confidentiality of classified 
information.  As a consequence, since absence-of-evidence is not evidence-of-absence, 
this remains an open question for future researchers.  As the years pass, it is 
reasonable to expect at least some classified documents concerning this topic to be 
declassified and available to researchers.  Suffice it to say at this point, I found no 
evidence of this option and continue to assess that the original hypothesis holds given 
the available information. 
 
 Rival Hypothesis #2: DoD Leaders Deliberately Suppressed the UW Option  
 Under this rival hypothesis, there are two independent reasons why this would 
have been plausible.  First, concern over a looming possible war with Iran, it could be 
speculated, would have caused the military leaders in the US Central Command and 
the Joint Staff to deliberately suppress the MSRA/UW option so that they could marshall 
the necessary resources in advance of that possible conflict.  Second, a more general 
war-weariness within the senior military ranks from years of fighting in Iraq and 
Afghanistan could have led the military leaders to suppress any consideration to 
become involved in the Syrian conflict to include MSRA/UW.320 
																																																								320	Although some might find it implausible that senior military officers would ever show 
war-wariness or a reluctance to use military forces, while serving twenty-seven years in 
uniform I did observe that many of the most combat-experienced officers, who saw the 
up-close horrors of warfare, tended to be the most pragmatic and conservative when it 
came to recommending combat options.  Paradoxically, some of the senior civilian 
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 I found no evidence to support this.  However, a careful review of Panetta’s 
memoirs and General Dempsey’s testimony in March 2012 provide some indications 
that this hypothesis would not be true.  First, as cited earlier in this chapter, Panetta 
wrote of providing Defense Department options in the 2011-2013 period to the NSC that 
included limited airstrikes and protecting refugee camps, options that would have 
suggested safe-zones with the associated assurances of an air defense umbrella and 
perhaps airstrikes to neutralize the regime’s artillery, if they approached the safe 
zones.321  Such options may be couched as “limited,” but they would be resource 
intensive.  Indeed, this approach would be more resource intensive than a classic small 
footprint and low-visibility UW option.  So Panetta’s statement does not seem to indicate 
a military that was protecting resources for a potential Iran conflict.  In a similar fashion, 
General Dempsey testified in March 2012, that initial planning (a commander’s 
estimate) was begun that included the options of no-fly zones, humanitarian relief, 
maritime interdiction, limited airstrikes, and the establishment of a humanitarian 
corridor.322 
 What the above shows is that there is no clear evidence that supports either 
variant of this rival hypothesis; moreover, there are some indicators that seem to 
suggest the opposite – at least on face value from what these senior leaders testified 
and wrote.  Given the lack of evidence associated with this rival hypothesis, one cannot 																																																																																																																																																																																		
leaders in the Department of Defense, whom never served in uniform, tended to be 
more hawkish. 321	Leon Panetta, Worthy Fights: A Memoir of Leadership in War and Peace (New York: 
Penguin Press, 2014), 448. 322	The Situation in Syria, Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services United 
States Senate, 100th Congress, 2nd session (March 7, 2012), accessed September 23, 
2014, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsy/pkg/CHRG-112shrg76271/html/CHRG-
112shrg7621.htm. 
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successfully argue its acceptance.  The prudent researcher, however, would flag this 
area as a subject for further research and analysis as more documentary evidence is 
declassified over time.   
 
Synthesizing the Results 
 I addressed two rival hypotheses in this chapter: presidential guidance pre-
empted any consideration of MSRA and that DoD leaders deliberately suppressed the 
MSRA/UW option and did not present it to the NSC.  As the analysis showed, the 
evidence available today best supports the original hypothesis and neither of the rival 
hypotheses.   
 However, over time as more information concerning the interagency decision-
making proceedings over the Syria issue becomes declassified, perhaps the new 
information will challenge this dissertation’s findings and conclusions. Of particular note 
would be any new public statements or newly declassified documents from the now 
retired general and current Secretary of Defense, James Mattis, the former 
commanding general of the US Central Command during much of this March 2011 to 
June 2014 period. 
 Perhaps more significant than the rival hypotheses are the four counter-
arguments that this chapter addressed.  The first, that MSRA/UW national security 
options rarely succeed, is shown to be not quite true.  The cited study does point to an 
important fact that when US advisors are embedded within the resistance forces, the 
degree of success was markedly higher.  The second counter-argument that the 
President ultimately did decide to support to the resistance with an MSRA/UW option is 
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shown to be false.  The President decided to provide a military “train and equip” 
program not a UW operation.  The third counter-argument, that this paramilitary realm 
should be the exclusive domain of the CIA, is shown to be too simplistic.  Both the CIA 
and the SOF have complementary roles in this important MSRA/UW arena.  However, 
the fourth counterargument – that the current US military structure can adequately 
support UW planning and activities – deserves further study.  Although this dissertation 
makes a compelling case to the contrary, it is irrefutable that the US has conducted 
some successful MSRA/UW activities, as General Votel has pointed out.  So while it 
seems that addressing the structural-functionalism and cultural-bureaucracy issues 
described in chapter four are necessary, perhaps they are insufficient to fully 
understand and address this issue. 
 A more complete explanation of the current research question, which is focused 
exclusively on the early years of the Syrian rebellion, might involve a broader research 
question as to why and how the US government executed MSRA/UW options in such 
an uneven fashion.  The MSRA/UW was not used in this period in Syria, but as 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, UW was successfully used in the early months of the 
Afghanistan conflict of 2001 (partnership with the Northern Alliance), the opening phase 
of the Iraq war in 2003 (partnership with the Kurds), the fight against al Qaeda in Iraq in 
2005 (partnership with the al Anbar tribes), and in Yemen fighting al Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) (partnership with tribal resistance), and arguably in Syria 
2015-2017 (partnership with the Syrian Democratic Forces).  Why was there such an 
uneven application of MSRA/UW? 
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 Although a comprehensive answer to that question is worthy of another 
dissertation, an initial indicator or hypothesis lies within the observation that in every 
case of a successful MSRA/UW option in the post-9/11 era, the US had some on the 
ground contact with the resistance force well ahead of time.  In the case of working with 
the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan and the Kurds in Iraq, the US had face-to-face 
contact with those fighters for years before the conflicts erupted and the US then 
decided to execute the UW option.  This was true too with the 2005 al Anbar uprising, 
the Yemeni tribal resistance to AQAP, and, interestingly enough, with the Syrian 
Democratic Forces by 2016.  If this observation is confirmed with thorough research, the 
implication is that to fully optimize MSRA/UW as a strategic option for the nation, the US 
must be willing to establish contact with resistance elements in advance of a crisis go-
to-war situation.  I will elaborate on this important point in the next chapter. 
 
Chapter Summary  
 Careful consideration of the counter-arguments and rival hypotheses that 
challenged the analysis and findings of chapters three and four was vital for a proper 
critical analysis of this topic. 
 I addressed two rival hypotheses in this chapter: presidential guidance pre-
empted any consideration of MSRA and that DoD leaders deliberately suppressed the 
MSRA/UW option and did not present it to the NSC.  As the analysis showed, the 
research evidence available today best supports the original hypothesis and not the 
rival hypotheses.   
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 Arguably more significant than the rival hypotheses are the four counter-
arguments that this chapter addressed.  The first, that MSRA/UW national security 
options rarely succeed, is shown to be not quite true.  The cited study does point to an 
important fact that when US advisors are embedded with the resistance forces, the 
degree of success was markedly higher.  The second counter-argument, that the 
President ultimately did decide to support the resistance with an MSRA/UW option, is 
shown to be false.  The President decided to provide a military “train and equip” 
program not a UW operation.  The third counter-argument, that these paramilitary 
activities should be the exclusive domain of the CIA, is shown to be too simplistic.  Both 
the CIA and the SOF have complementary roles in this important MSRA/UW arena.   
However, the fourth counter-argument – that the current US military structure can 
adequately support UW planning and activities – deserves further research to more 
precisely determine other factors that stimulate or cause the successful application of 
MSRA options.  One such factor appears to be the use of contact teams and the 
establishment of direct contact with resistance elements either early in the crisis or 
ideally in the pre-crisis phase.  
 As Janine Davidson, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Planning 
from 2009-2013, would write: “Ultimately, the output of the military’s planning process 
fails to delver the type of nuanced advice in the form of creative options that the 
president needs.”323 
																																																								323	Janine Davidson, “The Contemporary Presidency: Civil-Military Friction and 
Presidential Decision Making: Explaining the Broken Dialogue,” Presidential Studies 
Quarterly, 43 no.1, March 2013, 129. 
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 Two concluding observations surfaced during the critical analysis in this chapter:  
the need for contact with resistance elements before a crisis erupts and the need for 
“creative options that the president needs.”  These are perfect segues to the next 
chapter, the implications for national security practitioners. 
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CHAPTER SIX:  
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY PRACTITIONERS 
 
--“Our pilots fly combat missions in Syria 
at significant personal risk.  It is odd that 
the administration prefers that risk to our 
people and credibility instead of first 
trying a middle path, that is, enabling a 
serious indigenous force to counter the 
extremist problem as well as the Assad 
government, which is the root cause of 
the problem in Syria. 
 
--“One would wish that the CIA and the 
rest of the administration, with 
Congressional support, would use 
additional policy tools like serious 
material aid to the more moderate 
opposition, and perhaps even a no-fly 
zone, all properly conditioned, to press 
Assad to the negotiating table.” 
     --Ambassador Robert Ford324 
 
 The earliest chapters to this dissertation established the research design and the 
literature review, while the more recent chapters examined the arguments as to if viable 
and acceptable resistance force existed in Syria, and if so, why and how did the US 
military miss the opportunity to support them.  The preceding chapter critically analyzed 
the counter-arguments and plausible rival hypotheses and synthesized those results.  In 																																																								324	Robert S. Ford, Wringing Our Hands and Endless Bombing Won’t Help Us in Syria, 
Washington, DC: The Washington Institute, June 19, 2015.  Accessed at 
http://www.mei.edu/content/at/wringing-our-hands-and-endless-bombing-
won%E2%80%99t-help-us-syria? on December 31, 2015. 
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this chapter, I now examine the recommendations from this analysis for national 
security practitioners, but first it is important to review the framing of this dissertation.   
 At some level there is perhaps an argument to be made that the strategic choice 
of supporting the viable and acceptable resistance in the 2011 to 2014 period would 
have significantly changed today’s situation in Syria for the better.  Without MSRA the 
conflict in Syria has now resulted in five hundred thousand dead325 and ten million 
refugees or internally displaced Syrians.326  There is now also an extensive foreign 
military intervention with Russian, Iranian, Iranian-sponsored proxy militias (from 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq), plus Lebanese Hizballah forces fighting alongside the 
Assad regime.   Moreover, the failure to assist the viable and acceptable resistance 
elements contributed to a power shift from these forces to the extremists of the al-Nusra 
Front by early 2013 and ultimately to the rise of the Islamic State with a sanctuary from 
which to plan, organize, inspire, and conduct trans-regional terrorist acts.327 
 There are indicators that all of the above are true and that a MSRA campaign 
could have mitigated and disrupted those developments.  However, that was neither the 
																																																								325	“The Syrian Conflict and Refugee Crisis”, The Brookings Institute, accessed July 12, 
2016, http://www.brookings.edu/research/flash-topics-folder/syria-conflict-refugee-crisis. 326	Elizabeth Ferris and Kemal Kirisci, The Consequences of Chaos: Syria’s 
Humanitarian Crisis and the Failure to Protect (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute 
Press), April 26, 2016.  See www.brookings.edu/research/books/2016/the-
consequences-of-chaos. 327	Robert S. Ford and James F. Jeffrey, Acting Now Can Reverse an ISIS-Iran 
Power Grab in Iraq (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute, November 2, 
2015), accessed December 31, 2015, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-
analysis/view/acting-now-can-reverse-an-isis-iran-power-grab-in-syria.  See also 
Mick Krever, Former Ambassador to Syria Robert Ford: I could no longer ‘defend 
the American policy,’ accessed June 3, 2014, 
www.http://amanpour.blogs.cnn.com/2014/06/03/former-u-s-ambassador-to-
syria-i-could-no-longer-defend-the-american-policy-robert-ford/. 
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purpose nor design of this dissertation and indeed the research and analysis here does 
not demonstrate the causality between an MSRA option and necessarily a more 
peaceful outcome for Syria today.   
 Instead, this dissertation focused on the US interagency and military decision-
making concerning the Syrian rebellion in March 2011 to June 2014.  During those early 
years, the president was deprived of a full menu of military options, which should have 
included an MSRA option.  That much is argued and demonstrated in this dissertation.  
 Given this narrowed frame, what are the recommendations for national security 
practitioners today?  There are five directly derived recommendations from this 
dissertation and two strategic level overarching recommendations synthesized from the 
derived analysis.  The causal linkages are more clear and apparent with the directly 
derived recommendations, but the two synthesized recommendations are much more 
significant for national security senior leaders.  Adopting the five directly derived 
recommendations is important, but only by adopting the two strategic level overarching 
recommendations will the US begin to make real progress in addressing the 
deficiencies in assessing and supporting resistance activities. 
 
Five Directly Derived Recommendations  
 Before listing any of these recommendations, there should be a humbling 
recognition that MSRA/UW is not a silver bullet: it will not, by itself, solve such complex 
issues as the Syrian rebellion or civil war.  MSRA/UW is just one element in a complex, 
interagency, and multi-national campaign conducted under the leadership and direction 
of the president to shape a desired outcome by coercion, disruption, or regime change, 
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as necessary.  As harsh as some of these latter words sound, their level of violence and 
human suffering is far short of large-scale conventional war, revolution, or civil war.  
Moreover, the holistic effort surrounding an MSRA/UW option is a very complex and 
sophisticated undertaking; nonetheless, it is an option worthy of consideration and 
presentation to the senior national security decision-makers, the president included.   
 The following five specific recommendations are directly derived from the 
analysis presented in the dissertation.  The reader will also see a logic chain that builds 
and links the first recommendation through the fifth.  
 
 Department of Defense Organizational and Process Changes 
 First, the Department of Defense should make organizational and process 
changes to ensure the inclusion of UW expertise into the decision-making process.  
From a structural-functionalist perspective, DoD should expand the role of the US 
Special Operations Command to provide commander’s assessments, estimates, and 
courses of actions (options) for any developing situation that may require MSRA/UW 
options for the president to consider.  As this dissertation argued, the conventional 
military geographic combatant commands and military services are, by structure and 
personnel assignment patterns, not apt to be able to produce such well crafted UW 
options, nor would they support this recommended change since it would be 
bureaucratically interpreted as infringing on their current authorities and 
responsibilities.328  In addition, DoD should expand the assignment of Special Forces 
generals to key operational decision-making positions within the Joint Staff and 
																																																								328	Since 2014 there may be some movement in this regard.	
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geographic combatant commands.  This reform should also include assigning Special 
Forces officers to positions within the National Security Council staff.  Although these 
NSC assignments are not operational decision-making positions, having the MSRA/UW 
expertise in the NSC would also be beneficial for the effective interagency coordination 
of such options.  All of this will likely require a modest increase of Special Forces 
generals and consequently more junior Special Forces officers who may then develop 
into the senior ranks.  Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, conventional military 
officers should receive greater education and experiences in the art of MSRA/UW so 
that when they are assigned to key positions in the geographic combatant commands 
and joint staff, they too are better able to recognize developing MSRA/UW opportunities 
and to craft such options.   
 Certainly, these recommendations will not be supported by the conventional 
military, just like the military reorganization inherent in the Goldwater-Nichols Act that 
required future generals and admirals to have assignments outside of their parent 
service was opposed by the conventional military services.  Reforms such as this will 
need to be driven from either Congress or the President. 
 It is equally important that the US Special Operations Command broadens its 
vision and accepts these strategic responsibilities.  As Dr. Christopher Lamb, former 
director of policy planning in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special 
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, wrote, US Special Operations Command “ought 
to focus on its historic strategic value as an independent means of combating such 
unconventional threats….and (Special Operations Command) must come to better 
appreciate SOF’s role as an independent strategic option that can be applied indirectly 
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in order to advise Pentagon leaders on the best means of employing SOF.”329  Dr. Lamb 
continued that there are times when SOF should take the strategic lead rather than 
simply supporting conventional forces.330  Finally, he argued, “Filtering SOF command 
and control through a hierarchy of conventional-force commanders does not make 
sense when SOF are given the strategic lead for operations.”331 
 
 The Significance of the “Initial Contact” Assessment  
 Second, this dissertation exposes the significance of the initial contact with 
resistance leaders for the development of MSRA options.  Consequently, the 
interagency and military – and primarily US Special Operations Command -- should 
expend more attention and effort to consider, develop, and execute such activities.  
Assessments provided by this contact team would then better enable the development 
of MSRA options.  Just as significant, the contact may reveal that the resistance 
element is not suitable for US assistance if its political goals or operational techniques 
are not consistent with US policy and values.  Shutting down the consideration for 
MSRA options in this case is just as valuable when it can intelligently remove the MSRA 
option from the menu of options for the president.  The ability to have small, discrete 
engagements with resistance leaders to assess their viability and acceptability to US 
national security objectives, and then to be able to provide scalable supporting options 
																																																								329	David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 202 and176. 330	David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 177. 331	Ibid., 239. 
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that may include a comprehensive MSRA option, is essential to developing and 
providing the best military and interagency advice to the president. 
 
 More Carefully Define and Apply the “No Boots on the Ground” Mantra 
 Third, the overly simplistic label of “no boots on the ground” needs to be more 
carefully defined and applied so that it does not become a needless and harmful tool 
that excludes the use of contact teams and small footprint advice and assistance efforts.  
Arguably, the no-BOG label was originally intended to signify the deployment of 
conventional US military forces, like the first Iraq war in 1990-91 and the second war 
beginning in 2003. National security practitioners, especially those with no or limited US 
military experience, should either avoid using the BOG term or precisely define its use 
when considering options; e.g., specify no conventional troops on the ground.  Given 
the criticality of making the initial contact with resistance leaders, as described in the 
preceding paragraph, the “no BOG” label becomes an unintentional instrument that 
stifles the development of MSRA options. 
 
 The Real Achilles Heel 
 Fourth, the logical extension of the preceding two key points – the significance of 
the initial contact and the no BOG mantra – is to focus attention on the real Achilles heel 
of the argument for greater MSRA activities.  The Achilles heel issue is the political 
consideration of what would happen if extremist non-state forces were to capture US 
military personnel on these small unit missions.  When one recalls the Islamic State’s 
perverse 2015 execution of Jordanian pilot Muath Safi Yousef Al-Kasasbe by burning 
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him to death in a cage, it is inescapable to exclude such events from considerations 
inside the National Security Council.  Politically, is the president ready, willing, and able 
to deal with the resulting anger from the American people that would likely call for 
revenge and retribution, likely to the detriment of the planned or ongoing MSRA 
strategy?  This is the kind of issue that needs to be intelligently understood, framed, and 
considered by the national security practitioners, without a sophomoric reflexive 
response of “no BOG.”  
 
  Expand Relationships with Foreign SOF Partners for MSRA/UW 
 Fifth, directly following from the above, the US should expand relationships with 
foreign partner nation special operations forces to not only share the burden of such 
activities, but also in recognition that from a cultural and linguistic perspective, our 
regional partners will likely have better capabilities and strengths than US Special 
Forces.  The engagement of Emirati Special Operations Forces in Yemen and the 
insertion of other partner nation military contact teams early in the Libya civil war 
demonstrate that such capabilities already exist.  Expanding this partnership – perhaps 
with greater US advice, assistance, planning, intelligence sharing, and equipment -- 
would maximize the advantages that partner nations already possess while mitigating or 
minimizing the “US Achilles heel” argument above.  
 
Two Strategic Level Overarching Recommendations 
 The above five directly derived recommendations are necessary to address the 
issues uncovered in this dissertation, but they are not sufficient to address the 
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underlying deficiencies.  There are two strategic level overarching recommendations, 
synthesized from the derived analysis, that need to be addressed.  These 
recommendations are most relevant to senior national security officials; they are: 
• Adapting the strategic level organization and processes in Washington 
• Evolving the interagency institutional culture to support resistance 
activities 
 
 Adapting the Strategic Level Organization and Processes 
 The changes addressed in the above section dealing with DoD organization and 
processes are important, but such changes need to extend into the US interagency.  
Without a strategic level node within the Washington interagency, the changes at US 
Special Operations Command and the Pentagon would be like separate spinning gears 
not connected to the larger machine.   
 Within the National Security Council (NSC), there is no one organizational entity 
directly responsible for supporting resistance activities.  Although the current and 
previous administrations have published national security strategies that usually include 
support for human rights, support to oppressed people, and, in the current strategy, the 
specific inclusion of advancing American influence, there is no corresponding entity 
within the NSC structure to orchestrate the necessary policy coordination within the 
USG to achieve these goals.  By contrast, there is a Counterterrorism Directorate that 
provides the interagency policy coordination for counterterrorism and that model should 
be applied to the case of assessing and supporting resistance movements that are 
congruent with US national interests. 
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 This new entity within the National Security Council could appropriately be called 
the Directorate for Assessing and Supporting Resistance Activities or ASRA.  Like the 
other directorates within the NSC, it could convene subordinate interagency policy 
coordination committees (PCCs) to develop policy recommendation for the NSC 
deputies and principals committees.  In this manner, policy to assess and support 
resistance activities worldwide would be more streamlined and effective.  Moreover, as 
an NSC directorate, this entity could task the intelligence community, State Department, 
and Defense Department for assessments and programs to further the recognition, 
understanding, and support to appropriate resistance activities, congruent with US 
national policy objectives.   
 This idea is not new.  During the Kennedy Administration, when the Soviet Union 
had, as a matter of policy, supported communist revolutionary movements in a variety of 
locations, including south east Asia, Kennedy found the US military and State 
Department to be unable to adapt to this new situation and provide effective 
counterinsurgency responses.  Kennedy ordered the establishment of a Special Group 
for Counterinsurgency, a “high-level interagency committee to monitor and steer the 
national security community’s counterinsurgency work, including the formulation of 
policy and doctrine.”332  The Special Group was successful in its formative years, but 
was killed in 1966, just a few years after Kennedy’s assassination.   
																																																								332	Frank L. Jones, “The Guerrilla Warfare Problem: Revolutionary War and the 
Kennedy Administration Response, 1961-1963.”  U.S. Army War College Guide 
to National Security Issues, Vol.2 National Security Strategy and Policy, edited 
by J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., 402-407.  Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic 
Studies Institute, 2012.  
http://www.strtegicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1110pdf. 
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 Underpinning and supporting this new NSC Directorate for ASRA, the 
Department of State, CIA, US Special Operations Command, and the private sector 
should develop a strategic partnership for planning, coordinating, and executing support 
to resistance activities.  Although each entity has their unique functions within this 
umbrella topic, the synchronization of these entities is not optimized.  This may be 
partially explained by their different albeit complementary authorities, but a more 
complete explanation probably deals with organizational cultures again.  Those self-
imposed obstacles should be reduced – fully respecting the different authorities – for the 
good of the nation.  
 Procedurally this should include an executive-level interagency cell comprised of 
senior officials from each of these entities that meets perhaps quarterly and as needed.  
Although this cell would not work directly for the NSC-ASRA, it would certainly be 
responsive to NSC tasks and policy guidance.  The executive cell would provide 
guidance and direction plus set priorities in accordance with NSC-ASRA guidance.  
Below this executive cell would be a standing joint planning section staffed with 
personnel from each of these entities.  This standing planning section would provide 
daily interagency (and private sector) coordination and surface unresolved issues to the 
executive level, as required.  The primary utility of this planning section is to provide 
daily and continuous interagency coordination amongst these government entities and 
the private sector.  Of note, these organizational and process changes would cost 
nothing but the will to adapt the existing billet structure and personnel to this priority.  
Sufficient force structure and personnel exist within these organizations to enable this 
evolution. 
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 This recommendation is consistent with Dr. Christopher Lamb’s earlier writings 
on the need for SOF’s transformation: “The national security bureaucracy in Washington 
must adopt a more collaborative decision-making system to produce and choose among 
integrated strategic options, monitor progress in their implementation, and adjust and 
adjudicate risk rapidly in response to developments.”333 
 Finally, it is time to change the label of Unconventional Warfare (UW) and MSRA 
to Support to Resistance Activities for use within the US interagency.  Although this 
recommendation may seem trivial to many, it should be adopted for interagency use 
because the SRA label immediately establishes a much clearer foundation for 
interagency discussions than UW.  This does not mean that the military needs to 
change its terms or doctrine; rather, this recommendation does argue for establishing 
the term “Support to Resistance Activities” into the US interagency lexicon and for the 
military to use this terms when discussing UW options in the interagency arena.   
 The interagency and our foreign partners understand the English phrase of 
support to resistance activities.  What they do not understand is the military term 
unconventional warfare.  The messages that this latter term conveys are 1) it must be 
akin to asymmetric or hybrid warfare, and 2) it is war.  The first message is off-target: 
various tactics, techniques, and procedures may be deemed asymmetric or hybrid, but 
UW has a precise military doctrinal meaning of activities conducted to enable a 
resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or 
occupying power.  While the first message goes off-target with its audience, the second 
message (this is war) presents a significant obstacle when coordinating such activities 																																																								333	David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 240. 
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within the interagency.  When departments or agencies perceives that this is war – 
indeed that word is in the title of the concept – it triggers a serious of obstacles, 
concerns, and issues in the civilian national security practitioner’s mind that almost 
outright stops any consideration of the UW option.  To a diplomat, for example, the 
“war” option indicates that diplomacy has somehow failed – that the diplomat failed – 
and the situation has now turned into a war with the military as the lead US entity.  This 
is clearly not the intent with the military’s approach with unconventional warfare, but that 
is nonetheless the message that is immediately conveyed to a non-military official.  It 
would be far better to establish a more precise and clear term for discussions and 
coordination within the interagency – and with our foreign partners.  
 
 Evolving the Interagency Institutional Culture to Support Resistance 
Activities 
 More important than the structural and process changes outlined above, the 
interagency culture must be evolved to support resistance activities.  Integrated career 
paths, with clearly established promotion opportunities, must be designed within the 
military, the State Department, and the CIA to build and maintain expertise within this 
skill set.  That expertise will be enhanced with required rotational assignments of these 
individual to the other departments and agencies, similar to how US military officers are 
expected to seek and obtain “joint tours” outside of their respective Services to advance 
their careers into the senior ranks and become a general or admiral.  And similar to the 
military example here, it will likely take Congressional action to mandate such promotion 
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paths and quotas into law before our current department and agencies adequately 
adapt to these new realities.   
 Tailored career paths with promotions are not enough.  The concept of how best 
to develop and use SRA as a strategic option for the nation should be further developed 
by a national-level institution, research center, or university.334 This might best be 
accomplished at universities like Georgetown or Johns Hopkins, or in partnership with 
military-related educational institutions like the National Defense University or the Joint 
Special Operations University.  But it is also clear, from the organizational culture 
discussion earlier, that the development of this type of intellectual capital should not be 
exclusively resident and confined within the Department of Defense.  A partnership with 
a DoD university would be advantageous, but the lead and primacy of the effort should 
be from a national-level institution, research center, or university that can better develop 
the intellectual body of knowledge for MSRA, plus produce civilian and military 
graduates who become the next generation of national security practitioners.  Curricula 
and research areas for this institution would include the following topics (none of which 
figure prominently in the current US military war colleges nor the lower-level command 
and general staff colleges):335 
• Social movement theory 
• Language proficiency and cultural studies 
• Creation and preparation of an underground 																																																								334	Charles Cleveland T. Cleveland, Lieutenant General, US Army (retired), (three-star 
Commanding General, U.S. Army Special Operations Command from 2012-2015) in an 
interview with the author March 27, 2017. 335	Most of the listing depicted above is from Joseph L. Votel, Charles T. Cleveland, 
Charles T. Connett, and Will Irwin, “Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone,” Joint 
Forces Quarterly, 1st Quarter 2016, 101-109. 
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• Cyber UW tools and methods 
• Influence operations 
• Popular mobilization dynamics 
• Subversion and political warfare 
• Social network analysis and sociocultural analysis 
• Revolutionary warfare theory 
 
 In addition to research and publishing on the above topics, this institution should 
also produce graduates at the undergraduate and masters level.  The degrees would be 
in National Security Studies with a focus on Resistance Movements.  Talented civilian 
students at the undergraduate level and graduate level could then compete for positions 
within the National Security Council staff, the Department of State, CIA, and the US 
military and then embark on their new careers.  Select mid-level officers (e.g., majors) 
could earn their masters degrees here in lieu of their conventional schooling at their 
Service staff college.  Senior military officers (e.g., colonels and lieutenant colonels) 
could study here for one year fellowships and should receive credit for war college 
graduate studies, as already occurs with other universities and think tanks.  Likewise, 
mid- and senior-level CIA and State Department personnel could earn government-
funded masters degrees here, too, in combined classes with military counterparts.  Of 
significance, this yearlong fellowship process of studying with State Department, 
military, and CIA professionals would tighten the interagency bonds necessary for 
success at the strategic level.   
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Chapter Summary 
 There are five directly derived recommendations from this dissertation and two 
strategic level overarching recommendations synthesized from the derived analysis.   
 The five directly derived recommendations are: 
 First, the Department of Defense should make organizational and process 
changes to ensure the inclusion of UW expertise into the decision-making process.  
From a structural-functionalist perspective, DoD should expand the role of the US 
Special Operations Command to provide commander’s assessments, estimates, and 
courses of actions (options) for any developing situation that may require MSRA/UW 
options for the president to consider. 
 Second, this dissertation exposes the significance of the initial contact with 
resistance leaders for the development of MSRA options.  Consequently, the 
interagency and military – and primarily US Special Operations Command -- should 
expend more attention and effort to consider, develop, and execute such activities.  
Assessments provided by this contact team would then better enable the development 
of MSRA options. 
 Third, the overly simplistic label of “no boots on the ground” needs to be more 
carefully defined and applied so that it does not become a needless and harmful tool 
that excludes the use of contact teams and small footprint advice and assistance efforts.   
 Fourth, the logical extension of the preceding two key points – the significance of 
the initial contact and the no BOG mantra – is to focus attention on the real Achilles heel 
of the argument for greater MSRA activities.  The Achilles heel issue is the political 
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consideration of what would happen if extremist non-state forces capture US military 
personnel on these small unit missions. 
 Fifth, the US should expand relationships with foreign partner nation special 
operations forces to not only share the burden of such activities, but also in recognition 
that from a cultural and linguistic perspective, our regional partners will likely have better 
capabilities and strengths than US Special Forces. 
 In addition to these five directly derived recommendations, there are two 
overarching strategic level recommendation that should be implemented.  They are: 
 First, the US should extrapolate these earlier five recommendations to the 
national strategic level as well.  This includes establishing a new entity within the 
National Security Council, the Directorate for Assessing and Supporting Resistance 
Activities or ASRA.  It also includes the Department of State, CIA, US Special 
Operations Command, and the private sector developing a strategic partnership for 
planning, coordinating, and executing support to resistance activities.  These two 
initiatives are connected, with the NSC ASRA entity providing the strategic policy and 
guidance necessary for the strategic partners of the State Department, CIA, and US 
Special Operations Command to plan and execute.   
 Second, the interagency culture must be evolved to support resistance activities.  
This includes the establishment of interagency career paths and promotions for national 
security specialists within the US Special Operations Command, the State Department, 
and the CIA.  It also requires the establishment of a national-level institution, research 
center, or university focused on assessing and supporting resistance activities to build 
expertise in resistance activities.   
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 With the adoption of the above recommendations, we can begin to change 
the institutional cultures, the organizational biases, and the old structures to be 
able to provide the president a complete, comprehensive, and creative menu of 
options when assessing and responding to violent political crises short of 
conventional war. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
“This is another type of war, new in its intensity, 
ancient in its origin--war by guerrillas, subversives, 
insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of 
by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, 
seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the 
enemy instead of engaging him…. It preys on 
economic unrest and ethnic conflicts. It requires in 
those situations where we must counter it … a 
whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind 
of force, and therefore a new and wholly different 
kind of military training.” 
 —President John F. Kennedy, June 6, 1962336 
 
“We need strong, numerous boots on the ground, 
but we also need the right goal, the right strategy, 
and the right tactics.  Obviously, Syrian fighters, 
and especially Sunni Arab Syrians, and not 
Americans, are best placed to confront Sunni Arab 
extremists in Syria.” 
     ---Ambassador Robert S. Ford337 
 
 Between March 2011 and June 2014 an opportunity existed to disrupt the 
strategic partnership of Iran, Syria, and Lebanese Hizballah by supporting a viable and 
acceptable resistance movement within Syria that sought to overthrow the Bashar al-
Assad regime.  The resistance formed within the context of the social, economic, and 
political upheavals of the Arab Spring in general and the repressive actions of the Assad 
																																																								
336 Remarks at West Point to the Graduating Class of the U.S. Military Academy, 
accessed November 19, 2015, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8695. 337	Robert S. Ford, How to Correct America’s Strategy in Syria, Washington, DC: The 
Middle East Institute, March 11, 2015, accessed December 31, 2015, 
http://www.mei.edu/content/at/how-to-correct-americas-syria-strategy. 
	 226 
forces in particular. While the US government provided non-lethal aid to elements within 
the resistance movement, the US did not provide any military support.  Instead, by 2016 
a complex civil war unfolded that included military interventions from Russia, Iran, and 
Lebanese Hizballah.  By 2016 several hundred thousand people had died and ten 
million others were refugees or internally displaced.338 By late 2017, Assad was firmly in 
control, thanks to Russian, Iranian, and Lebanese Hizballah interventions and the 
constrained US response that restricted itself to only fighting ISIS.  Could the US have 
shaped and influenced this development differently in the earlier years?  If so, what 
implications should this have for US national security practitioners in future situations?   
 In this dissertation I posed the research question of why and how the US military 
missed the opportunity to provide military support to the moderate Syrian resistance in 
the March 2011 to June 2014 period.  I argued that the US military’s culture, structure, 
and process for providing advice to the president and his national security decision-
making team are flawed due to the marginalization of unconventional warfare expertise.  
This marginalization results in inadequate consideration to applying UW as a strategic 
option for the nation.  This inadequate planning and decision-making during the Syrian 
rebellion in March 2011 through June 2014 resulted in a missed opportunity to disrupt 
the strategic partnership of Iran, Syria, and Lebanese Hizballah and support the people 
of Syria.  Moreover, effective support to the resistance movement arguably could have 
mitigated perhaps the extent of the human tragedy inherent in the death or 
displacement of more than half of the Syrian population that resulted by 2016.  All that 
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said, this dissertation was not a case study of the Syrian rebellion; rather, it was a case 
study on the US interagency and military decision-making process.  The analysis of 
what could have happened with proper military support to the resistance will be a topic 
for a future researcher. 
 In this dissertation I showed that a viable and acceptable resistance force existed 
in Syria from March 2011 through June 2014 and that the US military conventional 
officers failed to recognize this development, adequately analyze its implications, and 
craft a strategic UW option for the senior national security decision-makers to consider.  
If these cultural, structural, and procedural flaws are left unaddressed, the US is likely to 
repeat this strategic error in the future. 
 In terms of research design and methodology, this dissertation was a disciplined 
configurative case study that used established theories to examine a case.339  More 
specifically, this was a single case study with macro- and micro-level process-tracing.  
Primary source evidence included Congressional testimonies and memoirs from the key 
participants in the decision-making, public statements from the White House and State 
Department, plus elite interviews with the US Ambassador to Syria and the 
Commanding General of the US Army’s Special Operations Command, both serving in 
these roles during the 2011-2014 period.  Ambassador Ford was a key participant in 
these events and retired Lieutenant General Cleveland is an expert in the military’s 
structure, process, and culture concerning unconventional warfare.  The resulting 
process-tracing charts, both macro- and micro-levels, were instrumental in identifying, 
placing in context, and then dissecting the decision-making that occurred.   																																																								339	Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in 
the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 74-76.	
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 Two rival hypotheses were identified during the research design and four 
counter-arguments surfaced during the research.  The two rival hypotheses postulated 
that presidential guidance pre-empted any consideration of MSRA/UW and that DoD 
leaders deliberately suppressed such an option and did not present it to the NSC.  As 
the research and analysis in this dissertation showed, the evidence available today best 
supports the original hypothesis and neither of the rival hypotheses.   
 Arguably more significant than the rival hypotheses were the four counter-
arguments that emerged during the research and analysis phases of the dissertation.  
The first, that MSRA/UW national security options rarely succeed, was shown to be not 
quite true.  The study cited by the proponents of this counter-argument points to an 
important fact that when US advisors are embedded within the resistance forces, the 
degree of success was markedly higher.  The second counter-argument, that the 
president ultimately did decide to support the resistance with an MSRA/UW option, is 
shown to be false.  The president decided to provide a military “train and equip” 
program, but not a UW operation.  The third counter-argument, that these paramilitary 
activities should be the exclusive domain of the CIA, is shown to be too simplistic.  Both 
the CIA and the SOF have complementary roles in this important MSRA/UW arena.  
However, the fourth counter-argument – that the current US military structure can at 
times adequately support UW planning and activities – deserves further research to 
more precisely determine other factors that stimulate or cause the successful 
application of MSRA options.  One such factor appears to be the use of small discreet 
teams to establish direct contact with resistance elements either early in the crisis or 
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ideally in the pre-crisis phase.  This factor figured prominently in distilling the 
recommendations of this study for national security decision-makers. 
 The dissertation research and analysis led to five directly derived 
recommendations and two strategic level overarching recommendations synthesized 
from the derived analysis.   
 The five directly derived recommendations are: 
 First, the Department of Defense should make organizational and process 
changes to ensure the inclusion of UW expertise into the decision-making process.  
From a structural-functionalist perspective, DoD should expand the role of the US 
Special Operations Command to provide commander’s assessments, estimates, and 
courses of actions (options) for any developing situation that may require MSRA/UW 
options for the president to consider. 
 Second, this dissertation exposes the significance of the initial contact with 
resistance leaders for the development of MSRA options.  Consequently, the 
interagency and military – and primarily US Special Operations Command -- should 
expend more attention and effort to consider, develop, and execute such activities.  
Assessments provided by this contact team would then better enable the development 
of MSRA options. 
 Third, the overly simplistic label of “no boots on the ground” needs to be more 
carefully defined and applied so that it does not become a needless and harmful tool 
that excludes the use of contact teams and small footprint advice and assistance efforts.   
 Fourth, the logical extension of the preceding two key points – the significance of 
the initial contact and the no BOG mantra – is to focus attention on the real Achilles heel 
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of the argument for greater MSRA activities.  The Achilles heel issue is the political 
consideration of what would happen if extremist non-state forces capture US military 
personnel on these small unit missions. 
 Fifth, the US should expand relationships with foreign partner nation special 
operations forces to not only share the burden of such activities, but also in recognition 
that from a cultural and linguistic perspective, our regional partners will likely have better 
capabilities and strengths than US Special Forces. 
 In addition to these five directly derived recommendations, there are two 
overarching strategic level recommendation that should be implemented.  They are: 
 First, the US should extrapolate these earlier five recommendations to the 
national strategic level as well.  This includes establishing a new entity within the 
National Security Council, the Directorate for Assessing and Supporting Resistance 
Activities or ASRA.  It also includes the Department of State, CIA, US Special 
Operations Command, and the private sector developing a strategic partnership for 
planning, coordinating, and executing support to resistance activities.  These two 
initiatives are connected, with the NSC ASRA entity providing the strategic policy and 
guidance necessary for the strategic partners of the State Department, CIA, and US 
Special Operations Command to plan and execute.   
 Second, the interagency culture must be evolved to support resistance activities.  
This includes the establishment of interagency career paths and promotions for national 
security specialists within the US Special Operations Command, the State Department, 
and the CIA.  It also requires the establishment of a national-level institution, research 
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center, or university focused on assessing and supporting resistance activities to build 
expertise in resistance activities.   
 The real crux of the issue uncovered and presented in this dissertation is 
the institutional-cultural bias within the conventional military that created an 
organizational structure and decision-making process that marginalizes 
MSRA/UW expertise to the detriment of national security practitioners and, by 
extension, to the nation.  The remedy is not merely a list of specific 
recommendations; rather, it is a focus on the idea of support to resistance 
movements as a national security option with strategic-level interagency 
organization and process changes plus a national-level institution from which to 
study and build expertise in resistance activities.   Only then can we more readily 
change the institutional cultures, the organizational biases, and the old structures 
to be able to provide the president a complete, comprehensive, and creative 
menu of options to consider when assessing and responding to violent political 
crises short of conventional war.  
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APPENDIX A: 
SYRIAN REBELLION MACRO-LEVEL PROCESS-TRACING CHART 
 
 This appendix consists of two sections.  The first section contains the 
macro-level process-tracing charts focused on the rebellion’s beginning in March 
2011, through the fall of Mosul in June 2014, and continuing through 2015 for 
some additional context that documents the Russian intervention.   
 Highlighted in red ink are the seven key events that provide critical 
insights to the interagency and military decision-making.  These events are 
further analyzed in the micro-level process-tracing charts in chapter four of this 
dissertation. 
 Highlighted in blue ink within this macro-level process-tracing chart are the 
key US policy and strategy announcements from the White House and the State 
Department.  The full text of these statements can be found in Section Two of 
this appendix. 
 The second section provides amplifying details concerning the US 
strategy by providing the actual texts of White House and State Department 
statements concerning the Syria situation.  These texts clearly show the evolving 
nature of the US policy and strategy and provide the detail that could not be 
captured in the matrix chart in section one. 
 The two sections should be read side-by-side.
	 246 
Appendix A, Section One 
The Chart 
 
 
 Purpose.  This section lists more than one hundred major political, economic, and military events, actions, and 
activities taken by Syrian actors (the Assad regime and resistance elements), ISIS, other state actors, international 
organizations, and the US government on one timeline.  This chart is intended to capture and depict the array of various 
key events throughout this conflict to allow the reader to refer to a specific event and then to see its temporal relationship 
to other events.  This array of events is then of utility for researchers to conduct more detailed process-tracing to 
determine linkages and causality of key events and variables.   
 
 Time Frame.  The focus of this dissertation is on the period March 2011 to June 2014.  However, to evaluate the 
various factors and events that impacted and shaped the decision-making in that precise period, one must also examine 
events that occurred both before and after.  To that point, the following paragraphs provide background information and 
set the listed events into context.  Moreover, the event charts themselves extend through December 2015 only to show 
the reader the continued evolution of US policy. 
   
  Pre-Arab Spring Resistance Activities.  In 2010, a year before the Arab Spring uprising began in Tunisia, 
Dr. Walid Phares published The Coming Revolution: Struggle for Freedom in the Middle East.  In this prescient work, Dr. 
Phares predicted the upcoming uprisings and provided a constructivist description of the various social, economic, and 
political underpinnings of the upcoming upheavals.  Although he described the historical roots of the inevitable revolutions 
from the Maghreb, Sudan, Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, his descriptions of Syria are illuminating for this study.  
Phares describes the 1982 uprising in Hama that left more than 18,000 dead, relentless regime oppression in the early 
1960s, and the brutal actions of Hafez Assad.340  With his death in June 2000, the control of the regime passed to his son 
Bashar Assad and his “five security services, all involved in financial and other interests inside Syria and Lebanon.”341  
Although the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would complain in 2012 that no one could identify moderate 
resistance leaders to him, Phares identified resistance leaders as early as 2010 who were opposing the regime’s 
oppression.  Resistance leaders like Ammar Abdelhamid, Michel Kilo, Riad Seif, Farid Ghadri, Abdel Halim Khaddam, and 
political organizations like the National Council for the Damascus Declaration, the Social Peace Movement Party, Syrian 																																																								
340 Walid Phares, The Coming Revolution: Struggle for Freedom in the Middle East.  (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
Inc., 2010), 203-210. 
341 Phares, 211. 
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Reform Party, would form the cadre and nucleus of much of the initial resistance activities by 2012.  Well before that, 
however, in 2006 three hundred Syrian and Lebanese intellectuals would sign the Beirut-Damascus Declaration calling for 
functional democracies in both countries.342  Phares prophetically wrote in 2010: “When (the Syrian masses mobilize for 
change)…democracies around the world must stand by Syria’s civil society, all the way to a democratic revolution.  No 
doubt about it — it is coming.”343 
 
  The Broader Regional Arab Spring Uprising.  In addition to placing the Syrian uprising in its historical 
context of oppression and resistance since the 1960s, one must also place the Syrian uprising within the context of the 
regional Arab Spring uprisings that began December 17, 2010 when “Tarek al-Tayeb Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on 
fire in front of a local municipal office after being harassed by police officers in the central Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid.”344  
Given the underlying political, social, and economic grievances against the many corrupt and repressive regimes 
throughout the region, this spark ignited the uprisings of the Arab Spring.  These revolts spread rapidly to Bahrain, Egypt, 
Jordan, Libya, Syria, and Yemen, with protests of various intensities in Algeria, Iraq, Mauritania, Morocco, Sudan, and the 
Gulf States.345  From December 2010 to June 2012 approximately 90,000 people in 16 countries would die, but only the 
autocrats in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen would fall.346   
 
 Methodology  
  
 This process trace is in accordance with Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett’s prescription for the detailed 
narrative version of process-tracing.  In this variant, “a detailed narrative or story (is) presented in the form of a chronicle 
that purports to throw light on how an event came about.  Such a narrative is highly specific and makes no explicit use of 
theory or theory-related variables.”347  This approach is also congruent with Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel’s 
																																																								
342 Phares, 212-217. 
343 Phares, 220. 
344 James Brownlee, Tarek Masoud, Andrew Reynolds, The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression and Reform.  (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015),10. 
345 Brownlee, 10. 
346 Brownlee, 10-11. 
347 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences.  
(Cambridge, MA: Belfor Center for Science and international Affairs, Harvard University, 2005), 210. 
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prescription for process-tracing.348  Within the chart, citations for these events are recorded in short form with full citations 
in the reference section. 
 
 Highlighted in blue within this macro-level process-tracing chart are the key US policy and strategy announcements 
from the White House and State Department.  The full text of these statements can be found in Section 2 of this appendix. 
 
 Within Section 1 of this macro-level process-tracing appendix, there are listings of more than one-hundred events.  
Highlighted in red ink are the seven key events that provide critical insights into the interagency and military decision-
making associated with the Syrian rebellion I the March 2011 to June 2014 period.  These seven events are further 
analyzed in micro-level process-trace charts in chapter four of this dissertation.  These events are: 
 
• The senior US defense and military leaders assess that “it is not clear what constitutes the Syrian armed 
opposition”  (February and March 2012). 
• Interagency senior leaders express frustration at DoD’s thinking (mid-2012). 
• President Obama rejects National Security Council recommendation for the CIA to arm the rebels (September 
2012). 
• Significant divergence apparent between DoD senior leaders and the US Ambassador in Syria on assessing the 
moderate resistance (April 2013). 
• Two months later President Obama approves plan for CIA to arm the resistance (June 2013). 
• In the wake of the fall of Mosul, President Obama orders the military to train and equip the moderate resistance in 
their fight against ISIS, not the Assad regime (June 2014). 
• Congress approves the funding for the DoD train and equip operation (December 2014). 
 
 
  
																																																								348	Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool (Cambridge, UK: University 
Printing House, 2015.)	
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Date Events by Syrian Actors 
(Assad Regime, Resistance 
Elements) and ISIS 
Actions by other States 
(minus US) and International 
Organizations 
Actions by the US 
Government to include 
Internal Decision-Making 
2011    
March Syrian security forces shoot and 
kill protestors in the southern 
city of Deraa who were 
demanding release of political 
prisoners.  This sparks violent 
unrest that steadily spreads 
nationwide over the following 
months. (BBC, Syria Profile 
Timeline, 2015) 
Turkey seizes weapons and 
ammunition from Iranian 
commercial flight en route to 
Syria.  (Will Fulton, Iranian 
Strategy in Syria, 2013, 17) 
 
Some Iraqi officials, including 
Transportation Minister Hadi al-
Amiri, assessed to be 
facilitating Iranian Revolutionary 
Guards Force (IRGC) arms 
supply flights to Syria.  (Fulton, 
Iranian Strategy, 2013, 17) 
 
April “The first public meeting of 
members of the Syrian 
opposition is held in Istanbul.” 
(Institute for the Study of War, 
Syria’s Political Opposition, April 
2012, 12) 
 
“150 people sign a new national 
initiative for democratic change, 
creating the Syrian National 
Coalition for Change.  This is 
the first attempt to establish an 
organized external leadership 
Iran dispatches Law 
Enforcement Force (LEF) (part 
of Iran’s interior Ministry) 
Deputy Commander BG Ahmad 
Reza Radam to Damascus to 
provide expertise and aid for 
the regime crackdown.  (Fulton, 
Iranian Strategy, 2013, 13-14) 
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Date Events by Syrian Actors 
(Assad Regime, Resistance 
Elements) and ISIS 
Actions by other States 
(minus US) and International 
Organizations 
Actions by the US 
Government to include 
Internal Decision-Making 
for the Syrian uprising.” 
(Institute for the Study of War, 
Syria’s Political Opposition, April 
2012, 12) 
May Syrian Army tanks enter Deraa, 
Banyas, Homs and suburbs of 
Damascus in an effort to crush 
anti-regime protests. President 
Assad announces amnesty for 
political prisoners. (BBC, Syria 
Profile Timeline, 2015) 
US and European Union tighten 
sanctions. (BBC, Syria Profile 
Timeline, 2015) 
May 19, US condemns Assad 
regime for its use of deadly force 
against protestors.  The US calls 
for democratic change.  (See 
Appendix A, Section 2 for full 
text.) 
 
Treasury Department designates 
Iranian IRGC-QF Commander 
Major General Qassem 
Suleimani and Operations and 
Training Commander Mohsen 
Chizari for their role in “the 
violent repression against the 
Syrian people.”  (Fulton, Iranian 
Strategy, 2013, 10) 
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Date Events by Syrian Actors 
(Assad Regime, Resistance 
Elements) and ISIS 
Actions by other States 
(minus US) and International 
Organizations 
Actions by the US 
Government to include 
Internal Decision-Making 
June The Assad government says 
that “armed gangs” in the 
northwestern town of Jisr al-
Shughour have killed 120 
members of the security forces. 
Troops besiege the town and 
more than 10,000 people flee to 
Turkey. President Assad 
pledges to start a "national 
dialogue" on reform. (BBC, 
Syria Profile Timeline, 2015) 
 
Elements of the Syrian 
opposition meet in Antalya, 
Turkey and form the Syrian 
National Coalition for Change.  
The opposition includes liberal, 
pro-Western, Muslim 
Brotherhood, Assyrian and 
Kurdish elements.  (Institute for 
the Study of War, Syria’s 
Political Opposition, April 2012, 
12) 
EU sanctions IRGC Intelligence 
Organization chief Hojjat al-
Eslam Hossein Taeb for his 
involvement in “providing 
equipment and support to help 
the Syria regime suppress 
protests.”  (Fulton, Iranian 
Strategy, 2013, 14-15) 
Treasury Department sanctions 
Iran Air and Yas Air (both Iranian 
airlines) for transporting military 
equipment and personnel to 
Syria. The designation described 
a series of flights in March 2011 
that transported weapons to 
Hezbollah and Syria at the 
beginning of the conflict. (Fulton, 
Iranian Strategy, 2013, 16) 
July President Assad sacks the 
governor of the northern 
province of Hama after mass 
demonstrations there.  Assad 
eventually dispatches in troops 
to restore order at the cost of 
 The US again condemns the 
Assad regime for its attacks 
against the peaceful protestors. 
(See Appendix A, Section 2 for 
full text.) 
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Date Events by Syrian Actors 
(Assad Regime, Resistance 
Elements) and ISIS 
Actions by other States 
(minus US) and International 
Organizations 
Actions by the US 
Government to include 
Internal Decision-Making 
scores of lives. (BBC, Syria 
Profile Timeline, 2015) 
August The Syrian National Transition 
Council (SNTC) forms in 
Istanbul with opposition 
elements.  (Institute for the 
Study of War, Syria’s Political 
Opposition, April 2012, 12) 
  
September Burhan Ghalioun is named 
President of the SNTC. (Institute 
for the Study of War, Syria’s 
Political Opposition, April 2012, 
12) 
 In addition to the Treasury 
Department designations 
announced in June, Treasury 
cites 117 cargo and passenger 
planes for transporting arms and 
personnel to Syria. (Fulton, 
Iranian Strategy, 2013, 16) 
October “Building on the foundation of 
the … (SNTC), a 
comprehensive opposition 
council is announced.  The 
Syrian National Council (SNC) 
formally declares its 
organizational affiliations and 
structure to include a General 
Assembly, a General Secretariat 
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Date Events by Syrian Actors 
(Assad Regime, Resistance 
Elements) and ISIS 
Actions by other States 
(minus US) and International 
Organizations 
Actions by the US 
Government to include 
Internal Decision-Making 
and an Executive Committee.” 
(Institute for the Study of War, 
Syria’s Political Opposition, April 
2012, 12) 
 
The new SNC says it has forged 
a common front of internal and 
exiled opposition activists. 
(BBC, Syria Profile Timeline, 
2015) 
November  Arab League votes to suspend 
Syria, accusing it of failing to 
implement the Arab peace plan, 
and imposes sanctions. (BBC, 
Syria Profile Timeline, 2015) 
 
December Twin suicide bombs outside 
security buildings in Damascus 
kill 44, the first in a series of 
large blasts in the capital that 
continue into the following 
summer. (BBC, Syria Profile 
Timeline, 2015) 
  
2012    
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Date Events by Syrian Actors 
(Assad Regime, Resistance 
Elements) and ISIS 
Actions by other States 
(minus US) and International 
Organizations 
Actions by the US 
Government to include 
Internal Decision-Making 
January “The SNC General Secretariat 
meets in Istanbul to extend 
Ghalioun’s presidency.”  
(Institute for the Study of War, 
Syria’s Political Opposition, April 
2012, 12) 
IRGC-QF Commander Qassem 
Suleimani meets with Assad in 
Damascus days prior to the 
commencement of the regime’s 
assault on Zabadani. (Fulton, 
Iranian Strategy, 2013, 12) 
Early 2012 - According to then-
Secretary of Defense Leon 
Panetta, the NSC discusses 
options and limits the US 
response to non-lethal support.  
“We presented a set of options 
to the NSC - ranging 
from…limited air 
strikes…protecting refugee 
camps, and supporting regional 
allies.  It was clear from those 
discussions that there was no 
strong support among the 
president’s top advisors for 
direct military action.” (Leon 
Panetta, Worthy Fights, 2014, 
448) 
 
“There was little coordination 
between the opposition groups, 
and some had unsavory ties to 
terrorist groups….so our initial 
support was nonlethal - training, 
for the most part, as well as 
supplies, but not weapons.”  
(Panetta, Worthy Fights, 2014, 
449) 
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Date Events by Syrian Actors 
(Assad Regime, Resistance 
Elements) and ISIS 
Actions by other States 
(minus US) and International 
Organizations 
Actions by the US 
Government to include 
Internal Decision-Making 
February Government steps up the 
bombardment of Homs and 
other cities. (BBC, Syria Profile 
Timeline, 2015) 
 
The SNC Executive Committee 
meets in Doha, Qatar. (Institute 
for the Study of War, Syria’s 
Political Opposition, April 2012, 
12) 
First meeting of the Group of 
Friends (more than 60 
countries, UN, Arab League, 
EU, and others).  The Group 
condemns Assad regime and 
affirms the goal of reform and 
democracy for the Syrian 
people.  Calls for Assad to 
delegate “full authority” to his 
deputy.  
 
The Group of Friends 
recognizes the Syrian National 
Council as the legitimate 
representative of the Syrian 
people.  The Group agrees to 
increase support to the 
opposition. 
 
(See Appendix A, Section 2 for 
full texts.) 
 
Event One (first of two parts): 
The senior US defense and 
military leaders assess that “it is 
not clear what constitutes the 
Syrian armed opposition”.  (See 
Chapter 4) 
 
In an interview with CNN, the 
Chairman of the JCS, General 
Martin Dempsey, stated it is 
“premature to take a decision to 
arm the opposition movement in 
Syria, because I would 
challenge anyone to clearly 
identify for me the opposite 
movement in Syria at this point.”  
(Interview with CNN’s Fareed 
Zakaria, U.S. Military Chief 
Dubious About Arming Syrian 
Rebels, February 20, 2012) 
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Date Events by Syrian Actors 
(Assad Regime, Resistance 
Elements) and ISIS 
Actions by other States 
(minus US) and International 
Organizations 
Actions by the US 
Government to include 
Internal Decision-Making 
   “US Department of Treasury 
designates the Iranian Ministry 
of intelligence and Security 
(MOIS) for providing substantial 
assistance to the Syrian General 
Intelligence Directorate for the 
purpose of assisting the Syrian 
regime in its violent crackdown 
on protestors.” (Fulton, Iranian 
Strategy, 2013, 15) 
March The SNC General Assembly 
meets in Istanbul. (Institute for 
the Study of War, Syria’s 
Political Opposition, April 2012, 
12) 
UN Security Council endorses 
non-binding peace plan drafted 
by UN envoy Kofi Annan. China 
and Russia agree to support 
the plan after an earlier, 
tougher draft is modified. (BBC, 
Syria Profile Timeline, 2015) 
 
Iran provides unmanned aerial 
vehicles to Syria to monitor 
opposition forces. (Fulton, 
Iranian Strategy, 2013, 15) 
Then-Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton meets with GCC leaders 
in Riyadh to discuss the need to 
support the Syrian resistance. 
The US was not prepared to arm 
the resistance. (Clinton, Hard 
Choices, 2014, 453) 
 
Event One (second of two 
parts): The senior US defense 
and military leaders assess that 
“it is not clear what constitutes 
the Syrian armed opposition.”  
(See Chapter 4) 
 
Secretary of Defense Panetta 
and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff General Dempsey testify 
to the Senate Armed Services 
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Date Events by Syrian Actors 
(Assad Regime, Resistance 
Elements) and ISIS 
Actions by other States 
(minus US) and International 
Organizations 
Actions by the US 
Government to include 
Internal Decision-Making 
Committee.  Panetta states, “It is 
not clear what constitutes the 
Syrian armed opposition.  There 
has been no single unifying 
military alternative that can be 
recognized, appointed, or 
contacted.”  General Dempsey 
adds that there are 
“…approximately one hundred 
groups that we’ve identified as 
part of the opposition….(but) 
some kind of coherent core…it 
doesn’t exist today.”  (Senate 
Armed Services Committee 
Hearings, March 7, 2012) 
 
(Note: In March The Institute for 
the Study of War, publishes a 
detailed 57-page description and 
assessment of the various units, 
commanders, locations, and 
activities of the moderate 
resistance in Syria, including 
photos of 39 active 
commanders.  The Institute 
would follow this publication with 
a 38-page document in April that 
detailed the grass-roots political 
opposition that was emerging in 
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Date Events by Syrian Actors 
(Assad Regime, Resistance 
Elements) and ISIS 
Actions by other States 
(minus US) and International 
Organizations 
Actions by the US 
Government to include 
Internal Decision-Making 
Syria.) (Holiday, Syria’s Armed 
Opposition, 2012) 
May  France, UK, Germany, Italy, 
Spain, Canada and Australia 
expel senior Syrian diplomats in 
protest at killing of more than a 
hundred civilians in Houla, near 
Homs. (BBC, Syria Profile 
Timeline, 2015) 
 
July Free Syria Army (FSA) bomb 
kills three security chiefs in 
Damascus; FSA seizes Aleppo 
in the north. (BBC, Syria Profile 
Timeline, 2015) 
 Event Two: Interagency senior 
leaders express frustration at 
DoD’s thinking  (See Chapter 4) 
 
CIA Director Petraeus and 
Clinton meet to discuss vetting, 
training, and equipping 
moderate opposition fighters.  
“Our military’s top brass was 
reluctant to get 
involved…consistently offering 
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Date Events by Syrian Actors 
(Assad Regime, Resistance 
Elements) and ISIS 
Actions by other States 
(minus US) and International 
Organizations 
Actions by the US 
Government to include 
Internal Decision-Making 
dire projections….”  (Clinton, 
Hard Choices, 2014, 462)  
“Secretary of Defense Panetta 
had become as frustrated as I 
was with the lack of options in 
Syria; he knew from his own 
time leading the CIA what our 
intelligence operatives could do.”  
(Ibid.) 
August Prime Minister Riad Hijab 
defects. (BBC, Syria Profile 
Timeline, 2015) 
48 Iranian nationals, including 
IRGC unit commanders and 
brigadier generals, are 
kidnapped near Damascus, 
providing a glimpse of the 
Iranian advisory and assistance 
mission inside Syria. (Fulton, 
Iranian Strategy, 2013, 11) 
 
US Secretary of Defense and 
C/JCS state that Iran is 
developing and training a militia 
named Jaysh al-Sha’bi 
(People’s Army) within Syria to 
fight on behalf of the regime. 
(Fulton, Iranian Strategy, 2013, 
18) 
President Obama warns that use 
of chemical weapons would tilt 
the US towards intervention. 
(BBC, Syria Profile Timeline, 
2015) 
 
NSC principals began exploring 
options to stand-up a vetted 
force of moderate Syrian rebels.  
(Clinton, Hard Choices, 2014, 
461) 
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Date Events by Syrian Actors 
(Assad Regime, Resistance 
Elements) and ISIS 
Actions by other States 
(minus US) and International 
Organizations 
Actions by the US 
Government to include 
Internal Decision-Making 
Sept/Oct   Sept 28th Secretary Clinton 
announces the US is increasing 
its humanitarian assistance by 
$30 million to $132 million in 
FY12, assisting more than 
975,000 people inside Syria and 
300,000 who have fled.  (See 
Appendix A, Section 2 for full 
text.) 
 
Event Three: President Obama 
rejects National Security Council 
recommendation for the CIA to 
arm the rebels.  (See Chapter 4) 
 
Director Petraeus presents the 
plan to President Obama who 
“worried that arming the rebels 
was not likely to be enough to 
drive Assad from power…. 
unintended consequences to 
consider.”  (Clinton, Hard 
Choices, 2014, 463)  “…the plan 
to arm the rebels dead in the 
water….” (Clinton, Hard 
Choices, 2014, 464) 
 
Panetta’s account of the 
meeting:  “I supported the idea, 
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Date Events by Syrian Actors 
(Assad Regime, Resistance 
Elements) and ISIS 
Actions by other States 
(minus US) and International 
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as did David Petraeus and 
Hillary Clinton.  All of us believed 
that withholding weapons was 
impeding our ability to develop 
sway with those groups and 
subjecting them to withering fire 
from the regime.” (Panetta, 
Worthy Fights, 2014, 449-450) 
 
“President Obama was initially 
hesitant….Only after Assad 
used chemical weapons in mid-
2013 did Obama reconsider 
supplying those arms, a step he 
approved in June (2013).” 
(Panetta, Worthy Fights, 2014, 
450) 
October Syrian-Turkish tensions rise 
when Syrian mortar fire on a 
Turkish border town kills five 
civilians. (BBC, Syria Profile 
Timeline, 2015) 
Turkey intercepts a Syrian 
plane allegedly carrying arms 
from Russia.  (BBC, Syria 
Profile Timeline, 2015) 
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November National Coalition for Syrian 
Revolutionary and Opposition 
Forces formed in Qatar, 
excludes Islamist militias. (BBC, 
Syria Profile Timeline, 2015) 
Arab League stops short of full 
recognition of newly formed 
National Coalition. (BBC, Syria 
Profile Timeline, 2015) 
President Obama wins re-
election over Republican 
candidate Mitt Romney. 
December  US, Britain, France, Turkey and 
Gulf States formally recognize 
opposition National Coalition as 
"legitimate representative" of 
Syrian people. (BBC, Syria 
Profile Timeline, 2015) 
 
US Treasury designation cites 
Lebanese Hizballah (LH), with 
support from the IRGQ-QF, 
supplying advisors, trainers, 
and direct combat fighters 
including snipers to Syria. 
(Fulton, Iranian Strategy, 2013, 
21-22) 
 
2013    
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January  Syria accuses Israeli jets of 
attacking a military research 
center near Damascus, but 
denies reports that lorries 
carrying weapons bound for 
Lebanon were hit. Unverified 
reports say Israel had targeted 
an Iranian commander charged 
with moving weapons of mass 
destruction to Lebanon. (BBC, 
Syria Profile Timeline, 2015) 
 
February  BG Hassan Shateri, Iranian QF 
commander in Syria, 
assassinated outside of 
Damascus. (Fulton, Iranian 
Strategy, 2013, 10) 
 
Israeli airstrike destroys SA-17 
anti-aircraft missile convoy in 
Syria. (Fulton, Iranian Strategy, 
2013, 22) 
 
LH escalates its combat role in 
Syria, launching a coordinated 
ground offensive against rebel 
forces near al-Qusayr. (Fulton, 
Iranian Strategy, 2013, 23) 
State Department reiterates its 
support to the Syrian Opposition 
Coalition as the legitimate 
representative of the Syrian 
people and announces $54 
million in non-lethal aid to the 
Syrian opposition to build the 
capacity of 1500 grassroots 
activists from over 100 
opposition councils in 10 
different regions of Syria.  (See 
Appendix A, Section 2 for full 
text.) 
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March Syrian warplanes bomb the 
northern city of Raqqa after 
rebels seize control. (BBC, Syria 
Profile Timeline, 2015) 
 US and Britain pledge non-
military aid to rebels. (BBC, 
Syria Profile Timeline, 2015) 
 
The administration notifies 
Congress of its intent to provide 
food rations and medical 
supplies to the National Coalition 
of Revolutionary and Opposition 
Forces and the Turkey-based 
Syrian Military Council (SMC). 
(Congressional Research 
Service, Armed Conflict in Syria: 
Overview and US Response, 
October 9, 2015, 22.) 
April  IRGQ-QF sponsored Iraqi Shia 
militia groups Kata’ib Hezbollah 
(KH) and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq 
(AAH) openly acknowledge 
their fighters are in Syria.  
There has been unconfirmed 
media reporting of their 
involvement since 2012. 
(Fulton, Iranian Strategy, 2013, 
23-24) 
Secretary Kerry announces the 
US will double its non-lethal 
assistance to the opposition to 
$123 million.  (See Appendix A, 
Section 2 for full text.) 
 
Event Four: Significant 
divergence apparent between 
DoD senior leaders and the US 
Ambassador in Syria on 
assessing the moderate 
resistance.  (See Chapter 4) 
 
US Ambassador to Syria 
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Robert Ford testifies April 
11th to the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee that 
the State Department is 
training and equipping 
(non-lethal) over 1,500 
local leaders and activists 
within Syria.  (US Policy 
Toward Syria. Hearings 
Before the Committee on 
Foreign Relations United 
States Senate. 113th 
Congress, April 11, 2013) 
 
However, in contradictory 
testimony six days later, 
the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, General 
Dempsey testifies to the 
Senate Armed Services 
Committee that he could 
not identify the moderate 
resistance.  “If we could 
clearly identify the right 
people, I would support 
it.” (The Situation in Syria, 
Hearings Before the 
Committee on Armed 
Services, United States 
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Senate, 113th Cong, 1st 
Session, April 17, 2013.  
Accessed on line at 
www.gpo.gov/fdsys, 
September 23, 2014) 
 
June Government and allied 
Lebanese Hezbollah forces 
recapture the strategically 
important town of Qusair 
between Homs and Lebanese 
border. Rebel commanders 
complain that arms supplies 
taper off over international 
concerns about Islamists in the 
opposition camp. (BBC, Syria 
Profile Timeline, 2015) 
 Event Five: Two months after 
event four, President Obama 
approves plan for CIA to arm the 
resistance.  (See Chapter 4) 
 
At an NSC meeting – in the 
aftermath of the Syrian regime’s 
use of chemical weapons 
against their own people – the 
president approves the CIA plan 
to arm the resistance.  (Panetta, 
Worthy Fights, 450; see also 
Plofchan, Timeline: Syrian Civil 
War, June 2013 entry) 
 
July Saudi-backed Ahmed Jarba 
becomes leader of opposition 
National Coalition, defeating 
Qatar-backed rival. (BBC, Syria 
Profile Timeline, 2015) 
(Note Saudi and Qatari 
references in adjacent entry.) 
The Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, General 
Dempsey, in a letter to the 
Chairman of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, Senator 
Levin, lists five options that the 
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military could (vice should) 
provide in Syria, one of which is 
titled, “Train, Advise, and Assist 
the Opposition.” (Dempsey, 
untitled memorandum, July 19, 
2013.) 
August Chemical weapons attack kills 
300 in the Ghouta area of 
Damascus.  (BBC, Syria Profile 
Timeline, 2015) 
 August 21st the White House 
strongly condemns the use of 
chemical weapons in Damascus 
on this day.  (See Appendix A, 
Section 2 for full text.) 
 
August 30th the White House 
attributes the above chemical 
attack to the Assad regime.  
(See Appendix A, Section 2 for 
full text.) 
September  UN weapons inspectors 
conclude that chemical 
weapons were used in an 
attack on the Ghouta area of 
Damascus, but do not explicitly 
allocate responsibility for the 
attack. (BBC, Syria Profile 
Timeline, 2015) 
Secretary of Defense Hagel 
reveals in testimony to the 
Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee that the CIA is 
providing weapons to some 
Syrian rebels under covert 
action authorities. (CRS, Train 
and Equip Program for Syria, 
June 9, 2015, 2) 
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October President Assad allows 
international inspectors to begin 
destroying Syria's chemical 
weapons on the basis of a US-
Russian agreement. (BBC, 
Syria Profile Timeline, 2015) 
  
December   US and Britain suspend "non-
lethal" support for rebels in 
northern Syria after reports 
Islamist rebels seize some 
bases of Western-backed Free 
Syrian Army. (BBC, Syria Profile 
Timeline, 2015) 
2014    
January/ 
February 
 January 31st, in a text of a 
London 11 communiqué 
released in Geneva, senior 
officials from Egypt, France, 
Germany, Italy, Jordan, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the UAE, 
the UK, and the USA called for 
an immediate political transition 
from the Assad regime to a 
pluralistic government.  The 
communiqué expressed 
“outrage” at the “starve or 
surrender” strategy of the 
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Assad regime.  (See Appendix 
A, Section 2 for full text.) 
 
UN-brokered peace talks in 
Geneva fail, largely because 
Syrian authorities refuse to 
discuss a transitional 
government. (BBC, Syria Profile 
Timeline, 2015) 
March Syrian Army and Hezbollah 
forces recapture Yabroud, the 
last rebel stronghold near the 
Lebanese border. (BBC, Syria 
Profile Timeline, 2015) 
  
May Hundreds of rebels are 
evacuated from their last 
stronghold in the central city of 
Homs. The withdrawal marks 
the end of three years of 
resistance in the city. (BBC, 
Syria Profile Timeline, 2015) 
 Secretary Kerry meets with 
Syrian Opposition Coalition 
President Jarba to discuss 
“empowering the moderate 
political and armed opposition” 
while stepping up deliveries of 
non-lethal assistance to the 
leaders of the Free Syrian Army. 
(See Appendix A, Section 2 for 
full text.) 
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June ISIS seizes Mosul, Iraq. 
(theguardian.com) 
UN announces removal of 
Syria's chemical weapons 
material complete. (BBC, Syria 
Profile Timeline, 2015) 
Event Six: In the wake of the fall 
of Mosul, President Obama 
orders the military to train and 
equip the moderate resistance in 
their fight against ISIS, not the 
Assad regime.  (See Chapter 4) 
 
The administration requests 
funding from Congress to begin 
DoD’s Train and Equip program. 
(CRS, Train and Equip Program 
for Syria, June 9, 2015, 2.) 
 Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
militants declare "caliphate" in 
territory from Aleppo to eastern 
Iraqi province of Diyala. (BBC, 
Syria Profile Timeline, 2015) 
 Secretary of Defense Ashton 
Carter, in testimony to the 
House Armed Services 
Committee, describes the best 
possible outcome as one in 
which Assad is removed from 
power, but with functioning state 
systems remaining in tact, 
allowing moderate Syrian forces 
to assume power and then take 
the fight against ISIS. (CRS, 
Armed Conflict in Syria, October 
9, 2015, 15-16.) 
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August Tabqa airbase, near the 
northern city of Raqqa, falls to 
Islamic State militants, who now 
control entire Raqqa province. 
(BBC, Syria Profile Timeline, 
2015) 
  
September  United States and five Arab 
countries launch air strikes 
against Islamic State around 
Aleppo and Raqqa. (BBC, Syria 
Profile Timeline, 2015) 
Secretary of Defense Chuck 
Hagel testifies to the HASC. 
-$500 million is necessary to 
fund the training, equipping, and 
sustainment for the expected 
5,000 moderate Syrian 
opposition fighters for the first 
year 
-The initial assistance will 
consist of small arms, 
communications equipment, 
vehicles, and training 
-“A rigorous vetting process will 
be critical to the success of this 
program.” (US Department of 
Defense, Secretary of Defense 
Testimony, “Statement on Iraq, 
Syria, and ISIL Before the 
HASC.”  Accessed at 
www.defense.gov November 14, 
2015) 
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December   Event Seven: Congress 
approves the funding for the 
DoD train and equip operation.  
(See Chapter 4) 
 
President Obama signs into law 
the Congressional authorities to 
train and equip vetted Syrian 
opposition for the purposes of: 
—Defending the Syrian people 
from attacks by ISIS and 
securing territory controlled by 
the Syrian opposition 
—Protecting the US, its friends 
and allies, and the Syrian people 
from the threats posed by 
terrorists in Syria 
—Promoting the conditions for a 
negotiated settlement to end the 
conflict in Syria  (CRS, Train and 
Equip Program for Syria, June 9, 
2015, 3.) 
 
Absent from this authority is the 
ability to take offensive actions 
against the Assad regime. (CRS, 
Train and Equip Program for 
Syria, June 9, 2015, 7.) 
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The act also requires the 
administration to submit a 
comprehensive interagency 
strategy with objectives and 
timelines.  The strategy must 
also address oversight and 
vetting procedures on the 
opposition. (CRS, Armed 
Conflict in Syria, October 9, 
2015, 21.) 
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   Congress defines vetting as 
“…assessments of possible 
recipients for associations with 
terrorist groups including ISIL, 
Jabhat al Nusrah, Ahrar al 
Sham, other al-Qaeda related 
groups, Hezbollah, or Shia 
militias supporting the 
Governments of Syria or Iran; 
and for commitment to the rule 
of law and a peaceful and 
democratic Syria.”  (CRS, Train 
and Equip Program for Syria, 
June 9, 2015, 33.) 
2015    
January  Kurdish forces push Islamic 
State out of Kobane on Turkish 
border after four months of 
fighting. (BBC, Syria Profile 
Timeline, 2015) 
 
March Opposition offensives push back 
government forces. New Jaish 
al-Fatah Islamist rebel alliance, 
backed by Turkey, Saudi Arabia 
and Qatar, captures provincial 
capital of Idlib. (BBC, Syria 
Profile Timeline, 2015) 
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 Southern Front alliance of 
secular and Islamist groups take 
Jordanian border crossing at 
Nassib. (BBC, Syria Profile 
Timeline, 2015) 
  
May Islamic State fighters seize the 
ancient city of Palmyra in central 
Syria, raising concerns that they 
might destroy the pre-Islamic 
World Heritage site. They also 
capture last border crossing to 
Iraq. Jaish al-Fatah takes 
control of Idlib Province, putting 
pressure on government's 
coastal stronghold of Latakia. 
(BBC, Syria Profile Timeline, 
2015) 
  
June Islamic State and Kurdish 
fighters intensify fighting 
between Raqqa and Turkish 
border. Kurds take Ain Issa and 
border town of Tal Abyad; 
Islamic State attacks Kobane 
and seizes part of Hassakeh, 
the main city in north-eastern 
Syria. (BBC, Syria Profile 
Timeline, 2015) 
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September  Russia carries out first air 
strikes in Syria, saying it targets 
the Islamic State group. But 
Syrian opposition and US say it 
overwhelmingly targets anti-
Assad rebels instead. (BBC, 
Syria Profile Timeline, 2015) 
 
October   Administration announces a shift 
in focus from training and 
equipping Syrian opposition 
members in neighboring 
countries to equipping select 
vetted fighters already in Syria. 
(CRS, Armed Conflict in Syria, 
October 9, 2015, 23.) 
December  Britain joins US-led bombing 
raids against Islamic State in 
wake of Paris suicide bombing 
attacks. Syrian Army allows 
rebels to evacuate remaining 
area of Homs, returning Syria's 
third-largest city to government 
control after four years. (BBC, 
Syria Profile Timeline, 2015) 
FY2016 administration’s request 
for Congressional funding 
includes: 
-$600 million to continue the 
Train and Equip program 
-$65 million for non-lethal 
assistance to vetted members of 
the Syrian opposition 
-$160 million for non-lethal 
assistance to other opposition 
groups 
-$10 million for justice sector 
support in opposition-held areas 
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(CRS, Armed Conflict in Syria, 
October 9, 2015, 17-18.) 
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  UN Security Council passes 
resolution setting timetable for 
peace talks and formation of a 
unity government.  Key 
elements: 
 
—Calls for ceasefire and formal 
talks on a political transition to 
start in early January 
—Groups seen as “terrorist”, 
including ISIS and al-Nusra 
Front, are excluded 
—“Offensive and defensive 
actions” against such groups to 
continue 
—UN Chief Ban Ki-moon to 
report by January 18th on how 
to monitor the ceasefire 
—Credible, inclusive, and non-
sectarian governance to be 
established within six months 
—Free and fair elections under 
UN supervision to be held 
within 18 months 
—Political transition should be 
Syrian-led  
(BBC, Syrian War Milestone, 
2015) 
Secretary of Defense Carter 
confirms US strategy of: 
-Developing “capable, 
motivated, and local ground 
forces as the only force that can 
ensure a lasting victory” 
-Setting the conditions for a 
political solution to the Syrian 
civil war 
-Seeking to identify and then 
enable capable, motivated local 
forces on the ground that can 
expel ISIS. 
(Department of Defense, 
Statement on the Counter-ISIL 
Campaign before the Senate 
Armed Services Committee, 
December 9, 2015, accessed at 
www.defense.gov December 10, 
2015) 
   
	 279 
Process-Tracing Chart References 
 
BBC. Syria Profile Timeline, accessed at bbc.com on December 10, 2015. 
 
BBC. Syrian War: US Welcomes ‘Milestone; as UN Endorses Peace Plan, accessed at bbc.com on December 19, 2015.  
 
Brownlee, James, Tarek Masoud and Andrew Reynolds. The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression and Reform. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015. 
 
Clinton, Hillary.  Hard Choices. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2014. 
 
Congressional Research Service. Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and US Response, report number RL33487, October 
9, 2015. 
 
Congressional Research Service. Train and Equip Program for Syria: Authorities, Funding, and Issues for Congress, 
report number R43727, June 9, 2015. 
 
Dempsey, Martin E., General, untitled memorandum to Senator Carl Levin, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, July 19, 2013, accessed at thehill.com/images/stories/news/2013/07_july/22/Dempsey.pdf on November 17, 
2017. 
 
Fulton, Will, Joseph Holiday, and Sam Wyer. Iranian Strategy in Syria. Washington, DC: Joint Report by the American 
Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project and the Institute for the Study of War, May 2013. 
 
George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. Cambridge, 
MA: Belfor Center for Science and international Affairs, Harvard University, 2005. 
 
Holiday, Joseph. Syria’s Armed Opposition: Middle East Security Report 3. Washington, DC: The Institute for the Study of 
War, March 2012. 
 
“Isis insurgents seize control of Iraqi city of Mosul,” The Guardian, accessed at https://www.theguardian.com › World › Iraq 
on February 15, 2017. 
 
	 280 
Panetta, Leon. Worthy Fights: A Memoir of Leadership in War and Peace. New York: Penguin Group, 2014. 
 
Phares, Walid. The Coming Revolution: Struggle for Freedom in the Middle East. New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 
2010. 
 
Plofchan, Thomas, Timeline: Syrian Civil War, Cairo Review 13/2014, accessed at thecairoreview.com on 
November 25, 2016. 
 
The Situation in Syria, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 112th Cong. 
March 7, 2012. 
 
The Situation in Syria, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 113th Cong, 1st 
Session, April 17, 2013.  Accessed at www.gpo.gov/fdsys on September 23, 2014. 
 
US Department of Defense. Secretary of Defense Testimony. “Statement on Iraq, Syria, and ISIL Before the HASC.”  
Accessed at www.defense.gov November 14, 2015. 
 
US Policy Toward Syria. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate. 113th 
Congress, April 11, 2013. 
 
Zakaria, Fareed. U.S. Military Chief Dubious About Arming Syrian Rebels.  Accessed at 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/19/us/syria/ on February 4, 2017. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 281	
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A, Section Two 
White House and State Department Press Statements 
to Accompany the Chart 
 
 
Office of the Spokesman 
Washington, DC 
May 19, 2011 
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/163825.htm 
accessed March 3, 2017 
 
We reject the Syrian government’s justification of its tactics as necessary to maintain 
“stability.” The Asad regime remains the source of instability as it foments violence by 
meeting peaceful protests with deadly force and mass arrests. Despite the Syrian 
government’s violent repression and blatant disregard for the human rights of its 
citizens, the Syrian people continue to call for their legitimate demands to be met. The 
Syrian people have made clear that the status quo is unacceptable and that the Syrian 
government must meet their legitimate aspirations and end the killing, torture, and 
arbitrary detentions of protestors and activists.  
 
Executive Orders and Sanctions 
Syria has been designated a State Sponsor of Terror since December 1979. An 
additional layer of sanctions were added in December of 2003 with the passage of the 
Syria Accountability Act, implemented by Executive Order 13338 on May 11, 2004. 
Additional sanctions have recently been added to target the human rights abuses being 
committed by the Syrian Government against peaceful demonstrators and their own 
citizens. 
• President Obama signed a new Executive Order targeting the Syrian government’s 
continuing escalation of violence against the people of Syria on May 18. 
President Asad was designated pursuant to this authority, among other Syrian 
regime officials. 
• President Obama also signed an Executive Order imposing sanctions on individuals 
and entities committing human rights violations in Syria on April 29, including 
President Asad’s brother and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force 
(IRGC-QF). 
• We have closely coordinated with our allies in the European Union, who imposed an 
arms embargo and their own-targeted sanctions on May 9. 
• We are actively considering a range of additional bilateral options for increasing 
pressure on the Syrian regime as the situation may require. 
• The United States will use the Executive Order to designate additional senior regime 
officials for targeted sanctions and will be imposing travel bans on all those who 
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commit or contribute to human rights violations. We will hold to account those 
responsible for human rights abuses; no one is immune. 
 
Actions at the United Nations 
• The United States led the call for a Special Session on Syria at the UN Human Rights 
Council in Geneva on April 29, which passed a strong resolution condemning the 
Syrian government and calling for an investigation by the office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights. As of May 18, Syria has not allowed access to 
the High Commissioner’s investigative team. 
• We actively lobbied at the United Nations to prevent Syria from being elected to the 
UN Human Rights Council later this month. Our lobbying efforts against the 
wholly inappropriate Syrian candidacy successfully resulted in Syria withdrawing 
its candidacy on May 11. Kuwait will stand for the seat instead. 
• The U.S. will call for further action in the Human Rights Council condemning the on-
going violence, torture and arrests of prisoners of conscience, calling for 
accountability and lifts of the restrictions on the press. 
 
Civil Society 
"Civil Society,” as we know it in many countries in the region, is almost non-existent in 
Syria. The Syrian government has traditionally viewed intellectuals, political activists, 
NGOs and civic groups with suspicion – and through arrests and other forms of 
intimidation has deterred much of Syrian society from participating in “Civil Society.” 
Those who have chosen to participate in defiance of the security services have often 
paid a terrible price. 
• We support the universal human rights of citizens across the region, and have noted 
quite regularly our concerns when governments, including the Syrian 
government, fail to respect those rights. We stand up for the work of human 
rights defenders in all countries around the world. 
• The President and the Secretary have both emphasized promoting partnerships with 
the Muslim World. Providing Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) support 
directly to the people of the Middle East and North Africa is one way the United 
States can help provide tools to citizens who aspire to deliver positive change in 
their countries. 
• Through MEPI, we support efforts to expand political participation, strengthen civil 
society and the rule of law, empower women and youth, create educational 
opportunities, and foster economic reform throughout the region. 
• At her first strategic dialogue with civil society, Secretary Clinton emphasized that “the 
United States supports democratic change,” and that change is more likely to be 
peaceful and permanent when it involves both the government and a broad 
cross-section of the population. Civil society holds governments accountable, 
keeps them honest, and helps them be more effective. But it plays an even more 
fundamental role than that as it helps to strengthen the basic bonds of trust that 
are essential to democracy. 
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Press Statement 
Victoria Nuland  
Department Spokesperson, Office of the Spokesperson 
Washington, DC 
July 5, 2011 
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/07/167577.htm 
accessed March 3, 2017 
 
The United States remains deeply concerned by the ongoing attacks against peaceful 
protestors at the hands of the Syrian government. The government of Syria claims it is 
interested in a dialogue with the opposition. Yet, its actions in cities like Hama and along 
the Turkish border directly undermine the credibility of its words and its initiative. Syrian 
security forces have once again stepped up their repression and harassment of 
peaceful demonstrators and opposition members. There is no justification, no excuse 
for the Syrian security forces to begin yet another crackdown, killing protesters and 
arresting people suspected of political opposition. We urge the government of Syria to 
immediately halt its intimidation and arrest campaign, pull its security forces back from 
Hama and other cities, and allow the Syrian people to express their opinions freely so 
that a genuine transition to democracy can take place. The international community will 
continue to stand with the people of Syria as they seek their universal human rights. 
 
 
Fact Sheet 
Office of the Spokesperson 
Washington, DC 
February 24, 2012 
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/02/184642.htm 
accessed March 3, 2017 
 
1. The first meeting of the Group of Friends of the Syrian People (“the Friends’ Group”), 
was held in Tunis on 24 February 2012, with the participation of more than 60 countries 
and representatives from the United Nations, the League of Arab States, the European 
Union, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the Arab Maghreb Union and the 
Cooperation Council for the Arab Gulf States to discuss the worsening situation in Syria. 
2. The Friends’ Group reaffirmed its firm commitment to the sovereignty, independence, 
national unity and territorial integrity of Syria. It expressed strong condemnation of the 
Syrian regime’s ongoing, widespread, and systematic human rights violations, including: 
the indiscriminate use of force against civilians; the killing and persecution of peaceful 
protestors; and sexual violence and ill-treatment of thousands of detainees, including 
children. The Syrian regime’s brutal actions over the past eleven months have led to the 
death of thousands of innocent civilians, caused widespread destruction, forced tens of 
thousands of Syrians to flee their homes, and created widespread suffering among the 
Syrian people. Journalists portraying the truth about what is happening in Syria have 
paid with their lives. The Group viewed the regime’s use of heavy artillery and tanks to 
attack residential areas of cities and towns as particularly reprehensible. The atrocities 
committed, as the UN Independent Commission of Inquiry has said, amount in some 
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cases to crimes against humanity. 
3. The Friends’ Group affirmed its goal of a political solution to this crisis that meets the 
aspirations of the Syrian people for dignity, freedom, peace, reform, democracy, 
prosperity and stability. The Friends’ Group recognized that this solution should address 
the concern of all citizens of Syria, regardless of their religion or ethnicity. It expressed 
its strongest possible concern about the situation in Syria and called for the following 
steps to be taken as a matter of urgency: 
 
Support for the League of Arab States 
4. The Friends’ Group commended the League of Arab States for their leadership on 
this issue and welcomed the League’s actions and proposals to achieve a peaceful 
resolution of the crisis. It underlined the need for an immediate end to all violence and 
for the full implementation of the decisions and resolutions of the League of Arab States 
on the situation in Syria, notably resolutions 7444 of 22 January 2012 and 7446 of 12 
February 2012, that, inter alia, call for the Syrian government to: 
• Cease all violence and protect its population; 
• Release all persons arbitrarily detained due to the recent incidents; 
• Withdraw all Syrian military and armed forces from cities and towns, and return 
them to their original home barracks; 
• Guarantee the freedom of peaceful demonstrations; and 
• Allow full and unhindered access and movement for all relevant League of Arab 
States’ institutions and Arab and international media in all parts of Syria to 
determine the truth about the situation on the ground and monitor the incidents 
taking place. 
The Friends’ Group noted the Arab League’s request to the United Nations Security 
Council to issue a resolution to form a joint Arab-UN peacekeeping force following a 
cessation of violence by the regime as outlined above and agreed to continue 
discussions on the appropriate conditions for the deployment of such a force. 
Political Transition 
5. The Friends’ Group called for an inclusive Syrian-led political process conducted in 
an environment free from violence, fear, intimidation and extremism and aimed at 
addressing the legitimate aspirations and concerns of Syria's people. The Friends’ 
Group noted that the Syrian government's effort to impose unilaterally a set of political 
steps labeled as reforms would not resolve the crisis. 
6. In this regard, the Friends’ Group set out its full support for the League of Arab 
States’ initiative to facilitate a political transition leading to a democratic, plural political 
system in which citizens enjoy equal rights regardless of their affiliations or ethnicities, 
beliefs or gender, including through commencing a serious political dialogue between 
the Syrian government and the Syrian opposition aimed at: 
• Formation of a national unity government; 
• Delegation by the President of Syria of his full authority to his First Deputy to 
cooperate fully with the national unity government in order to empower it to 
perform its duties in the transitional period; and 
• Transparent and free elections under Arab and international supervision. 
7. In this regard, the Friends’ Group welcomed the appointment of Kofi Annan as the 
Joint Special Envoy of the UN and the League of Arab States on the Syria Crisis. 
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Accountability for Regime Actions 
8. The Friends’ Group expressed disappointment that the United Nations Security 
Council had thus far been blocked from responding to the League of Arab States’ 
repeated appeals for support and for its plan to end the violence in Syria. The Friends’ 
Group calls on the Security Council to work with the League of Arab States and other 
interested parties to take effective action against the Syrian regime’ gross human rights 
violations, and to bring about an end to the violence against civilians. The Group 
underlined the need to end impunity and to hold those responsible for perpetrating 
crimes against the Syrian people to account. 
9. The Friends’ Group welcomed the adoption by the UN General Assembly on 16 
February of resolution 66/253 which strongly condemned the repression in Syria and 
demanded that the Syrian regime implement the Plan of Action of the Arab League of 2 
November, and its decisions of 22 January and 12 February without delay. In view of 
the significant support for this resolution, the Group called for the United Nations 
Security Council to fulfill its responsibilities on Syria by returning to this issue as soon as 
possible. The Group also welcomed the continued involvement of the Human Rights 
Council and called on the Syrian regime to cooperate fully with the independent 
Commission of Inquiry. It welcomed the report of the Independent International 
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic of 22 February 2012. 
10. The Friends’ Group set out its determination to continue to take relevant political, 
diplomatic and economic measures to press the Syrian regime to stop all acts of 
violence and to prevent the regime from generating further instability in the region. In 
this regard, participants committed to take steps to apply and enforce restrictions and 
sanctions on the regime and its supporters as a clear message to the Syrian regime that 
it cannot attack civilians with impunity. These should include: 
• Travel bans on members of the regime; 
• Freezing their assets; 
• Ceasing the purchase of Syrian hydrocarbon products; 
• Ceasing infrastructure investment in, and financial services relating to, Syria; 
• To reduce diplomatic ties with the Syrian regime; and 
• Preventing the shipment of arms and related materials to the Syrian regime; and 
studying means of restricting the Syrian regime's access to fuel and other 
supplies used for military purposes. 
 
Support for the Opposition 
11. The Friends’ Group commended the courage and determination of Syrians on the 
ground, who are the vanguard of the Syrian people seeking freedom and dignity. In this 
context, it also praised the work of the Syrian National Council (SNC) to form a broad 
and inclusive body and encouraged them to continue these efforts. 
12. To this end, the Friends’ Group recognized the Syrian National Council as a 
legitimate representative of Syrians seeking peaceful democratic change. The Group 
agreed to increase its engagement with and practical support for the Syrian opposition. 
The Friends’ Group encouraged the Syrian National Council to pursue its actions in a 
spirit of unity and to support the vision of an inclusive, prosperous and free Syria that 
protects its citizens and generates stability in the region, and where all citizens enjoy 
equal rights. 
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13. The Friends’ Group called on the Arab League to convene a meeting around the 
Syrian National Council with a range of opposition groups and individuals, including 
those inside Syria, committed to a peaceful political transition, in order for them to agree 
on: 
• A representative coordination mechanism for working together before, during and 
after a transition period; 
• A clear statement of shared principles for a transition in Syria, according to 
relevant covenants and resolutions of the United Nations regarding human, 
social and political rights, as well as a commitment to a civil, representative future 
government that safeguards the rights of minorities. 
 
Humanitarian Assistance 
14. The Friends’ Group expressed its strong concern about the humanitarian situation in 
Syria, including the lack of access to basic food, medicine and fuel, as well as threats 
and acts of violence to medical staff, patients and facilities, in some areas. It reiterated 
the need urgently to address humanitarian needs, and to facilitate effective delivery of 
assistance and to ensure safe access to medical treatment. The Friends’ Group called 
on the Syrian government immediately to cease all violence and to allow free and 
unimpeded access by the UN and humanitarian agencies to carry out a full assessment 
of needs in Homs and other areas. It demanded that the Syrian regime immediately 
permit humanitarian agencies to deliver vital relief goods and services to civilians 
affected by the violence, especially in Homs, Deraa, Zabadani and other areas under 
siege by the Syrian security forces. The Friends’ Group agreed that, if the Syrian regime 
stopped its assault on civilian areas and permitted access, it would deliver humanitarian 
supplies immediately. The Friends’ Group also noted the serious and growing burden 
carried by Syria’s neighbors in hosting refugees from Syria and committed to provide 
appropriate support and assistance in this regard. 
15. To this end, the Friends’ Group welcomed the United Nations’ efforts to coordinate 
the humanitarian response, including funding, under the leadership of the Emergency 
Relief Coordinator. The Group welcomed the Emergency Relief Coordinator's intention 
to visit Syria to engage with all parties to allow impartial access for humanitarian 
assistance. The Group also supported the establishment by international humanitarian 
agencies of Humanitarian Operational Hubs in neighboring countries. It welcomed the 
creation of the Syria Humanitarian Forum and pledged support to the body in its role as 
a working group to coordinate international assistance. It reinforced the importance of 
maintaining a clear distinction between the humanitarian response and the ongoing 
political negotiations. 
16. The Friends’ Group also declared its firm commitment to contribute substantially to 
rebuilding Syria in the process of transition and to support the future economic recovery 
of the country. To this end, the Group decided to create a working group on economic 
recovery and development. 
17. The Friends’ Group expressed their thanks and appreciation to Tunisia for hosting 
this international conference. The Group agreed to meet again in Turkey in the near 
future. The Group also agreed that the following meeting would be hosted by France. 
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Fact Sheet 
Office of the Spokesperson 
Washington, DC 
September 28, 2012 
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/09/198448.htm 
accessed March 3, 2017 
 
Today in New York, Secretary Clinton announced the United States is providing nearly 
$30 million in additional humanitarian assistance to help those affected by the conflict in 
Syria. With this new assistance, the United States is providing more than $132 million in 
fiscal year 2012 in humanitarian assistance to help more than 975,000 people inside 
Syria and the nearly 300,000 who have fled to the safety of neighboring countries. 
This newest funding from the United States will help provide critical aid to besieged 
communities inside Syria, and includes funding through nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs); the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the 
Near East (UNRWA); the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); 
the World Health Organization (WHO); and the United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF). 
This latest funding will be used to provide additional medical supplies and emergency 
medical care, including mental health care for children who are suffering severely in the 
midst of this crisis. This assistance will also help provide displaced children with 
continued access to education. The United States will also provide clean water, 
materials for shelter, blankets, basic household necessities such as hand soap and pots 
and pans, improved sanitation, and materials to help protect against the approaching 
winter. In some areas where markets are functioning, we will support a program for 
families to make housing repairs and purchase household supplies that will also infuse 
cash into the local economy. This funding provides assistance to Palestinian refugees 
and internally displaced Syrians impacted by the violence. 
With this new assistance, the United States is providing more than $132 million in fiscal 
year 2012 for humanitarian activities both inside Syria and in neighboring countries: 
• $48.5 million through the World Food Program (WFP); 
• $30 million through NGOs; 
• Almost $30 million through UNHCR; 
• $11 million through the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA); 
• $8 million through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); 
• Almost $4 million through the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF); 
• $1.3 million through the World Health Organization (WHO); 
• $1 million through the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies (IFRC); 
• $0.5 million through the International Organization for Migration (IOM); 
• $0.5 million through the United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs; and 
• $0.3 million through the UN Department of Safety and Security for support of 
humanitarian operations.1 
The United States is aggressively pursuing all feasible options to expand humanitarian 
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aid in Syria, utilizing both traditional and non-traditional humanitarian networks. The 
United States continues to pursue every available avenue to secure full, safe, and 
unfettered access for humanitarian organizations to provide humanitarian assistance to 
the innocent children, women, and men caught in the middle of the ongoing Syrian 
conflict. 
We recognize the generosity of the Governments of Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq 
for receiving those fleeing the violence in Syria and for hosting and providing assistance 
to those in need. We commend the efforts of the United Nations and other international 
organizations and nongovernmental organizations to ease the trauma that the conflict in 
Syria has inflicted on those fleeing the violence. 
 
 
Patrick Ventrell  
Acting Deputy Spokesperson, Office of the Spokesperson 
Washington, DC 
December 24, 2012 
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/12/202380.htm 
accessed March 3, 2017 
 
The United States condemns in the strongest terms the latest vicious attacks by the 
Syrian regime against civilians, most notably the attack on people waiting to buy bread 
at a bakery in the town of Helfeya. Brutal attacks such as these show that this regime 
has no future in Syria. Those that commit atrocities will be held accountable. The United 
States calls on all parties that continue to assist the regime in executing its war against 
the Syrian people to end their support. 
The visit of Joint Special Representative Brahimi to Damascus and his work offers an 
opportunity to move a political transition forward and the United States continues to 
support his efforts. We urge the regime to capitalize on the Joint Special 
Representative's efforts in order to transition to a new government and end the brutal 
repression of the Syrian people. 
 
 
Fact Sheet 
Office of the Spokesperson 
Washington, DC 
February 22, 2013 
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/02/205092.htm 
accessed March 3, 2017 
 
The United States supports the Syrian people’s aspirations for a Syrian-led transition to 
a democratic, inclusive, and peaceful Syria. The United Nations estimates that more 
than 70,000 Syrians have been killed in the nearly two years since unrest and violence 
began. In the last month alone, the number of Syrians seeking refuge in neighboring 
countries has risen sharply. More than 870,000 Syrians have registered as refugees 
since the crisis began, or are awaiting registration in neighboring countries while, inside 
Syria, an additional 2.5 million people remain internally displaced and 4 million people 
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are in need of assistance. The Syrian regime has sacrificed all legitimacy in a vicious 
effort to cling to power. U.S. assistance includes vigorous diplomatic support of the 
Syrian Opposition Coalition, nearly $385 million in humanitarian assistance to help 
those affected by the conflict, and over $50 million in non-lethal support for local 
opposition councils and civil society inside Syria. 
 
Diplomatic Support 
The United States continues to support the Syrian people as the Syrian Opposition 
Coalition sets a course toward the peaceful, democratic, inclusive future that the people 
of Syria deserve. We are working with other nations to further isolate the regime and 
support the Syrian people’s calls for President Assad to step down. We and our 
international partners actively supported the efforts of the Syrian people to launch the 
Syrian Opposition Coalition in Doha in November 2012 and, on December 11, 2012, 
President Obama recognized the Coalition as the legitimate representative of the Syrian 
people. The Coalition – which includes opponents of the Assad regime from across the 
political and ethno-sectarian spectrum – has made real progress since its founding, and 
is stepping up its outreach to women, minorities, religious leaders and civil society. The 
Coalition has also begun to develop formal structures and plans for a democratic 
political transition that protects the rights, the dignity, and the aspirations of all Syrians. 
In Paris on January 28, more than 50 countries supporting the Syrian opposition 
gathered to reaffirm their commitment to provide support to the Syrian Opposition 
Coalition and agreed on the urgent need to increase and improve the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance, including for areas outside of regime control. On February 2, 
Vice President Biden met with Syrian Opposition Coalition President al-Khatib in 
Munich. The Vice President praised al-Khatib’s personal courage and leadership of the 
Coalition and urged al-Khatib to continue his efforts to maintain unity among the SOC 
leadership, to isolate extremist elements within the broader opposition, and to reach out 
to – and be inclusive of – a broad range of communities inside Syria. 
 
Humanitarian Assistance 
The United States, along with the international community, is tirelessly working to 
provide humanitarian aid to the innocent civilians affected by the brutal conflict in Syria. 
At the Syria Humanitarian Forum in Geneva February 19, the U.S. announced an 
additional $19 million in humanitarian assistance to Syria. These new funds augment 
the contribution of an additional $155 million announced by President Obama on 
January 29. 
With this new assistance, U.S. humanitarian assistance totals nearly $385 million to 
help millions of people inside Syria and over 870,000 people who have fled to the safety 
of neighboring countries. Over $215 million of this total goes to address critical needs 
inside Syria. Our assistance is providing emergency medical care and medical supplies, 
food aid, and winterization supplies like blankets and heaters for those affected by the 
crisis, both inside Syria and those seeking refuge in the region and elsewhere. It also 
supports the psycho-social rehabilitation of Syrian refugees who are victims of torture 
and war. 
U.S. humanitarian aid is being provided throughout all 14 governorates of Syria on the 
basis of need. It is not branded in order to ensure the safety of aid recipients and 
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humanitarian aid providers as well as to ensure that aid distribution is not thwarted en 
route. The United States is committed to using all channels to reach affected Syrians 
throughout the country and is working through UN, NGO, and community-based 
partners, as well as with the Syrian Opposition Coalition’s Assistance Coordination Unit. 
The United States is also working closely with host governments in the region who have 
generously opened their borders. For more details on the United States humanitarian 
response to the Syria crisis and what U.S. humanitarian assistance has provided, 
please visit www.usaid.gov/crisis/syria. 
 
Transition Support to the Unarmed Opposition 
The United States is also providing just over $54 million in non-lethal support to the 
unarmed Syrian opposition, including emergent local and national democratic 
institutions, and nonsectarian civic groups. This assistance includes training and 
equipment to build the capacity of a nation-wide network of ethnically and religiously 
diverse civilian activists to link Syrian citizens with nascent governance structures. This 
support enhances the information security of Syrian activists, human rights 
organizations, and media outlets and empowers women leaders to play a more active 
role in transition planning and peace negotiations. Activities sponsored by these funds 
enable local councils and grassroots organizations to respond to the needs of their 
communities and promotes constructive participation in the country’s political transition. 
Over 4,000 major pieces of equipment have been provided, mostly to Damascus, 
Aleppo, and other areas with significant opposition presence, including communications 
and computer equipment, as well as generators and medical supplies, to support 
unarmed Syrian opposition groups strengthen civil society, media, and democratic 
transition planning. 
Support to civil society groups and local councils includes efforts to train, equip, and 
build the capacity of nearly 1,500 grassroots activists, including women and youth, from 
over 100 opposition councils and organizations in 10 different regions of Syria; develop 
groups’ abilities to mobilize citizens, share information, provide community services, and 
undertake civic functions; support interreligious and communal dialogues and 
encourage citizen participation in shaping the Syrian transition; and support human 
rights documentation and transitional justice workshops while laying the foundation for 
future accountability efforts. 
Support to independent media projects includes assistance to community radio stations 
providing information for refugees about available services; training for networks of 
citizen journalists, bloggers, and cyber-activists to support their documentation, 
packaging, and dissemination of information on developments in Syria; and technical 
assistance and equipment to enhance the information and communications security of 
Syrian activists within Syria. 
Assistance in support of democratic transition planning includes efforts to link unarmed 
opposition elements inside Syria with global supporters; support for the independent 
Syria Justice and Accountability Center to document human rights abuses and 
coordinate transitional justice and accountability efforts; technical assistance to 
emerging political parties; and facilitating non-sectarian Syrian activists’ participation in 
political and economic transition planning to promote the business community’s 
engagement in transition processes. 
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Fact Sheet 
Office of the Spokesperson 
Washington, DC 
April 20, 2013 
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/04/207810.htm 
accessed March 3, 2017 
 
Following his meetings with Syrian Coalition President al-Khatib, members of the 
Coalition’s leadership, and international partners supporting the Syrian opposition, 
Secretary of State John Kerry announced the United States’ intention to double non-
lethal assistance to the Syrian opposition, as well as provide additional humanitarian aid 
to Syrians in need. 
The new non-lethal assistance underscores the United States’ firm support for a political 
solution to the crisis in Syria and for the opposition’s advancement of an inclusive, 
tolerant vision for a post-Assad Syria. The United States will work with the Syrian 
Coalition and other opposition representatives to determine how the new $123 million in 
non-lethal assistance can best support their efforts to meet the needs of the Syrian 
people and lead the way to a political transition that will bring an end to this conflict, and 
build the inclusive, democratic Syria that its people deserve. This new pledge brings our 
total non-lethal assistance to the Syrian opposition and civil society groups to $250 
million. 
The United States will also use a portion of this non-lethal assistance to implement 
President Obama’s directive to provide an expanded range of support to the Supreme 
Military Council (SMC). We intend to expand this new support beyond military food 
rations and medical kits to include other types of non-lethal supplies, which would be 
determined in collaboration with SMC leadership. 
Secretary Kerry urged international partners gathered in Istanbul, as well as all Friends 
of the Syrian People, to make similar pledges of assistance to the Coalition and the 
Supreme Military Council with the goal of reaching $1 billion in total international 
support for the opposition. 
In recognition of the devastating humanitarian situation as a result of the crisis in Syria, 
Secretary Kerry also announced nearly $25 million in additional food assistance for the 
Syrian people. This aid will provide 25,500 metric tons of wheat – providing four months’ 
supply of flour to over one million people – as well as food rations for those inside Syria 
and refugees in Jordan affected by the violence. The United Nations World Food 
Program will begin distributing the wheat to those in need in all 14 Syrian governorates 
as quickly as possible. The United States is the largest donor of food assistance both 
within Syria and for refugees in the affected neighboring countries and is providing a 
total of over $409 million in humanitarian assistance for the Syrian crisis. 
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Press Statement 
Jen Psaki  
Spokesperson, Office of the Spokesperson 
Washington, DC 
July 6, 2013 
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/07/211569.htm 
accessed March 3, 2017 
 
The United States welcomes the July 6 election of Syrian Coalition President Ahmed 
Assi al-Jarba, and looks forward to working with him and with his team. We hope to 
make progress together with President Jarba to prevent the total collapse of Syria into 
chaos and rebuild its social fabric. 
We look to President Jarba and the new leaders to reach out to all Syrian communities 
and bring greater unity of purpose and further organization to the Syrian Coalition as the 
legitimate representatives of the Syrian people. 
A united opposition is essential to achieve a negotiated political solution in which 
Bashar al-Assad steps down, and a new transition government leads all Syrians to 
dignity, freedom and hope for the future. 
 
 
The White House 
Office of the Press Secretary 
August 21, 2013 
Statement by Principal Deputy Press Secretary Josh Earnest on Allegations of 
Chemical Weapons Use in Syria 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/21/statement-principal-
deputy-press-secretary-josh-earnest-allegations-chem 
accessed March 3, 2017 
 
The United States is deeply concerned by reports that hundreds of Syrian civilians have 
been killed in an attack by Syrian government forces, including by the use of chemical 
weapons, near Damascus earlier today.  We are working urgently to gather additional 
information. 
  
The United States strongly condemns any and all use of chemical weapons.  Those 
responsible for the use of chemical weapons must be held accountable.  Today, we are 
formally requesting that the United Nations urgently investigate this new allegation.  The 
UN investigative team, which is currently in Syria, is prepared to do so, and that is 
consistent with its purpose and mandate.  For the UN’s efforts to be credible, they must 
have immediate access to witnesses and affected individuals, and have the ability to 
examine and collect physical evidence without any interference or manipulation from the 
Syrian government.  If the Syrian government has nothing to hide and is truly committed 
to an impartial and credible investigation of chemical weapons use in Syria, it will 
facilitate the UN team’s immediate and unfettered access to this site.  We have also 
called for urgent consultations in the UN Security Council to discuss these allegations 
and to call for the Syrian government to provide immediate access to the UN 
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investigative team.  The United States urges all Syrian parties including the government 
and opposition, to provide immediate access to any and all sites of importance to the 
investigation and to ensure security for the UN investigative team. 
 
 
The White House 
Office of the Press Secretary 
For Immediate Release 
August 30, 2013 
Government Assessment of the Syrian Government’s Use of Chemical Weapons 
on August 21, 2013 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/30/government-
assessment-syrian-government-s-use-chemical-weapons-august-21 
accessed March 3, 2017 
 
The United States Government assesses with high confidence that the Syrian 
government carried out a chemical weapons attack in the Damascus suburbs on August 
21, 2013. We further assess that the regime used a nerve agent in the attack. These all-
source assessments are based on human, signals, and geospatial intelligence as well 
as a significant body of open source reporting. Our classified assessments have been 
shared with the U.S. Congress and key international partners. To protect sources and 
methods, we cannot publicly release all available intelligence – but what follows is an 
unclassified summary of the U.S. Intelligence Community’s analysis of what took place. 
Syrian Government Use of Chemical Weapons on August 21 
A large body of independent sources indicates that a chemical weapons attack took 
place in the Damascus suburbs on August 21. In addition to U.S. intelligence 
information, there are accounts from international and Syrian medical personnel; videos; 
witness accounts; thousands of social media reports from at least 12 different locations 
in the Damascus area; journalist accounts; and reports from highly credible 
nongovernmental organizations. 
A preliminary U.S. government assessment determined that 1,429 people were killed in 
the chemical weapons attack, including at least 426 children, though this assessment 
will certainly evolve as we obtain more information. 
We assess with high confidence that the Syrian government carried out the chemical 
weapons attack against opposition elements in the Damascus suburbs on August 21. 
We assess that the scenario in which the opposition executed the attack on August 21 
is highly unlikely. The body of information used to make this assessment includes 
intelligence pertaining to the regime’s preparations for this attack and its means of 
delivery, multiple streams of intelligence about the attack itself and its effect, our post-
attack observations, and the differences between the capabilities of the regime and the 
opposition. Our high confidence assessment is the strongest position that the U.S. 
Intelligence Community can take short of confirmation. We will continue to seek 
additional information to close gaps in our understanding of what took place. 
 
Background: 
The Syrian regime maintains a stockpile of numerous chemical agents, including 
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mustard, sarin, and VX and has thousands of munitions that can be used to deliver 
chemical warfare agents. 
Syrian President Bashar al-Asad is the ultimate decision maker for the chemical 
weapons program and members of the program are carefully vetted to ensure security 
and loyalty. The Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) – which is 
subordinate to the Syrian Ministry of Defense – manages Syria’s chemical weapons 
program. 
We assess with high confidence that the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons on 
a small scale against the opposition multiple times in the last year, including in the 
Damascus suburbs. This assessment is based on multiple streams of information 
including reporting of Syrian officials planning and executing chemical weapons attacks 
and laboratory analysis of physiological samples obtained from a number of individuals, 
which revealed exposure to sarin. We assess that the opposition has not used chemical 
weapons. 
The Syrian regime has the types of munitions that we assess were used to carry out the 
attack on August 21, and has the ability to strike simultaneously in multiple locations. 
We have seen no indication that the opposition has carried out a large-scale, 
coordinated rocket and artillery attack like the one that occurred on August 21. 
We assess that the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons over the last year 
primarily to gain the upper hand or break a stalemate in areas where it has struggled to 
seize and hold strategically valuable territory. In this regard, we continue to judge that 
the Syrian regime views chemical weapons as one of many tools in its arsenal, 
including air power and ballistic missiles, which they indiscriminately use against the 
opposition. 
The Syrian regime has initiated an effort to rid the Damascus suburbs of opposition 
forces using the area as a base to stage attacks against regime targets in the capital. 
The regime has failed to clear dozens of Damascus neighborhoods of opposition 
elements, including neighborhoods targeted on August 21, despite employing nearly all 
of its conventional weapons systems. We assess that the regime’s frustration with its 
inability to secure large portions of Damascus may have contributed to its decision to 
use chemical weapons on August 21. 
 
Preparation: 
We have intelligence that leads us to assess that Syrian chemical weapons personnel – 
including personnel assessed to be associated with the SSRC – were preparing 
chemical munitions prior to the attack. In the three days prior to the attack, we collected 
streams of human, signals and geospatial intelligence that reveal regime activities that 
we assess were associated with preparations for a chemical weapons attack. 
Syrian chemical weapons personnel were operating in the Damascus suburb of ‘Adra 
from Sunday, August 18 until early in the morning on Wednesday, August 21 near an 
area that the regime uses to mix chemical weapons, including sarin. On August 21, a 
Syrian regime element prepared for a chemical weapons attack in the Damascus area, 
including through the utilization of gas masks. Our intelligence sources in the Damascus 
area did not detect any indications in the days prior to the attack that opposition 
affiliates were planning to use chemical weapons. 
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The Attack: 
Multiple streams of intelligence indicate that the regime executed a rocket and artillery 
attack against the Damascus suburbs in the early hours of August 21. Satellite 
detections corroborate that attacks from a regime-controlled area struck neighborhoods 
where the chemical attacks reportedly occurred – including Kafr Batna, Jawbar, ‘Ayn 
Tarma, Darayya, and Mu’addamiyah. This includes the detection of rocket launches 
from regime controlled territory early in the morning, approximately 90 minutes before 
the first report of a chemical attack appeared in social media. The lack of flight activity 
or missile launches also leads us to conclude that the regime used rockets in the attack. 
Local social media reports of a chemical attack in the Damascus suburbs began at 2:30 
a.m. local time on August 21. Within the next four hours there were thousands of social 
media reports on this attack from at least 12 different locations in the Damascus area. 
Multiple accounts described chemical-filled rockets impacting opposition-controlled 
areas. 
Three hospitals in the Damascus area received approximately 3,600 patients displaying 
symptoms consistent with nerve agent exposure in less than three hours on the morning 
of August 21, according to a highly credible international humanitarian organization. The 
reported symptoms, and the epidemiological pattern of events – characterized by the 
massive influx of patients in a short period of time, the origin of the patients, and the 
contamination of medical and first aid workers – were consistent with mass exposure to 
a nerve agent. We also received reports from international and Syrian medical 
personnel on the ground. 
We have identified one hundred videos attributed to the attack, many of which show 
large numbers of bodies exhibiting physical signs consistent with, but not unique to, 
nerve agent exposure. The reported symptoms of victims included unconsciousness, 
foaming from the nose and mouth, constricted pupils, rapid heartbeat, and difficulty 
breathing. Several of the videos show what appear to be numerous fatalities with no 
visible injuries, which is consistent with death from chemical weapons, and inconsistent 
with death from small-arms, high-explosive munitions or blister agents. At least 12 
locations are portrayed in the publicly available videos, and a sampling of those videos 
confirmed that some were shot at the general times and locations described in the 
footage. 
We assess the Syrian opposition does not have the capability to fabricate all of the 
videos, physical symptoms verified by medical personnel and NGOs, and other 
information associated with this chemical attack. 
We have a body of information, including past Syrian practice, that leads us to conclude 
that regime officials were witting of and directed the attack on August 21. We 
intercepted communications involving a senior official intimately familiar with the 
offensive who confirmed that chemical weapons were used by the regime on August 21 
and was concerned with the U.N. inspectors obtaining evidence. On the afternoon of 
August 21, we have intelligence that Syrian chemical weapons personnel were directed 
to cease operations. At the same time, the regime intensified the artillery barrage 
targeting many of the neighborhoods where chemical attacks occurred. In the 24 hour 
period after the attack, we detected indications of artillery and rocket fire at a rate 
approximately four times higher than the ten preceding days. We continued to see 
indications of sustained shelling in the neighborhoods up until the morning of August 26. 
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To conclude, there is a substantial body of information that implicates the Syrian 
government’s responsibility in the chemical weapons attack that took place on August 
21.  As indicated, there is additional intelligence that remains classified because of 
sources and methods concerns that is being provided to Congress and international 
partners. 
 
 
The White House 
Office of the Press Secretary 
For Immediate Release 
September 07, 2013 
Weekly Address: Calling for Limited Military Action in Syria 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/07/weekly-address-
calling-limited-military-action-syria 
accessed March 3, 2017 
 
In his weekly address, President Obama makes the case for limited and targeted 
military action to hold the Assad regime accountable for its violation of international 
norms prohibiting the use of chemical weapons.  The President realizes the American 
people are weary after a decade of war, which is why U.S. action would not include U.S. 
boots on the ground.  Instead, the President has put forward a proposed authorization 
that is focused on his clearly stated objectives – preventing and deterring the use and 
proliferation of chemical weapons (CW) within, to, or from Syria, degrading 
the Assad regime’s capacity to carry out future CW attacks, and deterring this behavior 
in others who would otherwise feel emboldened to use such weapons.  The President 
acknowledged it is not a decision he made lightly, but failing to respond to such actions 
poses a serious threat to our national security. 
  
Remarks of President Barack Obama Weekly Address The White 
House September 7, 2013 
Almost three weeks ago in Syria, more than 1,000 innocent people – including hundreds 
of children – were murdered in the worst chemical weapons attack of the 21st 
century.  And the United States has presented a powerful case to the world that the 
Syrian government was responsible for this horrific attack on its own people. 
This was not only a direct attack on human dignity; it is a serious threat to our national 
security.  There’s a reason governments representing 98 percent of the world’s people 
have agreed to ban the use of chemical weapons.  Not only because they cause death 
and destruction in the most indiscriminate and inhumane way possible – but because 
they can also fall into the hands of terrorist groups who wish to do us harm. 
That’s why, last weekend, I announced that, as Commander in Chief, I decided that the 
United States should take military action against the Syrian regime.  This is not a 
decision I made lightly.  Deciding to use military force is the most solemn decision we 
can make as a nation. 
As the leader of the world’s oldest Constitutional democracy, I also know that our 
country will be stronger if we act together, and our actions will be more effective.  That’s 
why I asked Members of Congress to debate this issue and vote on authorizing the use 
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of force. 
What we’re talking about is not an open-ended intervention.  This would not be another 
Iraq or Afghanistan.  There would be no American boots on the ground.  Any action we 
take would be limited, both in time and scope – designed to deter the Syrian 
government from gassing its own people again and degrade its ability to do so. 
I know that the American people are weary after a decade of war, even as the war in 
Iraq has ended, and the war in Afghanistan is winding down.  That’s why we’re not 
putting our troops in the middle of somebody else’s war. 
But we are the United States of America.  We cannot turn a blind eye to images like the 
ones we’ve seen out of Syria.  Failing to respond to this outrageous attack would 
increase the risk that chemical weapons could be used again; that they would fall into 
the hands of terrorists who might use them against us, and it would send a horrible 
signal to other nations that there would be no consequences for their use of these 
weapons.  All of which would pose a serious threat to our national security.  
That’s why we can’t ignore chemical weapons attacks like this one – even if they 
happen halfway around the world.  And that’s why I call on Members of Congress, from 
both parties, to come together and stand up for the kind of world we want to live in; the 
kind of world we want to leave our children and future generations.   
Thank you. 
 
 
Taken Question 
Office of the Spokesperson 
Washington, DC 
Taken Question at the December 11, 2013 Daily Press Briefing  
December 12, 2013 
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/218654.htm 
accessed March 3, 2017 
 
Question: How much nonlethal assistance has the United States given to the Syrian 
opposition?  
Answer: The Department of State is providing nearly $260 million in nonlethal support 
to the Syrian opposition and the Supreme Military Council (SMC).  
 
 
Fact Sheet 
Office of the Spokesperson 
Washington, DC 
January 17, 2014 
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/01/220029.htm 
There is an updated version of this fact sheet located here //2009-
2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/03/223955.htm 
accessed March 3, 2017 
 
The United States supports the Syrian people’s aspirations for a democratic, inclusive, 
and unified Syria. President Bashar al-Asad has proven through his brutal and 
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repressive tactics that he cannot lead Syria’s transition. His continued tenure only 
inflames tensions throughout the region and fuels extremism on both sides of the 
conflict. 
The United Nations estimates that more than 130,000 people have been killed since the 
unrest and violence began over two years ago. The number of civilians fleeing Syria 
and seeking refuge in neighboring countries has increased sharply as violence has 
escalated. More than 2.2 million people affected by the conflict are now refugees in 
neighboring countries while, inside Syria, an additional 6.5 million people are displaced 
and 9.3 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance. The UN Security Council 
has condemned the Asad regime’s denial of humanitarian relief access to these civilians 
in need and urged immediate steps to facilitate the expansion of humanitarian relief 
operations throughout the country. 
At the Humanitarian Pledging Conference for Syria in Kuwait January 15, U.S. 
Secretary of State John Kerry announced that the United States would contribute an 
additional $380 million to Syrian humanitarian relief efforts – bringing the total U.S. 
humanitarian commitment to more than $1.7 billion, the largest of any nation. These 
resources support international and non-governmental organizations assisting those 
affected by the conflict both inside Syria and across the region. 
The United States is also providing nearly $260 million in direct non-lethal support to the 
moderate Syrian opposition. This assistance is helping the Syrian Opposition Coalition, 
local opposition councils and civil society groups provide essential services to their 
communities, extend the rule of law, and enhance stability inside liberated areas of 
Syria. These funds are also being used to provide non-lethal assistance to moderate 
factions of the Supreme Military Council (SMC) of the Free Syrian Army, which is 
contesting extremist groups for leadership of the struggle against the Asad regime. 
 
Diplomatic Support to End the Conflict 
Efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the Syria crisis are based on the Final 
Communiqué of the 30 June 2012 Action Group meeting in Geneva. The process set 
forth by the Communiqué is supported by the United States and the broad partnership 
of nations known as the “London 11” that are pressing for a negotiated political solution 
to the Syria conflict. The U.S. has been working vigorously to advance Syria’s transition 
through the “Geneva II” international conference based on the Communique: the 
establishment of a transitional governing body formed by mutual consent, exercising full 
executive powers over all government institutions. The transitional governing body will 
also be charged with establishing a national dialogue, reviewing the constitutional order 
and legal system, and preparing for and conducting free and fair elections. 
Simultaneous U.S. diplomatic efforts are helping coordinate the provision of assistance 
with other partners and allies in support of the Syrian opposition. Diplomatic efforts also 
seek to further isolate the regime, both politically and through comprehensive sanctions; 
to support the Syrian people’s calls for an end of Asad’s rule; and to reinforce the Syrian 
opposition’s vision of a democratic post-Asad Syria. 
 
Humanitarian Assistance 
The United States and the international community are working tirelessly to provide 
humanitarian assistance to those affected by the brutal conflict in Syria. At the 
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Humanitarian Pledging Conference for Syria in Kuwait on January 15, U.S. Secretary of 
State John Kerry announced that the United States would continue to increase its 
humanitarian contributions for those affected by the ongoing conflict in Syria. About half 
of the more than $1.7 billion in U.S. humanitarian assistance is being distributed to 
organizations working inside Syria, with the balance going to assist those affected by 
the conflict who have fled to other countries, and to the communities that host them. 
The United States is providing emergency medical care and supplies, shelter, food, 
clean water, relief supplies, access to education and protection – including activities to 
prevent and respond to gender-based violence – to those affected by the crisis inside 
Syria and in neighboring countries. U.S. assistance supports the activities of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Program (WFP), 
the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and other international and 
nongovernmental organizations, both within Syria and within the regional refugee 
response in Lebanon (more than $76 million), Jordan (more than $61 million), Iraq 
(nearly $20 million), Turkey (nearly $31 million) and Egypt (more than $12 million). 
In response to growing incidents of gender-based violence during the conflict, the U.S. 
is also providing psychosocial support for women and children from Syria through 
women’s health centers, mobile clinics and outreach workers. In September 2013, 
Secretary Kerry launched an initiative to help humanitarian agencies hire staff and 
develop programs to protect women and girls in global emergencies, including Syria. 
The U.S. is also building awareness and support for survivors of gender based violence 
into its broader assistance programming for those affected by the conflict. 
Within Syria, U.S. humanitarian assistance is reaching more than 4.2 million people 
across all 14 of the country’s governorates through the United Nations, international and 
non-governmental organizations, and local Syrian organizations, as well as in 
coordination with the Syrian Coalition’s Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU). To ensure 
the safety of recipients and humanitarian workers and to guard against assistance being 
blocked while en route to beneficiaries, U.S. humanitarian assistance is often not 
branded or marked. The U.S. supports approximately 260 field hospitals and makeshift 
clinics across Syria. These facilities have treated nearly one million patients and 
performed more than 190,000 surgeries. To meet the need for more medical staff 
capable of saving lives, the U.S. trained more than 1,500 volunteers inside Syria to 
provide emergency first aid care. 
The United States continues to work closely with governments in the region hosting 
refugees fleeing Syria. For more details on the U.S. humanitarian response to the Syria 
crisis and what U.S. humanitarian assistance is being provided, visit 
www.usaid.gov/crisis/syria. 
 
Non-lethal Transition Assistance to the Syrian Opposition 
The United States is working in partnership with the international community to assist 
the Syrian opposition to meet daily needs, provide essential services, and support a 
transition and is providing nearly $260 million in non-lethal transition assistance to the 
moderate opposition. These funds include a $15 million contribution to the multi-donor 
Syria Recovery Trust Fund. The purpose of this fund is unite and coordinate 
international donors to help with Syria’s current reconstruction and economic needs in 
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liberated areas and after the formation of a Transitional Governing Body. 
Assistance is being provided to a range of civilian opposition activists, including local 
councils, civil society organizations and the Syrian Coalition (SOC) to bolster their 
institutional capacity, create linkages to among opposition groups inside and outside 
Syria, and help counter extremism. These efforts enable the Coalition to deliver basic 
goods and essential services to liberated communities. For example, in close 
collaboration with the Coalition’s Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU), U.S. assistance is 
being used to procure equipment and critical supplies for prompt disbursement to 
communities inside Syria. This equipment includes generators to power water pumps 
and bakeries; ambulances to reinstate emergency medical services; crane, dump, and 
fire trucks for urban sanitation and civil defense; and water storage units to provide 
access to potable water. Other critical supplies provided through this assistance include 
educational kits for teachers, students and school administrators, winterization materials 
including blankets and heaters and commodity baskets for needy families. These efforts 
help the national-level opposition groups provide for the needs of local communities. 
Through a series of small cash and in-kind grants, the U.S. is helping to strengthen 
grassroots organizations and local administrative bodies– a foundation of democratic 
governance – as they step in to fill the void left by the regime and provide basic 
services, including emergency power, sanitation, water, and educational services to 
their communities. Some of this assistance is being directed to maintain public safety, 
extend the rule of law, and enhance the provision of justice to improve local stability and 
prevent sectarian violence. 
U.S. non-lethal assistance includes training and equipment to build the capacity of a 
network of over 2,000 grassroots activists, including women and youth, from more than 
100 opposition councils and organizations from around the country to link Syrian 
citizens with the Syrian opposition and local councils. This support enhances the 
linkages between Syrian activists, human rights organizations, and independent media 
outlets and empowers women leaders to play a more active role in transition planning. 
Support to independent media includes assistance to community radio stations 
providing news, including information for refugees about available services; training for 
networks of citizen journalists, bloggers, and cyber-activists to support their 
documentation and dissemination of information on developments in Syria; and 
technical assistance and equipment to enhance the information and communications 
security of Syrian activists within Syria. U.S. technical and financial assistance to the 
ACU’s Media Unit is supporting the Coalition’s outreach to Syrians through the internet; 
local, independent radio stations; and satellite television. 
The United States continues to assist in laying the groundwork for accountability by 
supporting the Syrian Justice and Accountability Center’s efforts to document violations 
and abuses of international human rights law and violations of international 
humanitarian law committed by all sides of the conflict, and by bolstering the capacity of 
civil society organizations to build the foundations for lasting peace. The United States 
also works at the grassroots levels with groups and individuals across a broad spectrum 
of Syria’s diverse religious and ethnic communities to empower women, religious 
leaders, youth, and civil society to advocate for their communities, build trust, tolerance, 
and mitigate conflict. 
In addition to this transition assistance, the U.S. has been increasing direct non-lethal 
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assistance to the SMC since the spring of 2013 along supply lines periodically 
contested by the regime or extremist fighters. To date, this includes over 408,000 halal 
food rations, vehicles and over three tons of medical supplies as well as planned 
deliveries of satellite access equipment, laptops, radio communication equipment, and 
medical kits to moderate SMC elements. 
 
Assistance to the International Effort to Eliminate Syria’s Chemical Weapons 
The United States remains firmly committed to the elimination of Syria’s chemical 
weapons arsenal, as outlined in the U.S.-Russia Framework and United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 2118. The process of removing chemical weapons from 
Syria for destruction as begun. To this end, the United States has contributed tens of 
millions of dollars in assistance to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons (OPCW)–UN Joint Mission to safely package and remove chemical weapons 
materials from Syria for elimination by the international community. U.S. assistance 
includes outfitting a U.S. ship with proven hydrolysis technology to neutralize safely at 
sea the most dangerous of Syria’s chemical agents and precursors. For more 
information please click here: //2009-2017.state.gov/t/217199.htm 
 
Additional Support for the Syrian People 
To help Syrians begin to rebuild, the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign 
Assets Control (OFAC) issued a Statement of Licensing Policy inviting U.S. persons to 
apply for specific licenses to participate in certain economic activities in Syria. The 
OFAC Statement focused on applications to engage in oil-related transactions that 
benefit the Syrian Coalition, or its supporters, and transactions involving Syria’s 
agricultural and telecommunications sectors. OFAC also amended Syria General 
License 11 to authorize the exportation of services and funds transfers in support of not-
for-profit activities to preserve and protect cultural heritage sites in Syria. 
A new limited waiver of the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration 
Act of 2003 authorizes the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and 
Security to process license applications for the export and re-export of certain 
commodities, software, and technology for the benefit of the Syrian people, including 
but not limited to: water supply and sanitation; agricultural production and food 
processing; power generation; oil and gas production; construction and engineering; 
transportation; and educational infrastructure. 
The United States continues to engage Syrians directly, offering academic advising to 
young people hoping to study in the United States and opportunities to participate in 
State Department exchanges and other outreach programs. The State Department is 
also working with a range of Syrian, American, and international partners to protect 
Syria’s rich cultural heritage – including archaeological sites, historic buildings, 
monuments, and collections of objects – and to halt the trade of looted Syrian cultural 
property in international antiquities markets. See http://icom.museum/resources/red-
lists-database/red-list/syria/ for more information.  The State Department maintains an 
active dialogue to coordinate policy and assistance for Syria with a broad cross-section 
of Syrian opposition groups, including with the Syrian Coalition offices in Turkey and the 
United States. The American people, including Syrian-Americans, have contributed 
generously and have organized to provide assistance to Syrians in need. 
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Media Note 
Office of the Spokesperson 
Washington, DC 
January 31, 2014 
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/01/221088.htm 
accessed March 3, 2017 
 
Below is the text of a London 11 communique, released today in Geneva, Switzerland. 
BEGIN TEXT:  
On January 31, Senior Officials from Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Jordan, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United 
States, after having met in Geneva with the Syrian opposition delegation led by the 
Syrian National Coalition, the legitimate representative of the Syrian people, adopted 
the following Core Group communiqué: 
1. We appreciate the efforts of the Joint Special Representative Brahimi and his team to 
lay the foundations of negotiations between the Syrian regime and the Syrian opposition 
delegations. The UNSG has convened the parties to the Geneva II Conference with the 
aim of achieving a political transition on the basis of the Geneva Communiqué which will 
preserve the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria. As 
reiterated by the UNSG at the Montreux Conference, the transition should begin with 
the formation, by mutual consent, of a transitional governing body with full executive 
powers, including control over security, intelligence and military apparatuses. The 
negotiations are to form without delay a transitional governing body with full executive 
powers in full implementation of the Geneva Communiqué. 
2. We welcome the courageous decision taken by the Syrian National Coalition to come 
to Geneva, and the constructive approach the opposition delegation has adopted 
throughout the first round of negotiations. We encourage the Coalition to pursue its 
efforts in this direction and to keep broadening the basis of the opposition delegation as 
well as to continue actively reaching out to all Syrians. We are fully committed to 
support this process. 
3. The regime must adopt a clear position by endorsing the Geneva Communiqué and 
commit to the objective of the Conference as stated in the invitation letter of the UN 
Secretary General and as requested by the countries present in Montreux. The regime 
is responsible for the lack of real progress in the first round of negotiations. It must not 
further obstruct substantial negotiations and it must engage constructively in the second 
round of negotiations. We ask all those who have influence on it to engage to create the 
conditions for the process to succeed. 
4. We express outrage at the maintaining, by the regime, of its “starve or surrender” 
strategy which in particular deprives hundreds of thousands of people in the suburbs of 
Damascus, in the old city of Homs and elsewhere, from receiving food and medicine, 
and at the arbitrary detention of tens of thousands of civilians. It is all the more 
important that the Geneva II process lead to tangible and immediate benefits to the 
Syrian people. We call on the international community to use all its influence to secure 
full humanitarian access throughout Syria without delay. The regime must let UN 
convoys have access to the old city of Homs, as proposed by the UN and accepted by 
the opposition. 
 303	
5. We condemn in the strongest terms the continued use of “barrel bombs”, ballistic 
missiles and heavy artillery by the regime against the Syrian people, in full contradiction 
with the Geneva process as well as basic human rights principles. 
6. We reiterate the right of the Syrian people to defend itself. In this vein, we commit to 
support the opposition groups respecting democratic and pluralistic values, as stated in 
the national covenant adopted by the opposition in July 2012, recognizing the political 
authority of the Syrian National Coalition and accepting the prospect of a democratic 
transition. We fully back the opposition groups in their action against Al-Qaeda affiliated 
groups. We condemn the presence of foreign fighters in Syria, both those fighting with 
the regime such as Hezbollah and other Iranian backed forces, and those fighting within 
other extremist groups. We call on the international community to do their part to ensure 
that the extremists don’t deny the Syrian people the opportunity to realize their 
democratic aspirations. 
7. The Geneva II Conference aims to allow the Syrian people to control its future 
through a genuine political transition. It is of utmost importance that these goals should 
be reached.  
 
 
 
Media Note 
Office of the Spokesperson 
Washington, DC 
May 8, 2014 
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/05/225807.htm 
accessed March 3, 2017 
 
Secretary Kerry met today with Syrian Opposition Coalition President Jarba at the 
Department of State. He and President Jarba had a productive discussion on the full 
range of our shared concerns in Syria, including empowering the moderate political and 
armed opposition, curbing the rise of extremism, completing the work of removing 
chemical weapons, and easing humanitarian suffering. 
As part of our continued efforts to bolster the moderate Syrian opposition and help the 
Coalition serve the interests of all Syrians, the Secretary also discussed with President 
Jarba some additional measures we are taking to support the Coalition, local 
communities inside Syria, and members of the moderate, armed opposition. These 
steps include our announcement that the Coalition’s representative offices in the United 
States are now foreign missions; working with Congress to provide more than $27 
million in new non-lethal assistance to the Syrian opposition; stepping up deliveries of 
non-lethal assistance to commanders in the Free Syrian Army to enhance their logistical 
capabilities; and, as announced earlier today by the Department of the Treasury, 
imposing new sanctions and restrictions against members of the regime and its 
supporters who have suppressed the Syrian people. 
Additionally, the Secretary reaffirmed to President Jarba that the United States remains 
committed to working towards a negotiated political solution that puts an end to the 
violence and ultimately leads to a representative government that is responsive to the 
needs of the Syrian people. The United States has led the international community’s 
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efforts to advance a political transition, and the Secretary commended the Coalition’s 
commitment to that goal. 
 
 
Media Note 
Office of the Spokesperson 
Washington, DC 
May 15, 2014 
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/05/226110.htm 
accessed March 3, 2017 
 
Following is the text of the communique agreed upon by the Ministers of the London 11 
countries at a meeting held in London on May 15, 2014. 
Begin text: 
We the countries of the ‘London 11’ Core Group of the Friends of Syria denounce the 
Assad regime’s unilateral plan to hold illegitimate presidential elections on 3 June. This 
mocks the innocent lives lost in the conflict, utterly contradicts the Geneva communiqué 
and is a parody of democracy. Under rules set by the regime, such elections will be 
devoid of political participation of millions of Syrians. We call on the entire international 
community to reject these illegitimate elections, as the Arab League, United Nations, 
United States of America, Turkey and the European Union have already done. 
We have agreed unanimously to take further steps together, through a coordinated 
strategy, to: increase our support for the moderate opposition National Coalition, its 
Supreme Military Council and associated moderate armed groups; hold the Assad 
regime accountable for the terror it is perpetrating against its own people and spreading 
across the region, including through Security Council referral to the International 
Criminal Court; counter the rising forces of extremism; complete the removal of Syria’s 
chemical weapons; and step up efforts to deliver humanitarian aid across borders and 
across lines irrespective of the consent of the regime. We have directed our officials to 
implement a Core Group action plan. 
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APPENDIX B: 
IRB APPROVAL AND EMAIL TEXT TO INTERVIEWEES 
 
 
2/7/2017  
Konrad Trautman School of Interdisciplinary Global Studies  
RE: Expedited Approval for Initial  Review  
IRB#: Pro00029448  
Title: Strategic Negligence: Why the United States Failed to Provide 
Military Support to the Syrian Resistance from 2011-2014  
Study Approval Period: 2/7/2017 to 2/7/2018  
Dear Mr. Trautman:  
On 2/7/2017, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) reviewed and 
APPROVED the above application and all documents contained 
within, including those outlined below.  
Approved Item(s):  Protocol Document(s):  dis irb protocol version 
1 .docx 
Consent/Assent Document(s)*:  dis irb informed consentv1 
Feb1.docx.pdf  
*Please use only the official IRB stamped informed consent/assent 
document(s) found under the "Attachments" tab. Please note, these 
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consent/assent documents are valid until the consent document is 
amended and approved.  
It was the determination of the IRB that your study qualified for 
expedited review which includes activities that (1) present no more than 
minimal risk to human subjects, and (2) involve only procedures listed 
in one or more of the categories outlined below. The IRB may review 
research through the expedited review procedure authorized by 
45CFR46.110 and 21 CFR 56.110. The research proposed in this study 
is categorized under the following expedited review category: 
(7) Research on individual or group characteristics or behavior 
(including, but not limited to, research on perception, cognition, 
motivation, identity, language, communication, cultural beliefs or 
practices, and social behavior) or research employing survey, interview, 
oral history, focus group, program evaluation, human factors evaluation, 
or quality assurance methodologies.  
As the principal investigator of this study, it is your responsibility to 
conduct this study in accordance with IRB policies and procedures and 
as approved by the IRB. Any changes to the approved research must be 
submitted to the IRB for review and approval via an amendment. 
Additionally, all unanticipated problems must be reported to the USF 
IRB within five (5) calendar days.  
We appreciate your dedication to the ethical conduct of human subject 
research at the University of South Florida and your continued 
commitment to human research protections. If you have any questions 
regarding this matter, please call 813-974-5638.  
Sincerely,  
  
John Schinka, Ph.D., Chairperson USF Institutional Review Board  
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Email text to: 
Ambassador (retired) Robert Ford and  
Lieutenant General (LTG) (retired) Charles Cleveland 
For the Dissertation  
Konrad Trautman 
#Pro00029448 
 
 January 31, 2017 
 
Email From: Konrad Trautman, trautman2@mail.usf.edu 
Email To: Ambassador (retired) Robert Ford and  
Lieutenant General (LTG) (retired) Charles Cleveland 
 
 
 
Subject: Request to Interview You for a Dissertation Concerning the Syrian Rebellion 
 
Gentlemen, 
I am Konrad Trautman, a PhD candidate at the University of South Florida (USF).  My 
dissertation concerns the early years of the Syrian rebellion and I would like to interview 
each of you to solicit your insights into the dissertation’s research question and key 
supporting questions.  I am asking for your participation because you were key 
participants or observers to major elements of the research question and the supporting 
subordinate questions. 
 
This is a voluntary study. 
 
My research question is: Why and how did the US military miss the opportunity to 
provide military support to the moderate Syrian resistance in the March 2011 – June 
2014 period? 
 
My hypothesis is: The US military structure and process for providing advice to the 
president and his national security decision-making team are flawed due to the 
marginalization of unconventional warfare (support to resistance movements) expertise.  
This marginalization results in inadequate consideration for applying US unconventional 
warfare as a strategic option for the nation. 
 
The three subordinate questions are: 
  (1) Did a moderate resistance force exist in Syria during this time? 
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  (2) If so, why and how did the US military miss this? 
  (3) What are the implications for national security practitioners? 
 
The specific questions I would like to ask you are listed below, but your responses may 
likely lead to follow-on questions.  I would like to ask each of you the first three 
questions, with the remaining two only addressed to Lieutenant General (retired) 
Cleveland. 
 
 Question 1: During this March 2011 – June 2014 period in, in your judgment did 
the military see and understand the resistance activities and potential in Syria?  If not, 
why not? 
 
 Question 2: During this period, did the military develop military options to support 
to the Syrian resistance?  If not, why not? 
 
 Question 3: Did you see or hear of any indication that the president proactively or 
pre-emptively provided guidance to his national security team to not even consider any 
option to support the resistance movement? (This evidence would support the rival 
hypothesis.) 
 
 Question 4: Are there any bureaucratic-cultural reasons why the conventional 
military would not fully understand the strategic option of support to resistance 
movements? 
 
 Question 5: Are there any structural-functionalism reasons why the military 
decision-making process would marginalize unconventional warfare expertise? 
 
Attached is a USF Informed Consent to Participate in Research Involving Minimal Risk.  
Please read this form, sign it if you agree to participate, and scan/email it back to me.  
Please also advise me on which dates and times would be best for you to conduct the 
interview.  I intend to ask you for a phone call or a Skype interview, at your 
convenience. 
 
I want to also disclose to you that in addition to being a USF doctoral candidate – the 
role in which I am contacting you and conducting this interview – that I am also a 
serving official with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).  The views, opinions, 
conclusions, and recommendations that will develop in this dissertation are solely my 
own and do not represent the views of the Defense Department, DIA, the United States 
Special Operations Command, or any other element of the Federal Government. 
 
If you desire to contact the USF, the identification number for this study is 
Pro#00029448.  My contact information is trautman2@mail.usf.edu and 813-XXX-
XXXX. 
 
Sincerely, 
Konrad Trautman  
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Email text to: 
Senator John McCain 
Major General (MG) (retired) William Rapp 
Dr. Christopher J. Lamb 
For the Dissertation 
Konrad Trautman 
#Pro00029448 
 
October 22, 2017 
 
Email From:  
 Konrad Trautman, trautman2@mail.usf.edu 
Email To:  
Senator John McCain  
Major General (MG) (retired) William Rapp 
Dr. Christopher J. Lamb 
 
 
 
 
Subject: Request to Interview You for a Dissertation Concerning the Syrian Rebellion 
 
Gentlemen, 
I am Konrad Trautman, a PhD candidate at the University of South Florida (USF).  My 
dissertation concerns the early years of the Syrian rebellion and I would like to interview 
each of you to solicit your insights into the dissertation’s research question and key 
supporting questions.  I am asking for your participation because you were key 
participants or observers to major elements of the research question and the supporting 
subordinate questions. 
 
This is a voluntary study. 
 
My research question is: Why and how did the US military miss the opportunity to 
provide military support to the moderate Syrian resistance in the March 2011 – June 
2014 period? 
 
My hypothesis is: The US military structure and process for providing advice to the 
president and his national security decision-making team are flawed due to the 
marginalization of unconventional warfare support to resistance movements) expertise.  
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This marginalization results in inadequate consideration for applying US unconventional 
warfare as a strategic option for the nation. 
 
The three subordinate questions are: 
  (1) Did a moderate resistance force exist in Syria during this time? 
  (2) If so, why and how did the US military miss this? 
  (3) What are the implications for national security practitioners? 
 
The specific questions I have asked all previous participants are listed below.  Based 
upon your familiarity with either the events in Syria during this time or the institutional 
cultural divides within the conventional and unconventional military elements, we will 
tailor the questioning accordingly.  
 
 Question 1: During this March 2011 – June 2014 period in, in your judgment did 
the military see and understand the resistance activities and potential in Syria?  If not, 
why not? 
 
 Question 2: During this period, did the military develop military options to support 
to the Syrian resistance?  If not, why not? 
 
 Question 3: Did you see or hear of any indication that the president proactively or 
pre-emptively provided guidance to his national security team to not even consider any 
option to support the resistance movement? (This evidence would support the rival 
hypothesis.) 
 
 Question 4: Are there any bureaucratic-cultural reasons why the conventional 
military would not fully understand the strategic option of support to resistance 
movements? 
 
 Question 5: Are there any structural-functionalism reasons why the military 
decision-making process would marginalize unconventional warfare expertise? 
 
Attached is a USF Informed Consent to Participate in Research Involving Minimal Risk.  
Please read this form, sign it if you agree to participate, and scan/email it back to me.  
Please also advise me on which dates and times would be best for you to conduct the 
interview.  We may conduct the interview by phone, Skype, or in person, at your 
convenience. 
 
I want to also disclose to you that in addition to being a USF doctoral candidate – the 
role in which I am contacting you and conducting this interview – that I am also a 
serving official with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).  The views, opinions, 
conclusions, and recommendations that will develop in this dissertation are solely my 
own and do not represent the views of the Defense Department, DIA, the United States 
Special Operations Command, or any other element of the Federal Government. 
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If you desire to contact the USF, the identification number for this study is 
Pro#00029448.  My contact information is trautman2@mail.usf.edu and 813-XXX-
XXXX. 
 
Sincerely, 
Konrad Trautman 
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APPENDIX C: 
COPYRIGHT PERMISSION FROM  
THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR 
 
See following two pages. 
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APPENDIX D 
GLOSSARY OF MILITARY TERMS349 
 
Combatant Command — A unified or specified command with a broad 
continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by 
the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and 
assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also called CCMD.  
J-2 – Within a combatant command and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Joint Staff, the staff sections are assigned “J-codes” to designate their functional 
staff specialty.  The J-2 staff section is responsible for intelligence. 
J-3 – Within a combatant command and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Joint Staff, the staff sections are assigned “J-codes” to designate their functional 
staff specialty.  The J-3 staff section is responsible for operations and short range 
or crisis planning. 
J-5 – Within a combatant command and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Joint Staff, the staff sections are assigned “J-codes” to designate their functional 
staff specialty.  The J-5 staff section is responsible for long range or deliberate 
planning. 
																																																								349	US Department of Defense, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 
(Washington, D.C.: The Joint Staff, March 2017), accessed April 1, 2017 at 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/dictionary.pdf 
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Special Forces — United States Army forces organized, trained, and equipped 
to conduct special operations with an emphasis on unconventional warfare 
capabilities. Also called SF.  
Special Operations — Operations requiring unique modes of employment, 
tactical techniques, equipment and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or 
politically sensitive environments and characterized by one or more of the 
following: time sensitive, clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through 
indigenous forces, requiring regional expertise, and/or a high degree of risk.  
Special Operations Forces — Those Active and Reserve Component forces of 
the Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, 
trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called 
SOF.  
Terrorism — The unlawful use of violence or threat of violence, often motivated 
by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs, to instill fear and coerce 
governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are usually political.  
Theater Special Operations Command — A subordinate unified command 
established by a combatant commander to plan, coordinate, conduct, and 
support joint special operations. Also called TSOC.  
Unconventional Warfare — Activities conducted to enable a resistance 
movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or 
occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and 
guerrilla force in a denied area. Also called UW.  
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Unified Command Plan — The document, approved by the President, that sets 
forth basic guidance to all unified combatant commanders; establishes their 
missions, responsibilities, and force structure; delineates the general 
geographical area of responsibility for geographic combatant commanders; and 
specifies functional responsibilities for functional combatant commanders. Also 
called UCP. See also combatant command; combatant commander.  
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